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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
03ABUDHABI1471 2003-03-28 09:23:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:  

TFIZ01 (EAC): ABU DHABI SITREP NO. 8, MARCH 28

Tags:   ASEC AMGT KHLS PTER PREL EAID PGOV TC 
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Diana T Fritz  05/24/2007 04:43:21 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                           March 28, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1471 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     ASEC, AMGT, PTER, PREL, EAID, PGOV                     

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  TFIZ01 (EAC): ABU DHABI SITREP NO. 8, MARCH 28         

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 01471

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   RSO ECON AMB ADM DCM P/M 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DCM: RALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: ECON:CCRUMPLER
CLEARED: RS:JROONEY P/M:MFOWLER

VZCZCADI703
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEKJCS RUMICEA RUEKJCS RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #1471/01 0870923
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 280923Z MAR 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9106
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 2957
					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001471 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR IRAQ TASK FORCE, ALSO NEA/ARP, NEA/EX,
CA, CA/OCS/NEASA, DS, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/IP/NEA,
DSERCC, S/CT, INR AND M

E.O. 12958: DECL 03/28/13
TAGS: ASEC AMGT KHLS PTER PREL EAID PGOV TC
SUBJECT: TFIZ01 (EAC): ABU DHABI SITREP NO. 8, MARCH 28

REF: A) ABU DHABI 1461 AND PREVIOUS B) STATE 79964



1. (U) Classified by DCM Richard A. Albright, for reasons
1.5 (B) and (D).



--------------------------


General Overview


--------------------------





2. (S/NF) COM convened Abu Dhabi's Iraq Task Force/core
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) at 1000 local time, 3/28 to
review recent threat reporting that potential Iraqi sleeper
cells are operating in and could take action in the UAE
during the period of 27-29 March (ref B). The Task
Force/EAC agreed that Embassy Abu Dhabi, FCS (located
outside of the Embassy compound), and the USGS office in Al
Ain will open as usual 3/29 with full staffing.



--------------------------


Security


--------------------------





3. (S/NF) ORCA provided background to ref B threat
reporting and emphasized that more information regarding
the specific threat to U.S. interests in the UAE would be
forthcoming during the next few days.



4. (S/NF) Concerned that a similar attack (in terms of
timing, targets, choice of weapons, etc.) may be planned
for the UAE, the Ambassador on 3/27 requested UAE Armed
Forces Chief of Staff Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan
to increase security at the Embassy compound and Embassy
residences. RSO echoed this request with his contacts at
the Abu Dhabi Police Department: stationary armed guards
are now posted at the DCM, PAO, P/M, DATT residences, and
additional undercover CID and roving police patrols are
monitoring Embassy staff residences.



5. (S/NF) Based on the new threat reporting, USLO has
implemented a Force Protection Condition upgrade to Delta
for all U.S. military non-combatants in the UAE. Al-
Dhahfra airbase has remained on FPCon Delta since the onset
of hostilities in Iraq.



--------------------------


UAEG Actions/Statements


--------------------------





6. (S/NF) Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayid assured the Ambassador
3/27 that he takes this threat reporting very seriously,
and UAE security services are keeping a close watch on all
Iraqi diplomats, known Mukhabarat, and personnel from Iraqi
front-companies in the UAE. Following the discovery of a
cache of weapons and explosives in the Iraqi Embassy here
during the 1991 Gulf War, the UAEG has been X-raying all
Iraqi diplomatic pouches coming into the country for at
least the last several years.



7. (S/NF) Director of State Security Shaykh Hazza Bin
Zayid Al-Nayhan confirmed to ORCA that one of the men named
in the investigation in Sanaa as a possible Iraqi agent
operating in the UAE is known to State Security and has not
been allowed to enter the country for many years. State
Security continues to search for the other suspects named
in the investigation.



--------------------------


Consular/ American Citizen Issues


--------------------------





8. (C) The Ambassador noted that, unlike in Yemen, there
are many more high-profile American companies, hotels, and
schools in the UAE. In order to minimize the threat to
soft targets, RSO continues to work with the police for
increased armed guard coverage at the American Community
School in Abu Dhabi, the FCS satellite office, and the
construction site for the New Embassy Compound. (Note:
USGS in Al-Ain already has a dedicated security guard as
per its contract with the UAEG. End note.)



9. (U) The Task Force/EAC agreed that the general "safety
and security" warden message disseminated by CONS on 3/27
is sufficient for now.



10. (U) Abu Dhabi Iraq Task Force/EAC will reconvene at
1000 local time, 3/29.


11. (U) Iraq Task Force/EAC members in attendance included
AMB, DCM, RSO, DAO, P/M, POL, ECON, CONS, PAO, USLO.
Wahba