(S/NF) INFORMATION ON IRAQI SUNNI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002654

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR INR/NESA, NEA/ARP AND NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: (1.6X1)
TAGS: KPRP PINR PGOV PINS PNAT PREL IZ TC
SUBJECT: (S/NF) INFORMATION ON IRAQI SUNNI
CLERIC AHMED AL-KUBAYSI (C-NE3-00474)

REF: A) STATE 120019; B) ABU DHABI 2013


1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


2. (S/NF) Post provides the following information,
gleaned from conversations with resident Iraqis and
Emirati leaders and academics on Iraqi Sunni cleric
Ahmed Al-Kubaysi. It is by no means comprehensive
and we attach the appropriate caveats given the
fact that Al-Kubaysi has become somewhat of a
divisive figure. We note the different spellings
of the subject's name that have appeared in e-mail
traffic. Those with direct knowledge of the
subject assure us that Al-Kubaysi is the correct
English spelling of the name and is derived from
name of the subjects ancestral hometown: Al-
Kubaysah -- on the banks of the Euphrates river
northwest of Baghdad. Subject's last name should
not/not be confused with the Al-Qubaisi tribe of
the Gulf region. Our answers are keyed to ref A
questions:


A. (S) What are Al-Kubaysi's strengths and
limitations? Has he demonstrated an ability to
learn, adapt.

Sixty-eight year-old Ahmed Al-Kubaysi is a popular
Sunni cleric who returned to Baghdad following the
ouster of Saddam in April after five years in exile
in the UAE. Al-Kubaysi is an important Sunni
religious figure who apparently also appeals to
some Shi'a elements, according to expat Iraqis in
the UAE as well as senior UAEG officials. Given
the extent of his apparent influence, Al-Kubaysi's
message is critical. Emirati leaders promoted Al-
Kubaysi early on, hopeful that he would help curb
Iranian influence and, conversely, serve as a
unifying force for Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a.
Following his strident April 18 sermon at the Abu
Hanifa Mosque in Baghdad, and our expressions of
concern, the Emiratis worked with Al-Kubaysi to
encourage a more measured tone. Following this
Emirati engagement, we have noted a slight
moderation. For example, in a May 8 interview with
the English language Dubai-based "Gulf News" Al-
Kubaysi warned against forming an Islamic
government in Iraq "at this time." When asked
about his call for a "jihad," Al-Kubaysi said "It
would not be to the advantage of the Iraqis to
fight the Americans at this time."


B. (S) Who is included in Al-Kubaysi's decision
making? What role do advisors and staff play? How
open is the leader to outside ideas?

It is unclear to us the extent of Al-Kubaysi's
organization. According to the local press and
expatriate Iraqis, Al-Kubaysi, following his return
to Baghdad, established the Iraqi Muslim Scholars
Association (comprising Sunni and Shi'a clerics)
and a political party -- the Iraqi Unified National
Movement (NFI). Expat Iraqis in the UAE tell us
that the clerics' "association" or committee is
modeled after Rafsanjani's Expediency Council in
Iran (NFI). Al-Kubaysi is closely aligned with the
UAE leadership in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. The UAE
leadership have repeatedly told us that they can
influence his message and activities. The Emiratis,
given their stake in his success, are working
closely with Al-Kubaysi to sensitize him to U.S.
policy objectives in Iraq.


C. (S) What are the equities of those involved?

For the Emiratis, Iran poses an existential threat
and anything that strengthens Iranian regional
ambitions is of concern to the UAE. The Emiratis
are worried about the potential for an Iranian-
influenced Shi'a theocracy in Iraq which in their
view would encourage similar Shi'a movements
elsewhere on the Arabian peninsula, resulting in
further regional instability. Thus, they view Al-
Kubaysi as a possible counterweight to potential
Iranian influence in Iraq. Given the fact that the
Sunni comprise between only 20-30% of Iraq's
population, the Emiratis want to ensure that
whatever Sunni religious leader emerges is
moderate, open to outside ideas and, perhaps most
importantly, has appeal among Sunnis and Shi'a.


D. (S) What is the quality of information the
leader relies upon to reach conclusions? Does it
vary from issue to issue? To what degree is
information reaching the leader politicized?

Unclear. The UAE has tried to sensitize Al-Kubaysi
to U.S. foreign policy concerns and has urged
moderation.


E. Through J. (U) Post does not yet have the
answers to these questions. As we develop further
information, we will forward it.


K. (S) What is the leader's tribal affiliation, if
any? Are they religious?

According to a reliable local Iraqi expat source,
Al-Kubaysi does not have a prominent tribal
affiliation. Rather, his name comes from his
family's hometown -- Al-Kubaysah -- on the banks of
the Euphrates river. Al-Kubaysi himself was born
in Fallujah, another Sunni stronghold. He is
religious. He is a Sunni from the Hanafi school
and while in Dubai, was in charge of a weekly
religious affairs program on Dubai TV. He also
helped draft the UAE's personal status law and
served as an advisor to the court of Dubai Crown
Prince Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum.


L. (S) Where was leader educated?

We have been told that he was educated at Al-Azhar
and also studied in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (NFI).


M. (S) What languages does the leader speak?

Arabic. His English is reportedly quite poor.


N. (S) Describe the leader's professional
background and family background?

Before fleeing Iraq in 1998, Al-Kubaysi reportedly
was one of Iraq's most prominent Sunni imams; he
was also a professor of Islamic Studies at Baghdad
University. As we noted above, when he moved to
the UAE, he was employed by Dubai TV and served as
an advisor to the Dubai government. The Al-Kubaysi
family is apparently quite wealthy and is rumored
to have made its money -- in the old days -- from
smuggling.


O. (S) Does the leader have ties to other
countries?

Al-Kubaysi has strong ties to the UAE, as noted
above. We have also heard that he has some ties to
the Saudi ruling family (NFI).


WAHBA