Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI1828
2003-04-15 12:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

TFIZ01: UAE TO DEPLOY LARGE MILITARY FIELD

Tags:  PHUM MARR MOPS EAID PREL PGOV IZ TC 
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Diana T Fritz 05/24/2007 04:30:13 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM April 15, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1828 - UNKNOWN) 

TAGS: PHUM, MARR, MOPS, EAID, PREL, PGOV 

Captions: None 

Subject: TFIZ01: UAE TO DEPLOY LARGE MILITARY FIELD HOSPITAL TO 
 BAGHDAD 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 01828

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: RSO AMB ECON DCM P/M 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DCM: RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: ECON:TEWILLIAMS
CLEARED: ECON:CMC, POL:STW, USLO:CAD

VZCZCADI476
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHDE RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RHEFDIA
RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUCJACC
DE RUEHAD #1828/01 1051244
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 151244Z APR 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9448
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J2/J3/J5/UNMA// IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA// IMMEDIATE
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ5// IMMEDIATE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 3045
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001828 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IRAQ TASK FORCE, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA,
PM FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD, ALSO PMAT

SECDEF FOR USEC FEITH, ALSO PRINCIPAL D/USEC RYAN
HENRY

KUWAIT FOR HOC AND ORHA

NSC FOR ABRAMS AND P/E KHALILZAD

E.O. 12958: DECL 04/15/13
TAGS: PHUM MARR MOPS EAID PREL PGOV IZ TC
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: UAE TO DEPLOY LARGE MILITARY FIELD
HOSPITAL TO BAGHDAD

REF: ABU DHABI 1827

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001828

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IRAQ TASK FORCE, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA,
PM FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD, ALSO PMAT

SECDEF FOR USEC FEITH, ALSO PRINCIPAL D/USEC RYAN
HENRY

KUWAIT FOR HOC AND ORHA

NSC FOR ABRAMS AND P/E KHALILZAD

E.O. 12958: DECL 04/15/13
TAGS: PHUM MARR MOPS EAID PREL PGOV IZ TC
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: UAE TO DEPLOY LARGE MILITARY FIELD
HOSPITAL TO BAGHDAD

REF: ABU DHABI 1827


1. (U) Classified by DCM Richard A. Albright for
reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


2. (U) This is an action message -- please see
paragraph five.


3. (C) UAE Chief of Staff (and de facto Defense
Minister) Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid (MBZ) called the
Ambassador 4/14 to relate that the UAEG planned to
deploy a large military field hospital to Baghdad and
urgently sought consultations with the USG on
modalities. Econchief and USLO Deputy Chief met later
that evening with UAE Armed Forces Deputy COS MG Hamad
Al-Thani Al-Rumaithi and his senior staff to get a
briefing on the UAE proposal. Al-Rumaithi said the
UAE military would have ready to deploy in about one
week a one hundred bed field hospital, 210 military
staff (120 medical, 90 support/security),50 vehicles,
associated equipment, and enough supplies for 14-25
days. This same capability had been deployed in
KOSOVO for 18 months and had a sustained capacity to
treat about 250 patients per day. The initial UAE
concept is to ship the vehicles and supplies to Umm
Qasr, fly the personnel to Kuwait, road march the
forces to Umm Qasr and then proceed overland (with
appropriate coalition escorts/clearances) to Baghdad
for a 90-day plus total deployment.


4. (C) Econchief welcomed the proposal and noted
that the mission would do everything it could to
facilitate. He asked if the UAE would consider
deploying to a location other than Baghdad if the need
elsewhere in Iraq proved more compelling. Al-Rumaithi
demurred, saying the UAEG preferred to be in Baghdad,
and hoped to find a suitable building (abandoned or
for rent) which it might move into. While the field
hospital was capable of operating out of tents, the
DCOS said arrangements would be simpler and more
comfortable in a more permanent structure. USLO
Deputy Chief said he would pass on all the relevant
information to the appropriate coalition authorities;
would the UAE have any problem being under full
coalition operational control? Al-Rumaithi said this
would be absolutely no problem. As a first step, USLO
Deputy Chief suggested that an Emirati advance team
(advon) meet with appropriate coalition officials
(once identified) to get a better sense of modalities
and timing; he also suggested that UAE LNOs at Centcom
Forward be fully briefed on the CONOPS -- the Emiratis
said this would be done.


5. (S) Comment and action request: Highlighting the
domestic and regional political significance of this
action, UAE President Zayid has already announced
publicly that the military hospital will be deployed
to Iraq (see reftel). The Emiratis clearly want to be
in Baghdad and, given the UAE leadership investment in
this effort, we strongly recommend active support to
facilitate this deployment. Welcoming and
facilitating this Emirati contribution will send a
strong political signal to Arab governments and
publics about our willingness to permit them a
significant role in Iraq humanitarian relief and
reconstruction and will open the door to broader Arab
contributions. Furthermore, having 210 uniformed
Emirati military personnel on the ground could ease
the way for a broader UAE/GCC military role in Iraq
stabilization.


6. (C) Comment and action request, continued: We
need have no concerns with regard to the capabilities
or competence of the Emiratis; they have done this all
before (the same hospital and staff spent 18 grueling
months in KOSOVO where they received high marks as
part of the UAE's broader military deployments there),
are extremely well-equipped and professional and their
support requirements from us will be minimal. The
most important step now is to make the deployment
happen, and as quickly as possible, by lashing up
their ADVON with the appropriate parties. We will
continue to coordinate closely with the HOC, ORHA and
CENTCOM on this deployment of very real operational
and political significance, and request that all
involved do all they can to support and expedite.

WAHBA