CPA Senior Advisor Slocombe Meets UAE Chief of Staff

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003416

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
NSC FOR ABRAMS, THEROUX AND KHALILZAD
DOD FOR OSD/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/22/08
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ TC
SUBJECT: CPA Senior Advisor Slocombe Meets UAE Chief of Staff


1.(U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

2.(C) Senior Advisor Walter Slocombe and UAE Chief of Staff
Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ) discussed the current
situation in Iraq and the workings of the governing council.
Mr. Slocombe reassured MBZ that the U.S. was committed to
rebuilding Iraq and to stay for the "long haul." They discussed
the role of the UN and the international community in Iraq. MBZ
was especially interested in the steps the coalition was taking
to restore security in Iraq and gave suggestions on how to seek
out "untainted" officers for the military. He also raised the
Iranian threat and discussed how the coalition could deal with
the threat of Sunni and Shia extremism. Mr. Slocombe gave an
interview to Abu Dhabi TV where he had the opportunity to
explain coalition activities in Iraq and the Iraq Governing
Council to a wider Arab audience. END SUMMARY.

THE SECURITY SITUATION
--------------


3. (C) Senior Advisor Slocombe, Ambassador Wahba, and DAS John
Scott Carpenter met with UAE Chief of Staff Lt. General Sheikh
Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ) on July 23 to discuss current
developments in Iraq and the efforts of the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraq Governing Council (GC).
MBZ was very interested in the current security situation in
Iraq. He asked whether the U.S had any evidence of foreign
participation in the attacks against coalition forces, and if
so, whether the foreigners had ties to Al-Qaeda. Mr. Slocombe
explained that the coalition had no clear evidence of foreign
involvement in the post-war attacks. He said that we believed
that most of the attacks were carried out by either Saddam's old
security forces or for pay. He noted that, in a country where a
good monthly wage was USD $200, people were being paid $1,500 to
attack coalition troops.


4. (C) They discussed the Iranian threat to Iraqi stability.
MBZ said that he thought that the Iranians had a long-term and a
short-term strategy. In the near term, he said that the
Iranians would provoke the Sunnis against the coalition
presence. Their long-term strategy is to fully infiltrate and
build closer relations with Iraqi Shia. He also advised Mr.
Slocombe that the best way for the coalition to co-opt the Shia
was to encourage them to think of themselves as Iraqis with
religious roots in Karbala not in Qom. He noted that the
Iranians are working hard to convince the Shia to view the
Americans as invaders and present themselves as powerful allies
against the US. DAS Carpenter noted that Iran was spending a
lot of money to build up support among the Iraqi Shia, but that
its money was not buying strong, widespread support.


5. (C) MBZ was interested in the steps that the CPA was taking
to rebuild security in Iraq. He was pleased to hear that the
Iraqis are starting to take a more active role in maintaining
their own security. (There are already approximately 35,000
Iraqi police and plans to hire another 30,000.) He was also
impressed by the plan to build three Iraqi divisions in three
years. He suggested that it would be useful if the CPA could
convince Arab states (specifically mentioning Morocco and
Tunisia i.e. outside of the ME and GCC) to provide military
forces. The participation of an Arab state, even in a "quiet
sector of Iraq" would encourage non-Arab countries to take a
more positive and active role in stabilizing Iraq.

REBUILDING THE MILITARY
--------------


6. (C) MBZ, in response to a question from Mr. Slocombe,
suggested how the CPA could find good military officers that
were not tainted by association with Saddam. First, he said
that the coalition should "look to the north" since 70% of the
officer corps came from the Sunni tribes in the north. If the
coalition wanted an officer corps of 30-40% Sunni, he said, it
needed to look in the area of greatest concentration. Secondly,
he recommended that the coalition look for 2-3 good senior
officers - division or corps commanders or deputies - who had
been purged by Saddam "a long time ago." They would be able to
find good junior and mid-level officers. MBZ specifically
suggested that the coalition consider the governor of Mosul,
Ghanim Bessou who was a respected officer in the Iraqi military
and would know many others who were purged by Saddam. He told
Mr. Slocombe that in a recent conversation with him Ghanim spoke
very highly of the U.S. military forces and the level of
cooperation he enjoyed with them.
DEALING WITH RELIGION
--------------


7. (C) The group also discussed the impact of religion in Iraq
and shared concerns about the efforts of religious groups to
take over the government's role in providing social services and
to dominate civil society. MBZ noted that it didn't matter how
balanced the governing council was if the religious extremists
dominated the society. He also suggested that the CPA increase
its outreach efforts to religious leaders, noting that an Imam
could turn from a "nice guy" to a "Wahabi" overnight if he had a
reason. He suggested that the U.S. bring in U.S. Muslim groups
to reach out to the Iraqi religious community by meeting with
clerics and attending Friday prayers etc. He said that, if it
were him, he would monitor the Friday sermons continuously and
put the Imams on the payroll of a Muslim organization "I could
trust." He noted that if the Imams were well salaried, they
would be less vulnerable to shifting loyalties. MBZ then
suggested that the GC limit the number of new mosques through
building permits and designate those that could offer the main
Friday prayer sermons. Only A-list mosques above a certain size
should have Friday prayer. The rest would be open for regular
prayer. (Note: This would obviously facilitate monitoring of
the Friday sermons and limit large crowds to a designated number
of mosques. End note.) He also gave a telling example of how
the UAE limits numbers and maintains supervision over mosques.
He said that the UAE was building a new housing complex of 3500
homes. When the government looked at the site, it found 46
sites designated for mosques and worried that there was no way
to monitor that many mosques in one neighborhood. The UAEG came
up with a religiously sanctioned answer by noting the saying
that "he who walks further to a mosque is more blessed" and
decreed that there would be a minimum distance of 1000 meters
between mosques.

MEDIA OUTREACH
--------------


8. Mr. Slocombe also gave a brief interview to Abu Dhabi
television on the situation in Iraq. Abu Dhabi TV is the second
most watched Arab television station behind Al-Jazeera. This
was an important opportunity to reach out to a larger Arab
audience with our message on the situation in Iraq and on
coalition efforts there.

ATTENDEES
--------------


9. (C) Other attendees at the meeting included MG Obaid and the
Director of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and
Research on the UAE side and the Defense Attach the Chief of
the US Liaison Office, and Mr. Slocombe's military advisor on
the U.S. side.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) This visit was a very useful opportunity for the CPA to
discuss policy issues and to describe the situation on the
ground to a senior UAE official. The UAE leadership is very well
informed about events in Iraq, through their robust humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance there. While some of his comments
reflected UAE specific concerns, MBZ's recommendations and ideas
reflect his strategic thinking on the broader challenges of
stabilizing Iraq and the region. End Comment


10. (U) This cable has been cleared by Senior Advisor Slocombe.

WAHBA