Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
03ABUDHABI1700 | 2003-04-08 12:28:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
null Diana T Fritz 05/24/2007 04:35:03 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results Cable Text: SECRET SIPDIS TELEGRAM April 08, 2003 To: No Action Addressee Action: Unknown From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1700 - UNKNOWN) TAGS: EFIN, PTER, ETTC, ECON Captions: None Subject: TERRORIST FINANCING: CONCERNS REGARDING HUMAN APPEAL INTERNATIONAL Ref: None _________________________________________________________________ S E C R E T ABU DHABI 01700 SIPDIS CXABU: ACTION: ECON INFO: AMB P/M DCM POL Laser1: INFO: FCS DISSEMINATION: ECON CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA DRAFTED: ECON:TEWILLIAMS CLEARED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT, PMIL:MFOWLER, POL:STW, CGD:ROLSON VZCZCADI185 OO RUEHC RUEHKU RUEHVJ RUEHRH RUEHDO RUEHDE RUEATRS DE RUEHAD #1700/01 0981228 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 081228Z APR 03 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9323 INFO RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0837 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0033 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1242 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0954 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3014 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001700 |
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARCELLE M. WAHBA
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D). 2. (S/NF) Post read with interest ref A reporting concerning Human Appeal International (HAI). We were unclear, however, as to the sourcing of the information. Some factual inaccuracies, for example, the assertion in para. three of ref A, that the Muslim Brotherhood has been designated by the USG as a Middle East terrorist organization, suggest that some of this information, may be of questionable provenance. With reference to the HAI employee currently being detained, we would note that one bad employee does not make an entire organization male fide. ORCA at post has not been able to confirm the substance of these allegations; we therefore would very much appreciate clarification with regard to the origin of this information. We also request that the Department forward to us (via intel channels if necessary) the case summary regarding HAI. 3. (S/NF) HAI is the third-largest charitable organization in the UAE. It is federally registered and licensed (via the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs) and is reportedly closely connected to the ruling family of Ajman emirate, where the organization is based. As noted in ref B, we have seen no evidence to suggest that the leadership of HAI is male fide (i.e., actively and knowingly operating in support of terrorist groups). If such information were available and compelling, we strongly believe that the UAE authorities would act promptly but quietly to replace the charity's management and stop any support for terrorist groups. 4. (S/NF) Previous actions by HAI and the UAEG in response to our concerns regarding support for Chechen groups demonstrates the willingness of the charity itself, and the government of the UAE, to act to prevent abuse. Our previous quiet representations led to the UAEG intervening quietly with HAI. As a result of those approaches, HAI stopped funding those Chechen groups of concern to us -- although we would note that, from the Emirati perspective, our view with regard to which Chechen groups were or were not involved in "terrorist" activity has tended to fluctuate over time. The UAE Central Bank Governor has frequently pointed to the HAI/Chechen issue, noting that the USG had initially not opposed support to these groups, but later changed position. The Governor has suggested that post facto condemnation by the USG regarding alleged support for "terrorist groups" in Chechnya would have greater resonance if our own thinking regarding these groups had been consistent over time. 5. (S/NF) Clearly, there are sensitivities here about charities, and about HAI in particular given the previous imbroglio over aid to Chechen groups. The key point to be emphasized is that the UAE has been an invaluable ally in the war against terrorism and terrorist financing. The UAE has been instrumental in the capture of a number of senior Al-Qaida operatives and that cooperation is ongoing. The UAE also continues to freeze more than two million USD belonging to the Al-Barakat organization, and has provided literally tens of thousands of pages of bank records and other documents -- including orginals when necessary -- that are crucial to the Moussaoui trial and to our ongoing investigation into the 9/11 case. With the capture of a top Al-Qaida 9/11 financier during the raid on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, we anticipate that there will be more requests that we will need to make of the UAE as we trace AQ's financial flows -- the Central Bank Governor has indicated that he will welcome those inquiries. To needlessly antagonize the UAEG by publicly embarrassing them via listing of HAI -- even if it is only listing of branch offices -- strikes us as potentially highly counter-productive. That such a listing might be made on the basis of inaccurate information would undermine our ability to work constructively with the Central Bank and the UAEG more broadly. 6. (S/NF) As noted above, the UAEG has given every sign of being prepared to act against groups quickly and decisively -- once credible information is provided. In the post-9/11 environment, the UAE permitted, for example, the vetting of the Muhammad Bin Rashid Charitable Foundation in Dubai by a USG team (which found no evidence of wrong-doing; our intel proved inaccurate). The MbR Foundation is directly associated with the de facto ruler of Dubai, so a willigness to open its books to us represented a real leap of faith on the part of the UAEG -- but also a strong commitment to making sure that UAE funds were not being misused. Based upon our experience here, we believe that if we have a compelling case, we should go to the Emiratis at the political level and enlist their support for a thorough vetting of the organization. But listing HAI as a terrorist organization based on unsupported assertions of links to a cast of terrorist organizations will not help us address any problems which may exist. It is essential that we see the basis of every assertion and the case summary on which these listing recommendations are being made. This is likely to achieve both a thorough investigation and effective measures to address any problem. Wahba |