TERRORIST FINANCING: CONCERNS REGARDING HUMAN APPEAL INTERNATIONAL

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARCELLE M. WAHBA
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D).

2. (S/NF) Post read with interest ref A reporting
concerning Human Appeal International (HAI). We
were unclear, however, as to the sourcing of the
information. Some factual inaccuracies, for
example, the assertion in para. three of ref A,
that the Muslim Brotherhood has been designated by
the USG as a Middle East terrorist organization,
suggest that some of this information, may be of
questionable provenance. With reference to the HAI
employee currently being detained, we would note
that one bad employee does not make an entire
organization male fide. ORCA at post has not been
able to confirm the substance of these allegations;
we therefore would very much appreciate
clarification with regard to the origin of this
information. We also request that the Department
forward to us (via intel channels if necessary) the
case summary regarding HAI.

3. (S/NF) HAI is the third-largest charitable
organization in the UAE. It is federally
registered and licensed (via the Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs) and is reportedly closely
connected to the ruling family of Ajman emirate,
where the organization is based. As noted in ref
B, we have seen no evidence to suggest that the
leadership of HAI is male fide (i.e., actively and
knowingly operating in support of terrorist
groups). If such information were available and
compelling, we strongly believe that the UAE
authorities would act promptly but quietly to
replace the charity's management and stop any
support for terrorist groups.

4. (S/NF) Previous actions by HAI and the UAEG in
response to our concerns regarding support for
Chechen groups demonstrates the willingness of the
charity itself, and the government of the UAE, to
act to prevent abuse. Our previous quiet
representations led to the UAEG intervening quietly
with HAI. As a result of those approaches, HAI
stopped funding those Chechen groups of concern to
us -- although we would note that, from the Emirati
perspective, our view with regard to which Chechen
groups were or were not involved in "terrorist"
activity has tended to fluctuate over time. The
UAE Central Bank Governor has frequently pointed to
the HAI/Chechen issue, noting that the USG had
initially not opposed support to these groups, but
later changed position. The Governor has suggested
that post facto condemnation by the USG regarding
alleged support for "terrorist groups" in Chechnya
would have greater resonance if our own thinking
regarding these groups had been consistent over
time.

5. (S/NF) Clearly, there are sensitivities here
about charities, and about HAI in particular given
the previous imbroglio over aid to Chechen groups.
The key point to be emphasized is that the UAE has
been an invaluable ally in the war against
terrorism and terrorist financing. The UAE has
been instrumental in the capture of a number of
senior Al-Qaida operatives and that cooperation is
ongoing. The UAE also continues to freeze more
than two million USD belonging to the Al-Barakat
organization, and has provided literally tens of
thousands of pages of bank records and other
documents -- including orginals when necessary --
that are crucial to the Moussaoui trial and to our
ongoing investigation into the 9/11 case. With the
capture of a top Al-Qaida 9/11 financier during the
raid on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, we anticipate that
there will be more requests that we will need to
make of the UAE as we trace AQ's financial flows --
the Central Bank Governor has indicated that he
will welcome those inquiries. To needlessly
antagonize the UAEG by publicly embarrassing them
via listing of HAI -- even if it is only listing of
branch offices -- strikes us as potentially highly
counter-productive. That such a listing might be
made on the basis of inaccurate information would
undermine our ability to work constructively with
the Central Bank and the UAEG more broadly.

6. (S/NF) As noted above, the UAEG has given
every sign of being prepared to act against groups
quickly and decisively -- once credible information
is provided. In the post-9/11 environment, the UAE
permitted, for example, the vetting of the Muhammad
Bin Rashid Charitable Foundation in Dubai by a USG
team (which found no evidence of wrong-doing; our
intel proved inaccurate). The MbR Foundation is
directly associated with the de facto ruler of
Dubai, so a willigness to open its books to us
represented a real leap of faith on the part of the
UAEG -- but also a strong commitment to making sure
that UAE funds were not being misused. Based upon
our experience here, we believe that if we have a
compelling case, we should go to the Emiratis at
the political level and enlist their support for a
thorough vetting of the organization. But listing
HAI as a terrorist organization based on
unsupported assertions of links to a cast of
terrorist organizations will not help us address
any problems which may exist. It is essential that
we see the basis of every assertion and the case
summary on which these listing recommendations are
being made. This is likely to achieve both a
thorough investigation and effective measures to
address any problem.

Wahba