GOI WORRIED ABOUT MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM; LOOKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000585

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/WE, AND SA HOLMES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2007
TAGS: MW PREL SR ZL UN
SUBJECT: GOI WORRIED ABOUT MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM; LOOKING
FORWARD TO WORKING WITH SA HOLMES

REF: A) BELGRADE 148 B) STATE 19796

CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON:1.5 (B)(D).


1. (U) ACTION REQUEST. SEE PARA 8.


2. (C) SUMMARY: THE GOI AND EU ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY
CONCERNED OVER THE POTENTIAL REGIONAL INSTABILITY THAT COULD
BE FOMENTED BY AN INDEPENDENT MONTENEGRO. THE EU BELIEVES
THAT IT IS NOT TOO LATE FOR THE IC TO STALL THE MOMENTUM
TOWARD A REFERENDUM. ACCORDING TO THE ITALIANS, THERE IS A
PERCEPTION AMONG LEADERS IN BELGRADE AND PODGORICA THAT THE
USG HAS RESIGNED ITSELF TO THE INEVITABILITY OF AN
INDEPENDENT EU. WE HAVE REITERATED TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS IN
THE MFA AND ON PRESIDENT CIAMPI'S STAFF THAT THE USG REMAINED
FIRMLY COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE EU TO KEEP MONTENEGRO IN
THE FRY. OUR GOI CONTACTS LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH SA
HOLMES ON BALKAN ISSUES, AND HOPE THAT HE CAN SCHEDULE A STOP
IN ROME ON HIS WAY TO OR FROM THE REGION.


3. (C) ON JANUARY 24, THE HEAD OF THE MFA'S BALKAN OFFICE,
MAURIZIO MASSARI, TOLD POLOFF THAT THE GOI WAS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE PROSPECT OF A REFERENDUM ON
THE STATUS OF MONTENEGRO, AND THE PRECEDENT FOR THE REGION
SHOULD IT RESULT IN AN INDEPENDENT MONTENEGRO. ANOTHER WEAK
STATE, UNABLE TO STAND ON ITS OWN FEET ECONOMICALLY,
POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY WOULD CAUSE FURTHER INSTABILITY IN
THE REGION AND CREATE ANOTHER MONEY PIT FOR INCREASINGLY
SCARCE IC AID FUNDS. AN ADDITIONAL OBVIOUS WORRY WAS THE
POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ON KOSOVO. MASSARI SAID THAT ITALY'S
AND THE EU'S IDEAS WERE "FIRMING UP" REGARDING THE NEED FOR
THE IC TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE AGAINST INDEPENDENCE BOTH IN
PODGORICA AND BELGRADE. THE EU'S VIEW IS IT WAS NOT TOO LATE
FOR THE IC TO ELABORATE A LIST OF DISINCENTIVES TO HELP STALL
THE MOMENTUM TOWARDS A REFERENDUM, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE IC
UNDERSCORING THAT ALL INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE
CHANNELED THROUGH BELGRADE. MASSARI HOPED THAT THE U.S.
WOULD JOIN THE EU IN SUPPORT OF SYG SOLANA'S EFFORTS TO KEEP
MONTENEGRO WITHIN THE FRY.


4. (C) MASSARI SAID THAT THERE WAS A PERCEPTION AMONG SOME
LEADERS, IN BOTH BELGRADE AND PODGORICA, THAT THE USG HAD
RESIGNED ITSELF TO THE INEVITABILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT
MONTENEGRO. THIS PERCEPTION WAS UNDERMINING THE EU'S EFFORTS
TO STOP THE REFERENDUM. POLOFF REITERATED TO MASSARI THAT
THE USG POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. OUR VIEW WAS THAT A STABLE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, WHICH INCLUDED MONTENEGRO,
WAS THE BEST OPTION FOR A SECURE FUTURE FOR MONTENEGRINS AND
SERBS ALIKE. POLOFF EMPHASIZED THAT FRY/MONTENEGRIN LEADERS
SHOULD NOT MISTAKE THE USG'S SLIGHTLY LOWER PROFILE AT THE
MOMENT, IN RELATION TO THE EU'S, FOR SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE
OR A RIFT BETWEEN THE EU AND U.S. ON THIS ISSUE.


5. (C) THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT CIAMPI,
STEFANO STEFANINI, EXPRESSED SIMILAR WORRIES TO POL MC TOM
COUNTRYMAN AND POLOFF ON JANUARY 25. STEFANINI SAID THAT THE
GOI WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE "SECURITY RISK" POSED BY A
SMALL STATE OF ONE-HALF MILLION PEOPLE, FINANCED ALMOST
EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING. THIS "ILLEGAL
SWITZERLAND" IN THE MIDDLE OF THE BALKANS WOULD BE MUCH
HARDER TO CONTROL AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE THAN AS AN ENTITY
WITHIN THE FRY.


6. (C) STEFANINI REPORTED THAT IT BECAME CLEAR TO HIM
DURING PRESIDENT CIAMPI'S JANUARY 17 VISIT TO THE FRY THAT
PRO-INDEPENDENCE MONTENEGRIN POLITICIANS WERE ENCOURAGED BY
WHAT THEY PERCEIVED AS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE EU AND U.S. ON THE
ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE. MASSARI ALSO COMPLAINED THAT EVEN
THOUGH CIAMPI HAD MADE CLEAR IN HIS STATEMENTS AND MEETING
THE GOI'S SUPPORT FOR THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERATION,
THE MONTENEGRIN PRESS REPORTED ITS OWN "INCORRECT" SPIN ON
CIAMPI'S TRIP.


7. (C) COUNTRYMAN REASSURED STEFANINI THAT THE USG REMAINED
FIRMLY COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE EU TO KEEP MONTENEGRO IN
THE FRY. HE USED AMBASSADOR MONTGOMERY'S REMARKS TO
MONTENEGRIN LEADERS, REPORTED REF A, IN WHICH MONTGOMERY
CALLED ON ALL SIDES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EU SPONSORED
DIALOGUE AND WARNED AGAINST HOLDING THE REFERENDUM WITHOUT
THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL PARTIES AND THE IC, AS EVIDENCE THAT
WE WERE IN LINE WITH EU VIEWS. COUNTRYMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
THE U.S. MAY HAVE SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME
OF THE PROCESS, GIVEN THE FACT THAT BOTH PARTIES HAD FAILED,
THUS FAR, TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. WE ARE ALSO BEING REALISTIC
BY STARTING TO THINK ABOUT CONTINGENCIES SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS
REMAIN STALLED AND A REFERENDUM BECOMES MORE IMMINENT. BUT,
EMPHASIZED COUNTRYMAN, THAT SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS
SUPPORT FOR THE REFERENDUM.


8. (C) BOTH MASSARI AND STEFANINI WERE PLEASED TO HEAR THAT
AMBASSADOR HOLMES HAD BEEN APPOINTED AS SA FOR SOUTHEAST
EUROPE (REF B). MASSARI IN PARTICULAR WAS ANXIOUS TO HAVE
HOLMES VISIT ITALY TO DISCUSS STRATEGY ON A RANGE OF BALKAN
ISSUES AND, DEPENDING ON TIMING, WOULD WORK WITH US TO SECURE
HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS IN THE MFA, UP TO AND INCLUDING
SECRETARY GENERAL BALDOCCI. EMBASSY STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT

SIPDIS
ONE OF AMBASSADOR HOLMES' FIRST EUROPEAN STOPS IS ROME.
ITALY, AS HEAD OF THE G-8 BALKAN WORKING GROUP IN 2001, DID
AN EXCELLENT JOB IN STEERING G-8 POLICY AND STATEMENTS ON A
NUMBER OF CRITICAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE KOSOVO ELECTIONS AND
FYROM FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT. AS EU PRESIDENT IN THE LATTER
HALF OF '03, THE GOI WILL PLAY A KEY ROLE IN DRIVING FUTURE
EUROPEAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS. DEPT IS REQUESTED TO
KEEP POST UPDATED ON SA HOLMES' TRAVEL PLANS TO THE REGION.


9. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SEMBLER