Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI3565
2003-07-30 13:51:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE

Tags:  KISL PREL PHUM TC 
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Cable 
Text: 
 
 
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM July 30, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 3565 - PRIORITY) 

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KISL 

Captions: None 

Subject: POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 03565

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB: MWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL: MMMENARD
CLEARED: CGD: JDAVIS; A/DCM: KVANDEVATE; ECON: OJOHN

VZCZCADI815
PP RUEHC RUEHDE RUEHVV
DE RUEHAD #3565/01 2111351
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301351Z JUL 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1115
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3314
RUEHVV/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003565 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/13
TAGS: KISL PREL PHUM TC
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE

REF: A) STATE 205815 D) ABU DHABI 2715

B) 02 ABU DHABI 3436 E) 02 ABU DHABI 5813
C) 02 ABU DHABI 2548 F) ABU DHABI 2107

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003565

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/13
TAGS: KISL PREL PHUM TC
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM COUNTRY SNAPSHOT: UAE

REF: A) STATE 205815 D) ABU DHABI 2715

B) 02 ABU DHABI 3436 E) 02 ABU DHABI 5813
C) 02 ABU DHABI 2548 F) ABU DHABI 2107


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


2. (U) This message has been coordinated with
AmConsul Dubai.


3. (S/NF) SUMMARY: There is little sign of an active
political Islamic movement in the UAE, primarily as a
result of the UAEG's support and promotion of a
moderate practice of Islam and the underdeveloped
political structure of the UAE (no political parties
or political opposition). There are a number of
groups here with a religious agenda, the vast majority
of which follow a moderate practice of Islam in line
with UAEG policy. The UAEG has used both carrots,
e.g., religious education, and sticks, e.g.,
preemptive steps to check those it perceives to be
under Islamist influence. The small number of Islamic
groups here do not appear to engage in activities that
meet the definition of political Islam. The several
organizations with an Islamist bent thus far have not
collided with that policy, in part as a result of
their active monitoring by the UAEG. Given the
situation on the ground here, we believe that a
continued low-profile approach which reinforces the
moderation espoused by the UAEG will best serve both
our short-term and long-term interests. END SUMMARY.

UAEG Promotes Moderate Practice of Islam
--------------


4. (U) The UAEG espouses and supports in practice a
moderate interpretation of Islam (Ref B),the official
religion of the UAE. Virtually all of the country's
citizens (less than 20 percent of the total
population) are Muslims, with approximately 85 percent
followers of Sunni Islam and the remaining 15 percent
followers of Shi'a Islam. We estimate that
approximately 55 percent of the expatriate population
are Muslim. Expatriates are predominantly from South
and Southeast Asia, but there are also a substantial
number of expatriate Arabs.


5. (U) The UAEG promotes the moderate practice of
Islam in a number of different ways. The Ministry of
Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Awqaf operates as the

central federal regulatory authority for Muslim imams
and mosques and distributes weekly guidance on
religious sermons to mosques and imams, both Sunni and
Shi'a. Emirate-level Departments of Islamic Affairs
also provide oversight over mosques and imams. The
Government ensures that clergy do not deviate
frequently or significantly from approved topics in
their sermons and monitors all sermons for political
content. In June 2003, the UAEG initiated a public
religious education campaign to promote a better
understanding of Islam, including a one-year training
course for 166 imams (Ref D).

UAEG Efforts to Thwart Islamic Extremism
--------------


6. (C) After 9/11, the UAE senior leadership launched
a comprehensive top-down internal security review to
assess the impact of extremist thought and elements on
UAE society. The UAEG closely scrutinized the
activities of the UAE's mosques, schools, academic
institutions, charities and NGOs. The UAEG also
rounded up about 160 people suspected of ties to
extremist groups for questioning. As part of this
review, the UAEG passed comprehensive anti-money
laundering legislation, initiated tighter controls on
funds transferred into and out of the country,
assessed the country's charities and NGOs, and took
steps to eliminate cash fundraising at mosques and
channel all charitable giving through government-
regulated relief organizations. (Ref C)


7. (S/NF) In an effort to reduce the influence of
Islamists in the educational and judicial systems, in
2002 the UAEG either transferred or early retired
around 60-70 educators and government officials
thought to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Although they were much more moderate than Islamists
elsewhere in the Gulf and in Egypt and were not/not
considered extremist in their views, some of those
sidelined are well known for their conservative
philosophy. The UAEG has demonstrated zero tolerance
for the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE, whose ultimate
goal it believes to be regime change and total
imposition of Shari'a law. (Ref E) The small number
of "Islamist" intellectuals in the UAE have been
sidelined. The UAEG continues to monitor those groups
and individuals deemed to be Islamist and/or
affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. (Ref F)

8. (C) Although Islamic studies are mandatory in all
public schools (UAEG-supported schools for primarily
citizen children) and in private schools for Muslim
children, the UAEG has worked to ensure that the study
of Islam is not overemphasized in the educational
systems. There is high-level concern about extremist
influence on school curricula. After 9/11, the UAEG
ramped up its revision of the K-12 public school
curriculum and is gradually replacing the large number
of expatriate Arab public school teachers with Emirati
nationals, over whom the UAEG has better control.
(Ref C)

Political Islam -- Slim to No Presence in the UAE
-------------- --------------


9. (U) The Government has been generally successful
in achieving its goal of a tolerant society. While
citizens regard the country as a Muslim nation that
should respect Muslim sensibilities, and the majority
of them are observant Muslims, society as a whole
places a high value on respect for others and on
Islamic traditions of tolerance. Citizens
occasionally express concern regarding the influence
on Emirati society by the country's foreign majority.
However, in general, citizens are familiar with
foreign societies, believe that they can best balance
foreign influence by supporting and strengthening
indigenous cultural traditions, and do not advocate
for legislation or government based on Islamic
principles.


10. (U) There are no elected institutions, no
political parties in the UAE and no political
opposition to the UAEG. There is also a clear absence
of widespread pressure for opening up the system here.
(Refs B, C) There is an acknowledged Salafi (highly
conservative and Wahhabi-influenced) presence in the
UAE, although there is as yet no identifiable Islamist
political movement in the UAE. (Ref B)


11. (C) As a Muslim country, the UAE hosts a number
of NGOs in the UAE that have religious components as
well as social, educational, cultural and charitable
ones. NGOs here are funded in whole or part by the
UAEG, an effective mechanism of control, and do not
generally receive funding from foreign sources.
Foreign funding, if received, is closely scrutinized
by the authorities. If/when these groups express
anti-American sentiment, it is almost invariably on
grounds of U.S. foreign policy rather than religious
grounds.


12. (C/NF) Most groups with religious components may
sponsor Quranic instruction courses and religious
workshops and lectures on Islam and require/encourage
their members to maintain and uphold Islamic
traditions and values. Examples:

--Dar Al-Bir Society (org. 1979),Dubai
--Women's Union Association (org. 1973),Sharjah
--Umm Al-Quwain Woman's Society (org. 1974),UAQ
--Fujairah Welfare Association (org. 1987),Fujairah
--Nahda Woman's Association (org. 1979),Ras Al-
Khaimah

Available information indicates that these groups
support a moderate view of Islam in line with UAEG
policy, have domestic agendas, and do not advocate an
Islamic government based on Shari'a law. Based on
available information, we believe that these groups
would engage in a democratic/pluralistic process and
do/would respect the rights of others as well as the
principle of alternance of government. Accordingly,
these groups would fall into category D as described
in Ref A para. 4.


13. (C/NF) Several NGOs are public proponents of
Islamic legislation or governance based on Islamic
principles. Available information indicates that
these groups practice a moderate interpretation of
Islam in line with UAEG policy and would be willing to
engage in a democratic, pluralistic process. We do
not have information to conclude that these groups
would not respect the rights of non-Islamists,
secularists and/or minorities. Accordingly, these
groups would fall into category D as described in Ref
A para. 4:

--Reform Society (org. 1994),Dubai
--Jurists Association (org. 1980),Sharjah
--Umm Al-Moumineen Women's Association (org. 1974),
Ajman
--Social Guidance Association (org. 1981),Ajman


14. (C/NF) We have little information on the
following two groups; however, they publicly
acknowledge one of their aims as working against
influences that have a negative impact on their
society. We have no information to suggest that these
two organizations are anti-democratic and anti-
pluralistic. Based on their public acknowledgements,
however, it appears that, if in the unlikely event
they obtained full political power, they might not
respect the rights of non-Islamists, secularists,
and/or minorities. Accordingly, these groups would
fall into category C as described in Ref A para. 4:

--Al Muntada Al Islami (org. 1996),Sharjah
--Irshad and Tawjih (org. 1983),Ras Al-Khaimah

Comment
--------------


15. (C/NF) Under the leadership of President Zayed,
the UAE has practiced a policy of tolerance and
moderation. Our regular engagement with the NGO
community -- in a low-key manner and not in an overtly
political context -- confirms that the UAEG has
largely been successful in this regard. The UAEG has
taken affirmative and preemptive action, without USG
prompting, to ensure that Islamic extremism does not
take root in their country. We expect that the UAEG's
zero-tolerance policy, applied in a thus far
relatively non-repressive manner, will do much to
prevent political Islam from raising its head here.
As discussed in Ref C, our behind-the-scenes
partnership with the Emiratis has worked in both
sides' favor, and we believe that in the UAE, a
continued low-profile, positive reinforcement approach
will serve our short-term as well as long-term
interests in this regard.

WAHBA