Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ABUDHABI1624
2003-04-05 13:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

IRAQI EXPATS URGE COALITION TO STAY

Tags:  KPAO PGOV PREL IZ TC 
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Diana T Fritz 05/24/2007 04:37:23 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM April 05, 2003


To: No Action Addressee 

Action: Unknown 

From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1624 - UNKNOWN) 

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KPAO 

Captions: None 

Subject: IRAQI EXPATS URGE COALITION TO STAY THE COURSE; OFFER 
 SUGGESTIONS ON TACTICS 

Ref: None 
_________________________________________________________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 01624

SIPDIS
CXABU:
 ACTION: POL 
 INFO: ECON PAO RSO AMB DCM P/M 
Laser1:
 INFO: PAO 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DCM:RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:STWILLIAMS
CLEARED: ECON:TEWILLIAMS

VZCZCADI018
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RHEFDIA RUEKJCS
RUEKJCS RUCJACC
DE RUEHAD #1624/01 0951321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051321Z APR 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9251
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J2/UNMA// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA// PRIORITY
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2// PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001624 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IRAQ PD TASKFORCE

STATE ALSO FOR NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP

CENTCOM FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/5/13
TAGS: KPAO PGOV PREL IZ TC
SUBJECT: IRAQI EXPATS URGE COALITION TO STAY
THE COURSE; OFFER SUGGESTIONS ON
TACTICS


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001624

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IRAQ PD TASKFORCE

STATE ALSO FOR NEA/NGA AND NEA/ARP

CENTCOM FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/5/13
TAGS: KPAO PGOV PREL IZ TC
SUBJECT: IRAQI EXPATS URGE COALITION TO STAY
THE COURSE; OFFER SUGGESTIONS ON
TACTICS



1. (U) Classified by DCM Richard Albright, for
Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).


2. (SBU) We recently met with two well-placed
Iraqi expats who expressed gratitude for
coalition efforts to rid Iraq of WMD and change
the regime. Describing President Bush as a
"savior," they advised us not to pay too much
attention to the toxic tone of the Arab
"street." They thanked the U.S. for the
sacrifices made by the service members who have
died as a result of the conflict and predicted
that the liberated Iraqi people would construct
a memorial to the fallen American and British
soldiers. Our Iraqi interlocutors provided some
potentially useful advice on how to better
manage the information war and offered
suggestions that might assist the tactical
effort. They described the next two weeks as
critically important to the success of the
campaign. As they put it, we are in
mathematical terms at "the point of inflection"
(i.e., when a convex shape turns concave or vice
versa).


3. (C) Polchief and senior PAO FSN visited over
the local weekend with two members of the large
Iraqi expat community in the UAE. Dr. Ala'a Al-
Tamimi was a senior official in the Iraqi
Ministry of Industry until he fled the country
in August 1991; after spending several years in
Jordan, he transferred to the UAE where he works
for the Abu Dhabi Department of Planning. Al-
Tamimi told us he designed and oversaw the
construction of one of Saddam's bunkers on the
Tigris. Dr. Niazi Sadiq has lived in the UAE
for thirty years and hails from Baghdad. Their
suggestions, detailed below, were offered in a
spirit of friendship; our interlocutors are
eager to see the conflict end and, along with
many Iraqis living in exile, they want to return
to rebuild their homeland. They put forward the
following suggestions:

-- TEAR DOWN POSTERS OF SADDAM. As much as
possible, we should remove visuals of Saddam in
liberated areas. Rumors abound that Saddam has cut
some kind of deal with the U.S. to remain in power

and the fact that these posters have not been torn
down feeds the conspiracy theories.

-- LEAFLET, LEAFLET, LEAFLET! Drop leaflets on a
daily basis over Baghdad updating the population on
the course of the campaign. Use photographs of
Iraqis desecrating Saddam's image (ideally, one like
the recent photo of an Iraqi taking a shoe to a
picture of Saddam's face). It is more important
that Iraqis see other Iraqis taking on regime
symbols than to see gun-toting American/British
soldiers. The leaflets, in Arabic, should provide
updates on what cities have been taken and where
coalition forces are in the country. They should
reassure Iraqis that "this time," the U.S. is here
to finish the job. We should also use leaflets to
address the Fedayeen, urging them to return to their
families and abandon the dying regime. We should
never underestimate how information-deprived Iraqis
are; they have received a steady diet of regime-
orchestrated propaganda behind what one of our
interlocutors described as the "Cement Curtain" that
has been Iraq for the last 35 years.

-- USE THE FREE IRAQI FIGHTERS AS YOUR VOICE. When
entering towns and villages, use the integrated FIF
fighters to communicate our message. It's better
for Iraqis to hear this message from someone who
speaks their dialect. Also, whatever radio
broadcasts are beamed in should have announcers with
Iraqi accents, rather than the Lebanese-accented
announcers at Radio Sawa.

-- DON'T HESITATE TO BOMB THE "CIVILIAN SHELTERS".
Al-Tamimi noted that there are 22 "civilian
shelters" in Baghdad. Under each one is a regime
command and control center; he believes this is
where Saddam and his henchmen are hiding. Most
Baghdadis, following the 1991 bombing of the Amariya
shelter, know to stay away from these sites. The
coalition should declare the shelters
military/regime sites and announce, two-three days
in advance, that they will be targeted. Leaflets
should be dropped on Baghdad warning people to avoid
these shelters.

-- DESCRIBING SHI'A HOLY SITES. The regime will
manipulate religious symbols, terminology and
iconography to its benefit, particularly in an
effort to stir up Iraq's large but mostly uneducated
Shi'a population. Coalition spokespersons must use
extreme care when describing Shi'a holy places. For
instance, never say the "Ali Mosque" (in Nasiriya).
This extremely important religious site should
always be referred to as "the Imam Ali Shrine." Ali
must always be referred to as "Imam Ali". (Note:
Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet
Muhammad; he is revered by the Shi'a sect of Islam.
End Note.)

-- REGIME WILL TARGET MOSQUES. Just as the regime
appears to have targeted with a missile attack a
marketplace in a heavily-populated Shi'a
neighborhood in Baghdad, our interlocutors expect
that Saddam's forces will target a Shi'a holy site
in Baghdad in order to blame the strike on the
coalition. A prime target would be the Imam Khadhim
Shrine in Baghdad; if this religious site were to be
damaged, the Shi'a would explode. Al-Tamimi (a
Sunni) compared the importance of this site for
Shi'as with the Ka'aba in Mecca to Muslims as a
whole.

-- TURN THE LIGHTS OFF IN BAGHDAD. Paralyze/cut the
power grid in Baghdad. The regime has placed
Fedayeen Saddam and special Republican Guard units
in every neighborhood to terrorize the population.
With the power out, the units will be cut off from
their commanders and will begin to feel
isolated/afraid. The neighborhood residents may
then feel empowered to go after these young men.

-- KEEP SAHHAF OFF THE AIR. We need to permanently
shut down Iraq TV/radio. The regime uses Sahhaf's
press conferences to send messages, using agreed
upon codes, to commanders in the field and to
intimidate the population. Until these media organs
are switched off, the Iraqi people will hesitate to
rise up.

WAHBA