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03ABUDHABI2798 2003-06-11 10:05:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL FRANKS'

Tags:   PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC 
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Diana T Fritz  03/21/2007 05:42:38 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                            June 11, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 2798 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, PARM, MOPS                                 

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL FRANKS' VALEDICTORY VISIT TO   
          THE UAE                                                

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 02798

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   AMB P/M DAO USLO ECON DCM RSO 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:STWILLIAMS
CLEARED: A/DCM:TEWILLIAMS; USLO:CJDAVIS

VZCZCADI636
OO RUCJACC RUEKJCS RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHEHNSC RUEAIIA
RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #2798/01 1621005
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111005Z JUN 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD/CCJ2/CCJ5// IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0365
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 002798 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMB LITT AND CCJ2

NSC FOR THEROUX

DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/13
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL FRANKS'
VALEDICTORY VISIT TO THE UAE

REF: Dubai 2235



1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).



2. (S) General Franks: Your Emirati friends and
the U.S. mission to the UAE are looking forward to
your valedictory visit. As always, UAE Armed
Forces Chief of Staff LTG Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid
Al-Nahyan (MbZ) and Dubai Crown Prince GEN Shaykh
Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR) relish the
opportunity to meet with you and exchange ideas,
but they are naturally disappointed that this will
be your last official visit to the UAE.



3. (S) MbZ visited the U.S. May 18-22, meeting with
the Vice President, NSA Rice, Secretary Powell,
Deputy Secretary Armitage, Secretary Rumsfeld,
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, DCI Tenet, General
Myers, U/S Bolton, A/S Burns, A/S Bloomfield and a
host of senior senators. The visit was very
positive and presented an opportunity for senior
U.S. policymakers and MbZ to exchange views on
Iraq, Iran, the peace process, Syria and the future
of our bilateral military relationship. From
Washington, MbZ traveled to Texas where he met with
Lockheed Martin officials to review the status of
the F-16 Block 60 program; the first Desert Falcon
is due to roll out of the assembly plant this
October and the Emiratis are beginning preparations
for the December 2004 arrival of the first squadron
in the UAE.



--------------------------


SUGGESTED THEMES


--------------------------





3. (S) We propose that you touch on the following
key bilateral military issues, in addition to the
more general themes outlined below in para four:

-- Provide a "look-ahead" on our likely military
footprint both in the UAE specifically and the
region more generally (MbZ, MbR);

-- Urge finalization of the Memorandum of Reference
between our armed forces for the deployment of a
Special Operations unit to Afghanistan (MbZ);

-- Express our appreciation for the superb
coordination and leadership provided for the
establishment of the Air Warfare Center. The
Center will be a model for multilateral training in
the region (MbZ);

-- Focus the UAE military leadership on the need,
as part of our commitment to building and
solidifying our strong military ties, to reengage
seriously on the Defense Cooperation Agreement
(MbZ, MbR).



4. (S) More broadly, you may also wish to:

-- Express thanks for the UAE's exemplary support
for U.S. and coalition efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, namely access to bases, logistical
support and intelligence coordination (MbZ, MbR);

-- Pass on our gratitude for the UAE's generous
humanitarian assistance, especially the UAE Armed
Force's establishment of the very successful Shaykh
Zayid hospital in Baghdad and the UAE's efforts to
resupply with equipment and medicine other Iraqi
hospitals and the provision of basic foodstuffs to
the Iraqi people (MbZ);

-- Consult and provide assurances on need to
maintain Iraq's territorial integrity, minimize
external influence (Iran) and manage sectarian
rivalries (MbZ, MbR);

-- Express concerns about the activities of Iraqi
Sunni imam Ahmed Al-Kubaysi (MbZ, MbR).



--------------------------


BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES


--------------------------



Regional Footprint:


--------------------------





5. (S) We have received informal queries from both
CENTAF and NAVCENT regarding the deployment of
assets to the UAE. If appropriate, I would
recommend that you outline with the leadership --
MbR and MbZ -- what we see in terms of our likely
regional footprint, and specifically what we have
in mind for the UAE. The Emiratis have dropped
strong hints at being open to a more robust
presence, including an alternate Air Force command
center, but we need to prepare them for the
direction in which we are likely to move here.

Afghanistan: SOC Deployment


--------------------------





6. (S) We are close to finalizing our Memorandum of
Reference (MOR) with the UAE Armed Forces on the
deployment of a 40-man Emirati Special Operations
contingent to Baghram Air Base. The MOR has become
mired in the Emirati bureaucracy and it may be
worthwhile for you to urge MbZ to nudge the process
forward so that this much anticipated deployment
does not experience any unnecessary delays. As you
know, the UAE continues to play a very helpful role
in Afghanistan, particularly in the provision of
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The
UAE Armed Forces provided the Afghan National Army
with approximately $50 million in assistance in
kind in 2002 and overall humanitarian assistance
has crossed the $30 million mark.

Air Warfare Center


--------------------------





7. (S) MbZ provided the leadership to make possible
the soon-to-be-inaugurated regional Air Warfare
Center at Al-Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi. This
training facility is a joint CENTAF-UAE Air Force
project that will eventually host trainers,
students and aircraft from the GCC and the U.S., UK
and France. With a range close by that is larger
than that located at Nellis AFB, the AWC will
provide an unmatched opportunity for USAF (and
eventually NAVCENT and MARCENT) pilots to hone
their skills in theater. It comes with the added
benefit of offering the perfect setting for our
officers to build long-term relationships with
their Arab and European coalition counterparts.
The AWC represents the UAE leadership's commitment
to increasing interoperability with U.S. and
coalition forces.

Defense Cooperation Agreement


--------------------------





8. (S) We need to discuss a successor agreement to
the dormant, unimplemented Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA), which comes up for renewal in


2006. This will require heavy lifting on both
sides and the sooner we agree on a strategy and
define our "non-negotiable" items, the easier it
will be to proceed with the Emiratis. The past two
years have been quiet on the DCA front, mostly due
to the fact that there have been almost no major
carrier visits to Jebel Ali in Dubai. Fifth Fleet
has already indicated that they would like to send
more carriers our way and we thus anticipate the
potential for future complications relating to the
unimplemented DCA. Your visit would provide a good
opportunity to resurface this important bilateral
military issue.

ATACMs/Predator Update -- (If Raised)


--------------------------





9. (S) We are moving forward with the ATACMs 1A
deal. The Emiratis have agreed to the principles
outlined in what will be a regional Memorandum of
Understanding governing the use of this system. We
are awaiting the provision of P&A and the visit in
July of an U.S. Army team to meet with the Emiratis
to discuss their exact needs.



10. (S) MbZ raised his desire to procure the
Predator B with just about every interlocutor in
Washington. He believes this system will provide
him with the much-needed capability to patrol the
UAE's long coast and ward off on any potential
threats before they reach the shores. MbZ desires
an answer to the UAE's LOR by year's end.



--------------------------


BROADER ISSUES


--------------------------



Concerns About Ahmed Al-Kubaysi


--------------------------





11. (S) We continue to express our concerns to
senior Emiratis -- including MbR, MbZ and MFA
Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid -- about the unhelpful
statements and activities of Iraqi Sunni imam Ahmed
Al-Kubaysi. As you know, the Emiratis had placed
great hopes in Al-Kubaysi to serve as a bridge
between Sunnis and Shi'a in order to avert a Shi'a
majority power grab. Al-Kubaysi, who is even a
controversial figure in Iraqi expat circles in the
UAE, has proven difficult to manage, though our
interlocutors assure us that he is "controllable."
Following our latest expressions of concern, MbR
told Dubai Consul General Olson that he believes
Al-Kubaysi has a positive role to play in effecting
a reconciliation among the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurdish
populations. MbR urged us to use Al-Kubaysi to
counteract what he sees as a creeping Shi'a/Iranian
takeover of Iraq and, along with MbZ and Hamdan,
has offered to intercede with the Iraqi imam and
pass any message the USG would like to have hand-
delivered. I would strongly recommend that you use
this visit to personally raise your concerns about
Al-Kubaysi with both MbZ and MbR.

Iraq: UAE Humanitarian/Medical Assistance


--------------------------





12. (S) As you know, the Emiratis were among the
first in the Arab world to step up to the plate in
providing much-needed humanitarian assistance and
medical relief to the Iraqi people. The Embassy,
the HOC in Kuwait and CENTCOM worked closely with
the UAE Red Crescent Authority to move supplies
into Iraq and transport Iraqi patients to the UAE
for treatment. This cooperation continues though
thanks to the fine system put in place by CENTCOM
and the HOC, the Emiratis are now moving assistance
into Iraq on an almost daily basis using their own
transportation. The Shaykh Zayid hospital in
Baghdad continues to receive hundreds of patients a
day and the Emiratis are now considering adopting
yet another hospital. Since you last visited with
MbZ, he has traveled to Iraq where he toured the
Shaykh Zayid hospital and visited with the UAE
embassy staff in Baghdad.

WAHBA