Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ROME5624
2002-11-19 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA

Tags:  PREL PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET IT 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005624 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2007
TAGS: PREL PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET IT ITPREL
SUBJECT: ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE
D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA


CLASSIFIED BY: POL M C TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASON 1.5 (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 05624 01 OF 02 191607Z
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005624

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2007
TAGS: PREL PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET IT ITPREL
SUBJECT: ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE
D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA


CLASSIFIED BY: POL M C TOM COUNTRYMAN FOR REASON 1.5 (D)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 05624 01 OF 02 191607Z

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. SEE PARA 7.


2. (C) SUMMARY: ON NOVEMBER 14, MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFRICA BRUNO CABRAS GAVE A READOUT OF THE EU-SADC MEETING,
WHICH FOCUSED ON ZIMBABWE AND MADE NO PROGRESS; REQUESTED
THAT THE SUDAN "TROIKA" BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE GOI;
ARGUED FOR GREATER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOMALIA
PEACE PROCESS; SHARED CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE
IVOIRIAN CRISIS ON THE REGION; AND ASKED FOR EMBASSY
ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING A CONTRACTOR TO TRANSPORT THE
ETHIOPIAN AXUM OBELISK HOME. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
EU-SADC: NO REAL DIALOGUE, JUST THEATRE ON ZIMBABWE
-------------- --------------


3. (C) POLMINCOUNS MET WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFRICA BRUNO CABRAS (AT THE DG'S REQUEST) NOVEMBER 14 FOR AN
OVERVIEW ON AFRICA DEVELOPMENTS. CABRAS OPENED WITH A
READOUT ON THE RECENT EU MEETING WITH THE SOUTHERN AFRICA
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) IN MAPUTO. CABRAS NOTED THAT
THE ZIMBABWE ISSUE "CAST A SHADOW" ON THE MEETING THAT
LIMITED ITS SUCCESS. THE GOZ REFUSED A TEXT THAT COULD HAVE
ESTABLISHED AN EU-SADC TASK FORCE TO WORK ON A SOLUTION TO
ZIMBABWE'S CRISIS, BECAUSE IT WAS "AN INTERNAL AFFAIR."
CABRAS REMARKED, "THERE WAS NO REAL DIALOGUE, JUST THEATRICAL
PRESENTATION. IT DOESN'T AUGUR WELL FOR THE 28 NOVEMBER
MINISTERIAL IN OUAGADOUGOU, WHICH WILL PREPARE FOR THE EU-OAU
(EU-AU) SUMMIT IN COPENHAGEN NEXT APRIL."


4. (C) CABRAS CONTINUED THAT THE EU HAD NO PROSPECTS OR
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 05624 01 OF 02 191607Z
IDEAS ON ZIMBABWE. THE SITUATION WAS BLOCKED BUT NOT
NECESSARILY WORSENING, EU STATES BELIEVED. WHETHER TO INVITE

ZIMBABWE TO THE MEETING HAD BEEN DEBATED IN THE EU UNTIL THE
LAST MINUTE, WITH SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FAVORING THE
ISSUANCE OF THE INVITATION SO AS TO ASSURE CONTINUED EU-SADC
DIALOGUE. SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OPPOSED EXCLUSIONS AND
SANCTIONS AGAINST ANY SADC MEMBER.

--------------
SHORING UP CAPACITY IN SUDAN
--------------


5. (C) CABRAS NOTED THAT THE GOI WAS INCREASING ITS
CAPACITY IN SUDAN BY SENDING A COLONEL TO JOIN THE ITALIAN
POLITICAL ADVISOR IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS CEASE-FIRE MONITORING
UNIT. CABRAS SAID THAT THE INFORMAL TROIKA -- NORWAY, THE
US, AND THE UK -- WAS ACTIVE IN BOTH NEW YORK AND GENEVA ON
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AND APPEALS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY, AND ITALY WOULD "LIKE TO GET IN ON THAT." BOTH
THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION WERE MORE COMFORTABLE
WHEN THE GOI WAS INVOLVED.

--------------
CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS FOR SOMALIA
--------------


6. (C) CABRAS UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO HELP SOLVE THE SOMALI PROBLEM. WAHHABISM
IMPORTED ALONG WITH SAUDI FINANCING FOR NGOS IS "SLOWLY BUT
SURELY" AFFECTING SOMALIA. "IF WE ABANDON SOMALIA," HE SAID,
"IT WILL BECOME A SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORISTS." HE ADDED THAT
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PAGE 04 ROME 05624 01 OF 02 191607Z
THE SOMALIS HAD RESPONDED WELL TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE
INITIATIVE AND WERE "GENUINELY INTERESTED." IN ORDER TO
INCREASE ITS PRESENCE IN SOMALIA, THE GOI HAD SENT TO ELDORET
AMB. GIACCOMELE, A FORMER AMBASSADOR TO SOMALIA. IN
ADDITION, THE GOI WAS WORKING WITH THE EU TO OBTAIN FINANCING
FOR ADDITIONAL EXPERTS FOR SOMALIA AND EXPECTED TO BE
SUCCESSFUL. CABRAS ALSO BELIEVED IT NECESSARY TO SEND
CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS TO SOMALIA, PERHAPS FIFTY OR SIXTY
PEOPLE FROM AFRICAN COUNTRIES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE
WERE "MANY PROBLEMS" SUCH AS SECURITY THAT WOULD NEED TO BE
ADDRESSED BEFORE SUCH PEACEKEEPERS COULD BE DEPLOYED. HE
CHARACTERIZED VIOLATIONS OF THE SOMALI CEASE-FIRE DECLARATION
AS "VERY LIMITED" AND "OVERCOME NOW."

--------------
ERITREA LOOKING FOR TROUBLE
--------------


7. (C) MEANWHILE, THE UNITED STATES COULD TALK WITH
ETHIOPIA OR ERITREA ABOUT SOMALIA. CABRAS EXPRESSED INTEREST
IN THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF ERITREA. ACTION REQUEST: POST
HAS FOUND BRIEFINGS TO THE GOI BY TDY REGIONAL INTEL ANALYSTS
TO BE EXTREMELY USEFUL TO BOTH SIDES. REQUEST THAT
DEPARTMENT DISPATCH ONE TO TWO HORN OF AFRICA INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSTS FROM INR OR THE IC FOR EXCHANGES WITH THE GOI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTO5417

PAGE 01 ROME 05624 02 OF 02 191607Z
ACTION INR-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AF-00 AID-00 INL-00 USNW-00 DINT-00
DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EB-00 EUR-00
FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 L-00 VCE-00
AC-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIG-03 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00
NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /008W
-------------- 0B311F 191622Z /38
R 191448Z NOV 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6988
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY HARARE
CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005624

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2007
TAGS: PREL PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET PINR ZI SU SO ER IV ET IT ITPREL
SUBJECT: ITALY ON ZIMBABWE, SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA, COTE
D'IVOIRE, AND ETHIOPIA

SERVICES AND THE MFA. END ACTION REQUEST. CABRAS NOTED THAT
YEMEN, ETHIOPIA, AND SUDAN HAD "GANGED UP" AGAINST ERITREA.
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PAGE 02 ROME 05624 02 OF 02 191607Z
FURTHERMORE, THE ERITREAN DELEGATION FELT SIDELINED AT
MACHAKOS. THESE TENSIONS WERE VERY DANGEROUS, BECAUSE THEY
COULD DISRUPT THREE REGIONAL PEACE PROCESSES. CABRAS
CHARACTERIZED ERITREA AS "LOOKING FOR TROUBLE." HE ASKED
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WOULD EXTEND MILITARY COOPERATION
TO ASMARA. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR POLICY WAS NO EXPANSION OF
COOPERATION UNTIL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED. CABRAS
ADDED THAT PRESIDENT ISAIAS OF ETHIOPIA HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN
TO THE DANISH EU PRESIDENCY TO SAY THAT ETHIOPIA WAS READY
FOR DIALOGUE, HOPEFULLY PERMANENT DIALOGUE.

-------------- ---
CRISIS IN COTE D'IVOIRE COURTS REGIONAL DISASTER
-------------- ---


8. (C) AS THE KEY STATE IN WEST AFRICA AND AN IMMIGRANT
MAGNET, COTE D'IVOIRE WAS IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF AFRICA.
"WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE WORST THING THAT COULD HAVE
HAPPENED TO AFRICA," CABRAS OPINED. IT WAS A VERY COMPLEX
AND DANGEROUS SITUATION, WITH NO SOLUTION IN SIGHT, WHICH
COULD DEGENERATE INTO A REGIONAL CRISIS OF SERIOUS
PROPORTIONS. NOTING THAT FRANCE HAD OVER 25,000 NATIONALS
THERE, CABRAS OBSERVED THAT FRANCE WAS DOING THE ESSENTIAL
JOB OF MANNING THE BORDERS OF THE TWO CONFLICT ZONES AND
PROTECTING FOREIGNERS. HOWEVER, BOTH SIDES PERCEIVED FRANCE
AS BEING SELF-INTERESTED, SO IT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SERVE AS
A MEDIATOR. CABRAS WANTED THE EU TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE
IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND JOINT CANADIAN-EU-US DEMARCHES AND
CONSULTATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN CARRIED OUT.


9. (C) CABRAS SAID THE SITUATION COULD EASILY BECOME A
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PAGE 03 ROME 05624 02 OF 02 191607Z
DISASTER AFFECTING THE ECONOMY OF THE ENTIRE REGION BECAUSE
OF ABIDJAN'S IMPORTANCE AS A REGIONAL SEAPORT. THE REBELS
HAD A FOLLOWING AND MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE NORTH AND WEST.
ECOWAS COULD PROVIDE A WAY OUT WITH EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION OR
MEDIATION, BUT IF IT FAILED, THE RESULT WOULD BE EITHER CIVIL
WAR OR PARTITION.


10. (C) ASKED IF THE GOI HAD ANY PARTICULAR INFLUENCE ON
PRESIDENT GBAGBO, GIVEN THAT HE WAS IN ROME WHEN THE COUP
ATTEMPT TOOK PLACE, CABRAS SAID YES. THE GOI HAD TOLD GBAGBO
NOT TO GIVE IN TO ETHNIC OR REGIONAL PREJUDICE (IMPLICITLY
CRITICIZING HIS MILITARY'S MOVES TO PURGE ALL OFFICERS FROM A
NORTHERN ETHNIC GROUP AND TO DESTROY THE RESIDENCES OF
BURKINABE IMMIGRANTS). HOWEVER, THE MILITARY HAD DEFEATED
THE COUP ATTEMPT AND KEPT GBAGBO IN POWER, A FACT THAT MIGHT
"CONSTRAIN" HIS "GOOD INTENTIONS" TO KEEP IT IN CHECK.

--------------
HOW TO GET THE AXUM OBELISK BACK TO ETHIOPIA
--------------


11. (C) HAVING FINALLY AGREED -- NOT ONLY IN THEORY BUT
ALSO IN PRACTICE -- TO RETURN THE AXUM OBELISK THAT WAS TAKEN
TO ITALY BY THE FASCISTS IN 1937, THE GOI IS FACING VERY
COMPLICATED TRANSPORT ISSUES. THE OBELISK WILL BE CUT INTO
PIECES AND FLOWN DIRECTLY TO AXUM TO AVOID THE JARRING
OVERLAND ROUTE THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY IF IT WERE SHIPPED
BACK. BECAUSE THE AXUM AIRPORT IS LIMITED, THE GOI IS
CONSIDERING THE USE OF C5A GALAXY AND/OR C17 AIRPLANES FOR
TWO LOADS (68 AND 86 TONS). CABRAS ASKED IF POST KNEW OF A
CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR FOR THESE TYPES OF PLANES.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ROME 05624 02 OF 02 191607Z
SEMBLER

CONFIDENTIAL

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2002ROME05624 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL