Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI2861
2003-06-14 12:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM ETTC IR TC 
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Diana T Fritz 03/21/2007 05:40:41 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM June 14, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 2861 - UNKNOWN) 

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, ETTC 

Captions: None 

Subject: SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY BOLTON'S VISIT TO THE 
 UAE 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 02861

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:STWILLIAMS
CLEARED: A/DCM:TEWILLIAMS; DCG:RGOLSON

VZCZCADI737
OO RUEHC RUEHEG RUEHRH RUEKJCS RUCAACC RUCNIRA
RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #2861/01 1651254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141254Z JUN 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0420
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0055
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1270
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA//
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD/CCJ2/CCJ5//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002861 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

CAIRO AND RIYADH PLEASE PASS U/S BOLTON PARTY

NSC FOR THEROUX

DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA

STATE FOR T, NEA/ARP, AND NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ETTC IR TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY
BOLTON'S VISIT TO THE UAE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002861

SIPDIS

NOFORN

CAIRO AND RIYADH PLEASE PASS U/S BOLTON PARTY

NSC FOR THEROUX

DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA

STATE FOR T, NEA/ARP, AND NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ETTC IR TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY
BOLTON'S VISIT TO THE UAE


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


2. (S) Secretary Bolton: Your visit to the UAE
will provide an excellent opportunity to discuss
our concerns about Iran with the UAEG. We have
secured a meeting with de facto Foreign Minister,
Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayid Al-Nahyan, who has primary
responsibility for the UAE's bilateral relationship
with Iran. Unfortunately, Armed Forces Chief of
Staff LTG Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (with
whom you recently met in Washington) will not be in
the UAE at the time of your visit. We have also
scheduled a meeting with the Executive Director of
Dubai Ports and Custom Authority, Sultan bin
Sulayem. Bin Sulayem is our primary interlocutor
on Dubai-related exports controls issues.

IRAN
--------------


3. (S/NF) The UAE has long viewed Iran as a far
greater threat to its existence than that posed by
Iraq. With a small national population (between
600-700,000 Emirati citizens),ten percent of the
world's oil reserves and among the region's most
developed economies, the UAE's vulnerabilities are
not inconsiderable. Chief of Staff Shaykh Muhammad
bin Zayid, in a June 11 meeting, briefed me that in
the recently held GCC Intelligence Chief's semi-
annual meeting, there was consensus that with
Saddam's regime removed, the primary threat in the
region is Iran. The Emiratis have viewed with
alarm Iran's nuclear and WMD-collection effort and
have offered to work with us to coordinate on
intelligence-collection efforts.


4. (S) The combination of Iran's robust illicit
arms collection effort and increasing domestic
instability has greatly unsettled the Emiratis. De
facto FM Hamdan told me June 11 that the UAEG has
determined that Khatami -- in whom they held great
hopes -- has been completely sidelined by the
hardliners. Hamdan shared that it is now President

Zayid's view that the Iranian leadership writ large
cannot be trusted. For the UAE, this has
translated into a major setback in the resolution
of their dispute with Tehran over Iran's occupation
of three islands in the Gulf claimed by the UAE.
Hamdan had personally invested time and prestige --
making several journeys to Tehran -- to hammer out
a resolution on the largest of the three islands,
Abu Musa. At one point last year, Hamdan believed
that a resolution was close and had extended, on
behalf of President Zayid, an invitation to Khatami
to visit the UAE. Those efforts now appear to have
been for naught, though Khatami's invitation still
stands. On June 11, Hamdan briefed that relations
have soured to the point that the Iranians have
arrested an Emirati national of Iranian origins on
espionage charges. This despite, in Hamdan's
words, the "hundreds of Iranian agentsz' the UAEG
knows are operating in the UAE.


5. (C) Despite the UAE's strained political
relationship with Iran, bilateral trade ties are
strong and growing. The number one destination for
goods transshipped through Dubai is Iran, and the
UAE is a major destination for Iranian agricultural
and mass produced consumer products. Abu Dhabi
shares production from an off-shore oil field with
Iran, and monthly consultative meetings proceed
cordially regardless of political developments.
Nonetheless, Abu Dhabi's political concerns
regarding Iran led to the decision to develop the
multi-billion dollar Dolphin project to pipe
natural gas to the UAE from Qatar -- despite the
fact that Iranian gas sources would certainly have
been cheaper, particularly for the northern
Emirates (including Dubai). Business may be
business, but clearly there are limits (especially
for Abu Dhabi),and particularly when it comes to
sensitive national security items like fuel for the
UAE's massive power and water sector.

IRANIAN MEDDLING IN IRAQ
--------------


6. (S) The Emiratis have also expressed grave
concern about what they believe is outright Iranian
meddling in the internal affairs of Iraq. The
Emiratis would like to see a democratic process
unfold in the post-Saddam era, one in which all of
Iraq's ethnic and religious elements are
represented. They fear that Iranian intervention,
particularly via the Badr Corps, may tip the scales
in favor of those advocating a Shi'a/Iranian-style
theocracy.

GETTING TO YES ON AN ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT
--------------


7. (C) Hamdan is committed to finalizing an Article
98 agreement with us, preferably via the exchange
of diplomatic notes. We have traded suggestions on
language and are working through the often
laborious UAE interagency process to schedule a
video teleconference with PM/B. While we had hoped
to have an agreement ready for signature by the end
of June, it now appears that an early fall signing
ceremony is more likely. I recommend that you use
your meeting with Hamdan to press him on the need
for an early closure of this issue.

EXPORT CONTROLS
--------------


8. (C) The UAE political leadership is strongly
committed to working with us on export control
issues and fully recognizes that this is a top
bilateral priority. Internal bureaucratic
wrangling at the federal level over which Ministry
should take the lead on this issue has now been
resolved in favor of the Ministry of Interior. A
USG interagency team is visiting the UAE June 14-16
to relaunch our comprehensive "road map" of export
controls and border security training programs, and
has found strong support at the federal level both
at the MFA and Interior Ministry. The Dubai Ports
and Customs Authority (DPA, which runs Jebel Ali
and Port Rashid, together the 12th largest port in
the world) has separately indicated its interest in
working with us directly on EXBS issues,
particularly enforcement, and DPA is also pursuing
participation in Homeland Security's Container
Security Initiative (CSI).


9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Amconsul
Dubai.

WAHBA