Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ROME5090
2002-10-17 16:25:00
SECRET
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005090
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY (MILAN, FLORENCE, NAPLES ADDED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
REF: ROME 5036 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON,
REASON 1.5 (B & D )
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 182140Z
-------
SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005090
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY (MILAN, FLORENCE, NAPLES ADDED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
REF: ROME 5036 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON,
REASON 1.5 (B & D )
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 182140Z
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (S) IRAQ WAS THE MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT A WORKING
LUNCH IN MOSCOW BETWEEN ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI AND RUSSIAN
PRESIDENT PUTIN ON OCTOBER 16. THE TWO LEADERS AGREED ON THE
NEED FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION THAT WOULD SEND INSPECTORS
BACK TO IRAQ SOON WITH A STRONG MANDATE TO GO "ANYWHERE,
ANYTIME." PUTIN, HOWEVER, SAID THERE WERE TWO RED LINES HE
COULD NOT CROSS: AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER FOR THE USE OF FORCE,
AND UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S. WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL
SANCTION. PUTIN PRESSED HOME TO BERLUSCONI THE POINT THAT
HIS PROBLEMS WITH CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA SHOULD BE EQUATED WITH
PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ, AND IF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY ACCEPTED U.S. ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IT SHOULD ALSO
ACCEPT RUSSIAN ACTION AGAINST CHECHNYA "TERRORISTS." ON
OTHER ISSUES, PUTIN CLAIMED THAT RUSSIAN AID TO IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS SOLELY FOR NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS, AND
TOLD BERLUSCONI HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THE NATO SUMMIT IN
PRAGUE. END SUMMARY.
--------------
BERLUSCONI TO MOSCOW
--------------
2. (C) ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI MADE A ONE-DAY TRIP TO MOSCOW ON
OCTOBER 16 FOR A WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN,
PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS IRAQ. UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, THE PM
RELATED HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PUTIN TO
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER DURING A SOCIAL EVENT BOTH ATTENDED THE
SECRET
PAGE 03 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 182140Z
EVENING OF OCTOBER 16. ON OCTOBER 17, DCM RECEIVED A FULL
READOUT FROM THE PM'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR GIOVANNI
CASTELLANETA, WHO ACCOMPANIED BERLUSCONI TO HIS MEETING WITH
PUTIN.
---
WMD
---
3. (C) THE NORMALLY RESERVED CASTELLANETA WAS CLEARLY PEEVED
WITH THE ITALIAN PRESS, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD COMPLETELY
MISINTERPRETED THE PM'S COMMENTS ON IRAQI WMD FOLLOWING HIS
MEETING WITH PUTIN. ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, PUTIN TOLD
BERLUSCONI THAT SADDAM PROBABLY HAD ALREADY DESTROYED SOME OF
HIS WMD STOCKS AND "DISPLACED" OTHERS SO THAT THEY WOULD BE
DIFFICULT FOR UN INSPECTORS TO LOCATE, A VIEW WITH WHICH THE
PM AGREED. THE SENSE OF THE CONVERSATION HAD BEEN THAT THIS
WAS REASON TO SEND IN INSPECTORS QUICKLY AND WITH A STRONG
MANDATE, BEFORE EVEN MORE TIME WAS LOST AND SADDAM CONCEALED
MORE OF HIS WMD.
4. (SBU) THE PM HAD MEANT TO CONVEY THIS POINT TO THE ITALIAN
PRESS UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, BY STATING THAT THERE WAS
PROBABLY NO LONGER ANY WMD STOCKS AT THOSE SITES IN IRAQ
WHERE THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LOCATED. THE PRESS,
UNFORTUNATELY, HAD REPORTED THAT BERLUSCONI NO LONGER
BELIEVED IRAQ HAD ANY WMD, PERIOD. CASTELLANETA DESCRIBED
THE MEDIA REPORTS AS A HUGE "MISUNDERSTANDING." (LATER ON
OCTOBER 17, BERLUSCONI, SPEAKING TO THE PRESS IN LISBON WHERE
HE WAS ATTENDING A MEETING OF EUROPEAN CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES,
STATED "I NEVER SAID THERE WERE NO WEAPONS OF MASS
SECRET
PAGE 04 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 182140Z
DESTRUCTION ( I SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WAS VERY LIKELY,
ALMOST CERTAIN, THAT THERE WERE THESE WEAPONS.")
--------------
UNSC ACTION
--------------
5. (S) CASTELLANETA SAID THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT ANY
RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE REINTRODUCTION OF INSPECTORS HAD TO
BE A TOUGH ONE WHICH MADE CLEAR THAT INSPECTORS COULD GO
"ANYWHERE, ANYTIME." PUTIN MADE CLEAR TO BERLUSCONI,
HOWEVER, THAT RUSSIA HAD GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD GO TO MEET
USG DESIRES FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAQ. THE
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT IDENTIFIED TWO RED LINES THAT HE COULD NOT
CROSS: A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT CONTAINED AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER
FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IF IRAQ FAILED TO MEET ALL OF
ITS OBLIGATIONS, AND ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL RESORT TO FORCE
BY THE U.S. WITHOUT "INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY" (I.E., UN
SANCTION).
6. (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, HIS PM TRIED TO BRIDGE
THE GAP BY ARGUING THAT IF A STRONG RESOLUTION CALLING FOR
EFFECTIVE INSPECTIONS INSIDE IRAQ WAS PASSED AND SADDAM
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY."
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW
SECRET
SECRET PTQ5680
PAGE 01 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 182140Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 COR-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 VC-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00
ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 PMB-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /008W
-------------- FA735C 182140Z /40
O 171625Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6400
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005090
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY (MILAN, FLORENCE, NAPLES ADDED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRANEMWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY."
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 182140Z
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW
SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF TWO RESOLUTIONS; BERLUSCONI REPLIED
"NO, I DO NOT."
--------------
EQUATING IRAQ WITH CHECHNYA
--------------
7. (S) CASTELANETTA REPORTED THAT PUTIN ARGUED STRONGLY TO
BERLUSCONI THAT HIS PROBLEMS WITH GEORGIA AND CHECHNYA WERE
ISSUES OF TERRORISM, NOT POLITICS, AND HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED
AS SUCH BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD BE A "DOUBLE STANDARD." BERLUSCONI COMMENTED THAT
RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE PROOF OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN
CHECHNYA, TO WHICH PUTIN REPLIED THAT HE ALREADY HAD PROOF:
RUSSIAN SECURITY FORCES HAD CAPTURED NUMEROUS FOREIGN
TERRORISTS AND EVEN RECOVERED THE DEAD BODY OF A BRITISH
CITIZEN FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE "TERRORISTS." PUTIN
STRESSED THAT IF THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE GIVEN A
GREEN LIGHT TO DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEM IN IRAQ, HE SHOULD
HAVE SIMILAR ACQUIESCENCE FOR DEALING WITH HIS TERRORIST
PROBLEM IN CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA.
--------------
IRAN
--------------
8. (S) CASTELLANETA REPORTED THAT THE ITALIAN SIDE HAD
RAISED IRAN AS REQUESTED BY THE USG (REFTEL),BUT BECAUSE THE
DISCUSSION ON IRAQ HAD GONE ON FOR SO LONG THE IRAN PORTION
OF THE CONVERSATION WAS ABBREVIATED. PUTIN MAINTAINED THAT
SECRET
PAGE 03 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 182140Z
RUSSIA WAS INVOLVED ONLY IN IRAN'S CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
AND HAD NO INTENTION OF SUPPORTING A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM
OR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHAHAB III MISSILE; TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR RUSSIA AND CLEARLY NOT IN ITS
INTEREST. CASTELLANETA VOLUNTEERED TO DCM THAT PUTIN
APPEARED SINCERE IN HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO
BACK THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN WMD OR TEHRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM (ALTHOUGH CASTELLANETA ALSO COMMENTED THAT PUTIN
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF SOME OF THE GRAY AND BLACK MARKET
DEALS ORIGINATING IN RUSSIA).
--------------
NATO SUMMIT
--------------
9. (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, BERLUSCONI RECEIVED A
FLATLY NEGATIVE REPLY WHEN HE ASKED PUTIN IF HE WOULD ATTEND
THE NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT; THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT INTENDED TO
SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER INSTEAD.
--------------
PUTIN'S VIEW OF U.S.
--------------
10. (S) BERLUSCONI TOLD AMBASSADOR SEMBLER THAT HE HAD
STRESSED TO PUTIN THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S DETERMINATION TO DEAL
WITH IRAQ REFLECTED THE DEEP FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
ABOUT FACING UP TO POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER
11. THE ITALIAN PM HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT PUTIN WAS
SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS ASSESSMENT, AND APPEARED NOT TO BE
AWARE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S STAND ENJOYED WIDE PUBLIC BACKING
SECRET
PAGE 04 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 182140Z
WITHIN THE U.S. CASTELLANETA TOLD DCM THAT PUTIN MADE CLEAR
TO HIS ITALIAN GUESTS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING DISAGREEMENTS
OVER THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, HE BELIEVED
PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE A SINCERE LEADER WHO HE TRUSTED AND WITH
WHOM HE ENJOYED WORKING. SEMBLER
SECRET
>
@@@OASYS@@@
SECRET PTQ1845
PAGE 01 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 172304Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00
P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /007W
-------------- F99139 172304Z /40
O 171625Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6399
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005090
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
REF: ROME 5036 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON, REASON 1.5
(B & D)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 172304Z
1. (S) IRAQ WAS THE MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT A WORKING
LUNCH IN MOSCOW BETWEEN ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI AND RUSSIAN
PRESIDENT PUTIN ON OCTOBER 16. THE TWO LEADERS AGREED ON THE
NEED FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION THAT WOULD SEND INSPECTORS
BACK TO IRAQ SOON WITH A STRONG MANDATE TO GO "ANYWHERE,
ANYTIME." PUTIN, HOWEVER, SAID THERE WERE TWO RED LINES HE
COULD NOT CROSS: AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER FOR THE USE OF FORCE,
AND UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S. WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL
SANCTION. PUTIN PRESSED HOME TO BERLUSCONI THE POINT THAT
HIS PROBLEMS WITH CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA SHOULD BE EQUATED WITH
PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ, AND IF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY ACCEPTED U.S. ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IT SHOULD ALSO
ACCEPT RUSSIAN ACTION AGAINST CHECHNYA "TERRORISTS." ON
OTHER ISSUES, PUTIN CLAIMED THAT RUSSIAN AID TO IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS SOLELY FOR NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS, AND
TOLD BERLUSCONI HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THE NATO SUMMIT IN
PRAGUE. END SUMMARY.
--------------
BERLUSCONI TO MOSCOW
--------------
2. (C) ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI MADE A ONE-DAY TRIP TO MOSCOW ON
OCTOBER 16 FOR A WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN,
PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS IRAQ. UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, THE PM
RELATED HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PUTIN TO
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER DURING A SOCIAL EVENT BOTH ATTENDED THE
EVENING OF OCTOBER 16. ON OCTOBER 17, DCM RECEIVED A FULL
READOUT FROM THE PM'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR GIOVANNI
CASTELLANETA, WHO ACCOMPANIED BERLUSCONI TO HIS MEETING WITH
PUTIN.
SECRET
PAGE 03 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 172304Z
---
WMD
---
3. (C) THE NORMALLY RESERVED CASTELLANETA WAS CLEARLY PEEVED
WITH THE ITALIAN PRESS, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD COMPLETELY
MISINTERPRETED THE PM'S COMMENTS ON IRAQI WMD FOLLOWING HIS
MEETING WITH PUTIN. ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, PUTIN TOLD
BERLUSCONI THAT SADDAM PROBABLY HAD ALREADY DESTROYED SOME OF
HIS WMD STOCKS AND "DISPLACED" OTHERS SO THAT THEY WOULD BE
DIFFICULT FOR UN INSPECTORS TO LOCATE, A VIEW WITH WHICH THE
PM AGREED. THE SENSE OF THE CONVERSATION HAD BEEN THAT THIS
WAS REASON TO SEND IN INSPECTORS QUICKLY AND WITH A STRONG
MANDATE, BEFORE EVEN MORE TIME WAS LOST AND SADDAM CONCEALED
MORE OF HIS WMD.
4. (SBU) THE PM HAD MEANT TO CONVEY THIS POINT TO THE ITALIAN
PRESS UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, BY STATING THAT THERE WAS
PROBABLY NO LONGER ANY WMD STOCKS AT THOSE SITES IN IRAQ
WHERE THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LOCATED. THE PRESS,
UNFORTUNATELY, HAD REPORTED THAT BERLUSCONI NO LONGER
BELIEVED IRAQ HAD ANY WMD, PERIOD. CASTELLANETA DESCRIBED
THE MEDIA REPORTS AS A HUGE "MISUNDERSTANDING." (LATER ON
OCTOBER 17, BERLUSCONI, SPEAKING TO THE PRESS IN LISBON WHERE
HE WAS ATTENDING A MEETING OF EUROPEAN CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES,
STATED "I NEVER SAID THERE WERE NO WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION ( I SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WAS VERY LIKELY,
ALMOST CERTAIN, THAT THERE WERE THESE WEAPONS.")
--------------
SECRET
PAGE 04 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 172304Z
UNSC ACTION
--------------
5. (S) CASTELLANETA SAID THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT ANY
RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE REINTRODUCTION OF INSPECTORS HAD TO
BE A TOUGH ONE WHICH MADE CLEAR THAT INSPECTORS COULD GO
"ANYWHERE, ANYTIME." PUTIN MADE CLEAR TO BERLUSCONI,
HOWEVER, THAT RUSSIA HAD GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD GO TO MEET
USG DESIRES FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAQ. THE
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT IDENTIFIED TWO RED LINES THAT HE COULD NOT
CROSS: A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT CONTAINED AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER
FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IF IRAQ FAILED TO MEET ALL OF
ITS OBLIGATIONS, AND ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL RESORT TO FORCE
BY THE U.S. WITHOUT "INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY" (I.E., UN
SANCTION).
6. (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, HIS PM TRIED TO BRIDGE
THE GAP BY ARGUING THAT IF A STRONG RESOLUTION CALLING FOR
EFFECTIVE INSPECTIONS INSIDE IRAQ WAS PASSED AND SADDAM
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY."
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW
SECRET
SECRET PTQ1847
PAGE 01 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 172305Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00
P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /007W
-------------- F9913F 172305Z /40
O 171625Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6400
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005090
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF TWO RESOLUTIONS; BERLUSCONI REPLIED
"NO, I DO NOT."
--------------
EQUATING IRAQ WITH CHECHNYA
--------------
7. (S) CASTELANETTA REPORTED THAT PUTIN ARGUED STRONGLY TO
BERLUSCONI THAT HIS PROBLEMS WITH GEORGIA AND CHECHNYA WERE
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 172305Z
ISSUES OF TERRORISM, NOT POLITICS, AND HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED
AS SUCH BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD BE A "DOUBLE STANDARD." BERLUSCONI COMMENTED THAT
RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE PROOF OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN
CHECHNYA, TO WHICH PUTIN REPLIED THAT HE ALREADY HAD PROOF:
RUSSIAN SECURITY FORCES HAD CAPTURED NUMEROUS FOREIGN
TERRORISTS AND EVEN RECOVERED THE DEAD BODY OF A BRITISH
CITIZEN FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE "TERRORISTS." PUTIN
STRESSED THAT IF THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE GIVEN A
GREEN LIGHT TO DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEM IN IRAQ, HE SHOULD
HAVE SIMILAR ACQUIESCENCE FOR DEALING WITH HIS TERRORIST
PROBLEM IN CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA.
--------------
IRAN
--------------
8. (S) CASTELLANETA REPORTED THAT THE ITALIAN SIDE HAD
RAISED IRAN AS REQUESTED BY THE USG (REFTEL),BUT BECAUSE THE
DISCUSSION ON IRAQ HAD GONE ON FOR SO LONG THE IRAN PORTION
OF THE CONVERSATION WAS ABBREVIATED. PUTIN MAINTAINED THAT
RUSSIA WAS INVOLVED ONLY IN IRAN'S CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
AND HAD NO INTENTION OF SUPPORTING A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM
OR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHAHAB III MISSILE; TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR RUSSIA AND CLEARLY NOT IN ITS
INTEREST. CASTELLANETA VOLUNTEERED TO DCM THAT PUTIN
APPEARED SINCERE IN HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO
BACK THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN WMD OR TEHRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM (ALTHOUGH CASTELLANETA ALSO COMMENTED THAT PUTIN
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF SOME OF THE GRAY AND BLACK MARKET
DEALS ORIGINATING IN RUSSIA).
SECRET
PAGE 03 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 172305Z
--------------
NATO SUMMIT
--------------
9. (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, BERLUSCONI RECEIVED A
FLATLY NEGATIVE REPLY WHEN HE ASKED PUTIN IF HE WOULD ATTEND
THE NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT; THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT INTENDED TO
SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER INSTEAD.
--------------
PUTIN'S VIEW OF U.S.
--------------
10. (S) BERLUSCONI TOLD AMBASSADOR SEMBLER THAT HE HAD
STRESSED TO PUTIN THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S DETERMINATION TO DEAL
WITH IRAQ REFLECTED THE DEEP FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
ABOUT FACING UP TO POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER
11. THE ITALIAN PM HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT PUTIN WAS
SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS ASSESSMENT, AND APPEARED NOT TO BE
AWARE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S STAND ENJOYED WIDE PUBLIC BACKING
WITHIN THE U.S. CASTELLANETA TOLD DCM THAT PUTIN MADE CLEAR
TO HIS ITALIAN GUESTS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING DISAGREEMENTS
OVER THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, HE BELIEVED
PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE A SINCERE LEADER WHO HE TRUSTED AND WITH
WHOM HE ENJOYED WORKING.
SEMBLER
SECRET
>
2002ROME05090 - Classification: SECRET
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY (MILAN, FLORENCE, NAPLES ADDED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
REF: ROME 5036 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON,
REASON 1.5 (B & D )
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 182140Z
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (S) IRAQ WAS THE MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT A WORKING
LUNCH IN MOSCOW BETWEEN ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI AND RUSSIAN
PRESIDENT PUTIN ON OCTOBER 16. THE TWO LEADERS AGREED ON THE
NEED FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION THAT WOULD SEND INSPECTORS
BACK TO IRAQ SOON WITH A STRONG MANDATE TO GO "ANYWHERE,
ANYTIME." PUTIN, HOWEVER, SAID THERE WERE TWO RED LINES HE
COULD NOT CROSS: AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER FOR THE USE OF FORCE,
AND UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S. WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL
SANCTION. PUTIN PRESSED HOME TO BERLUSCONI THE POINT THAT
HIS PROBLEMS WITH CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA SHOULD BE EQUATED WITH
PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ, AND IF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY ACCEPTED U.S. ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IT SHOULD ALSO
ACCEPT RUSSIAN ACTION AGAINST CHECHNYA "TERRORISTS." ON
OTHER ISSUES, PUTIN CLAIMED THAT RUSSIAN AID TO IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS SOLELY FOR NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS, AND
TOLD BERLUSCONI HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THE NATO SUMMIT IN
PRAGUE. END SUMMARY.
--------------
BERLUSCONI TO MOSCOW
--------------
2. (C) ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI MADE A ONE-DAY TRIP TO MOSCOW ON
OCTOBER 16 FOR A WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN,
PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS IRAQ. UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, THE PM
RELATED HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PUTIN TO
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER DURING A SOCIAL EVENT BOTH ATTENDED THE
SECRET
PAGE 03 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 182140Z
EVENING OF OCTOBER 16. ON OCTOBER 17, DCM RECEIVED A FULL
READOUT FROM THE PM'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR GIOVANNI
CASTELLANETA, WHO ACCOMPANIED BERLUSCONI TO HIS MEETING WITH
PUTIN.
---
WMD
---
3. (C) THE NORMALLY RESERVED CASTELLANETA WAS CLEARLY PEEVED
WITH THE ITALIAN PRESS, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD COMPLETELY
MISINTERPRETED THE PM'S COMMENTS ON IRAQI WMD FOLLOWING HIS
MEETING WITH PUTIN. ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, PUTIN TOLD
BERLUSCONI THAT SADDAM PROBABLY HAD ALREADY DESTROYED SOME OF
HIS WMD STOCKS AND "DISPLACED" OTHERS SO THAT THEY WOULD BE
DIFFICULT FOR UN INSPECTORS TO LOCATE, A VIEW WITH WHICH THE
PM AGREED. THE SENSE OF THE CONVERSATION HAD BEEN THAT THIS
WAS REASON TO SEND IN INSPECTORS QUICKLY AND WITH A STRONG
MANDATE, BEFORE EVEN MORE TIME WAS LOST AND SADDAM CONCEALED
MORE OF HIS WMD.
4. (SBU) THE PM HAD MEANT TO CONVEY THIS POINT TO THE ITALIAN
PRESS UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, BY STATING THAT THERE WAS
PROBABLY NO LONGER ANY WMD STOCKS AT THOSE SITES IN IRAQ
WHERE THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LOCATED. THE PRESS,
UNFORTUNATELY, HAD REPORTED THAT BERLUSCONI NO LONGER
BELIEVED IRAQ HAD ANY WMD, PERIOD. CASTELLANETA DESCRIBED
THE MEDIA REPORTS AS A HUGE "MISUNDERSTANDING." (LATER ON
OCTOBER 17, BERLUSCONI, SPEAKING TO THE PRESS IN LISBON WHERE
HE WAS ATTENDING A MEETING OF EUROPEAN CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES,
STATED "I NEVER SAID THERE WERE NO WEAPONS OF MASS
SECRET
PAGE 04 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 182140Z
DESTRUCTION ( I SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WAS VERY LIKELY,
ALMOST CERTAIN, THAT THERE WERE THESE WEAPONS.")
--------------
UNSC ACTION
--------------
5. (S) CASTELLANETA SAID THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT ANY
RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE REINTRODUCTION OF INSPECTORS HAD TO
BE A TOUGH ONE WHICH MADE CLEAR THAT INSPECTORS COULD GO
"ANYWHERE, ANYTIME." PUTIN MADE CLEAR TO BERLUSCONI,
HOWEVER, THAT RUSSIA HAD GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD GO TO MEET
USG DESIRES FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAQ. THE
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT IDENTIFIED TWO RED LINES THAT HE COULD NOT
CROSS: A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT CONTAINED AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER
FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IF IRAQ FAILED TO MEET ALL OF
ITS OBLIGATIONS, AND ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL RESORT TO FORCE
BY THE U.S. WITHOUT "INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY" (I.E., UN
SANCTION).
6. (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, HIS PM TRIED TO BRIDGE
THE GAP BY ARGUING THAT IF A STRONG RESOLUTION CALLING FOR
EFFECTIVE INSPECTIONS INSIDE IRAQ WAS PASSED AND SADDAM
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY."
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW
SECRET
SECRET PTQ5680
PAGE 01 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 182140Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 COR-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 VC-00 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00
ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 PMB-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /008W
-------------- FA735C 182140Z /40
O 171625Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6400
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005090
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY (MILAN, FLORENCE, NAPLES ADDED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRANEMWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY."
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 182140Z
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW
SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF TWO RESOLUTIONS; BERLUSCONI REPLIED
"NO, I DO NOT."
--------------
EQUATING IRAQ WITH CHECHNYA
--------------
7. (S) CASTELANETTA REPORTED THAT PUTIN ARGUED STRONGLY TO
BERLUSCONI THAT HIS PROBLEMS WITH GEORGIA AND CHECHNYA WERE
ISSUES OF TERRORISM, NOT POLITICS, AND HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED
AS SUCH BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD BE A "DOUBLE STANDARD." BERLUSCONI COMMENTED THAT
RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE PROOF OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN
CHECHNYA, TO WHICH PUTIN REPLIED THAT HE ALREADY HAD PROOF:
RUSSIAN SECURITY FORCES HAD CAPTURED NUMEROUS FOREIGN
TERRORISTS AND EVEN RECOVERED THE DEAD BODY OF A BRITISH
CITIZEN FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE "TERRORISTS." PUTIN
STRESSED THAT IF THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE GIVEN A
GREEN LIGHT TO DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEM IN IRAQ, HE SHOULD
HAVE SIMILAR ACQUIESCENCE FOR DEALING WITH HIS TERRORIST
PROBLEM IN CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA.
--------------
IRAN
--------------
8. (S) CASTELLANETA REPORTED THAT THE ITALIAN SIDE HAD
RAISED IRAN AS REQUESTED BY THE USG (REFTEL),BUT BECAUSE THE
DISCUSSION ON IRAQ HAD GONE ON FOR SO LONG THE IRAN PORTION
OF THE CONVERSATION WAS ABBREVIATED. PUTIN MAINTAINED THAT
SECRET
PAGE 03 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 182140Z
RUSSIA WAS INVOLVED ONLY IN IRAN'S CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
AND HAD NO INTENTION OF SUPPORTING A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM
OR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHAHAB III MISSILE; TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR RUSSIA AND CLEARLY NOT IN ITS
INTEREST. CASTELLANETA VOLUNTEERED TO DCM THAT PUTIN
APPEARED SINCERE IN HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO
BACK THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN WMD OR TEHRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM (ALTHOUGH CASTELLANETA ALSO COMMENTED THAT PUTIN
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF SOME OF THE GRAY AND BLACK MARKET
DEALS ORIGINATING IN RUSSIA).
--------------
NATO SUMMIT
--------------
9. (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, BERLUSCONI RECEIVED A
FLATLY NEGATIVE REPLY WHEN HE ASKED PUTIN IF HE WOULD ATTEND
THE NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT; THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT INTENDED TO
SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER INSTEAD.
--------------
PUTIN'S VIEW OF U.S.
--------------
10. (S) BERLUSCONI TOLD AMBASSADOR SEMBLER THAT HE HAD
STRESSED TO PUTIN THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S DETERMINATION TO DEAL
WITH IRAQ REFLECTED THE DEEP FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
ABOUT FACING UP TO POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER
11. THE ITALIAN PM HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT PUTIN WAS
SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS ASSESSMENT, AND APPEARED NOT TO BE
AWARE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S STAND ENJOYED WIDE PUBLIC BACKING
SECRET
PAGE 04 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 182140Z
WITHIN THE U.S. CASTELLANETA TOLD DCM THAT PUTIN MADE CLEAR
TO HIS ITALIAN GUESTS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING DISAGREEMENTS
OVER THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, HE BELIEVED
PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE A SINCERE LEADER WHO HE TRUSTED AND WITH
WHOM HE ENJOYED WORKING. SEMBLER
SECRET
>
@@@OASYS@@@
SECRET PTQ1845
PAGE 01 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 172304Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00
P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /007W
-------------- F99139 172304Z /40
O 171625Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6399
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 005090
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
REF: ROME 5036 (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON, REASON 1.5
(B & D)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 172304Z
1. (S) IRAQ WAS THE MAJOR SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT A WORKING
LUNCH IN MOSCOW BETWEEN ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI AND RUSSIAN
PRESIDENT PUTIN ON OCTOBER 16. THE TWO LEADERS AGREED ON THE
NEED FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION THAT WOULD SEND INSPECTORS
BACK TO IRAQ SOON WITH A STRONG MANDATE TO GO "ANYWHERE,
ANYTIME." PUTIN, HOWEVER, SAID THERE WERE TWO RED LINES HE
COULD NOT CROSS: AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER FOR THE USE OF FORCE,
AND UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S. WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL
SANCTION. PUTIN PRESSED HOME TO BERLUSCONI THE POINT THAT
HIS PROBLEMS WITH CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA SHOULD BE EQUATED WITH
PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ, AND IF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY ACCEPTED U.S. ACTION AGAINST IRAQ IT SHOULD ALSO
ACCEPT RUSSIAN ACTION AGAINST CHECHNYA "TERRORISTS." ON
OTHER ISSUES, PUTIN CLAIMED THAT RUSSIAN AID TO IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS SOLELY FOR NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS, AND
TOLD BERLUSCONI HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THE NATO SUMMIT IN
PRAGUE. END SUMMARY.
--------------
BERLUSCONI TO MOSCOW
--------------
2. (C) ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI MADE A ONE-DAY TRIP TO MOSCOW ON
OCTOBER 16 FOR A WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN,
PRIMARILY TO DISCUSS IRAQ. UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, THE PM
RELATED HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PUTIN TO
AMBASSADOR SEMBLER DURING A SOCIAL EVENT BOTH ATTENDED THE
EVENING OF OCTOBER 16. ON OCTOBER 17, DCM RECEIVED A FULL
READOUT FROM THE PM'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR GIOVANNI
CASTELLANETA, WHO ACCOMPANIED BERLUSCONI TO HIS MEETING WITH
PUTIN.
SECRET
PAGE 03 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 172304Z
---
WMD
---
3. (C) THE NORMALLY RESERVED CASTELLANETA WAS CLEARLY PEEVED
WITH THE ITALIAN PRESS, WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD COMPLETELY
MISINTERPRETED THE PM'S COMMENTS ON IRAQI WMD FOLLOWING HIS
MEETING WITH PUTIN. ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, PUTIN TOLD
BERLUSCONI THAT SADDAM PROBABLY HAD ALREADY DESTROYED SOME OF
HIS WMD STOCKS AND "DISPLACED" OTHERS SO THAT THEY WOULD BE
DIFFICULT FOR UN INSPECTORS TO LOCATE, A VIEW WITH WHICH THE
PM AGREED. THE SENSE OF THE CONVERSATION HAD BEEN THAT THIS
WAS REASON TO SEND IN INSPECTORS QUICKLY AND WITH A STRONG
MANDATE, BEFORE EVEN MORE TIME WAS LOST AND SADDAM CONCEALED
MORE OF HIS WMD.
4. (SBU) THE PM HAD MEANT TO CONVEY THIS POINT TO THE ITALIAN
PRESS UPON HIS RETURN TO ROME, BY STATING THAT THERE WAS
PROBABLY NO LONGER ANY WMD STOCKS AT THOSE SITES IN IRAQ
WHERE THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LOCATED. THE PRESS,
UNFORTUNATELY, HAD REPORTED THAT BERLUSCONI NO LONGER
BELIEVED IRAQ HAD ANY WMD, PERIOD. CASTELLANETA DESCRIBED
THE MEDIA REPORTS AS A HUGE "MISUNDERSTANDING." (LATER ON
OCTOBER 17, BERLUSCONI, SPEAKING TO THE PRESS IN LISBON WHERE
HE WAS ATTENDING A MEETING OF EUROPEAN CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES,
STATED "I NEVER SAID THERE WERE NO WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION ( I SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WAS VERY LIKELY,
ALMOST CERTAIN, THAT THERE WERE THESE WEAPONS.")
--------------
SECRET
PAGE 04 ROME 05090 01 OF 02 172304Z
UNSC ACTION
--------------
5. (S) CASTELLANETA SAID THE TWO LEADERS AGREED THAT ANY
RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE REINTRODUCTION OF INSPECTORS HAD TO
BE A TOUGH ONE WHICH MADE CLEAR THAT INSPECTORS COULD GO
"ANYWHERE, ANYTIME." PUTIN MADE CLEAR TO BERLUSCONI,
HOWEVER, THAT RUSSIA HAD GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD GO TO MEET
USG DESIRES FOR A STRONG UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAQ. THE
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT IDENTIFIED TWO RED LINES THAT HE COULD NOT
CROSS: A UNSC RESOLUTION THAT CONTAINED AN AUTOMATIC TRIGGER
FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IF IRAQ FAILED TO MEET ALL OF
ITS OBLIGATIONS, AND ACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL RESORT TO FORCE
BY THE U.S. WITHOUT "INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY" (I.E., UN
SANCTION).
6. (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, HIS PM TRIED TO BRIDGE
THE GAP BY ARGUING THAT IF A STRONG RESOLUTION CALLING FOR
EFFECTIVE INSPECTIONS INSIDE IRAQ WAS PASSED AND SADDAM
PREVENTED SUCH INSPECTIONS FROM BEING CARRIED OUT, ANY
SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE
CONSIDERED "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY."
IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH BERLUSCONI, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER ASKED
THE PM DIRECTLY IF, FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH PUTIN, HE NOW
SECRET
SECRET PTQ1847
PAGE 01 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 172305Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NEA-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00
P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /007W
-------------- F9913F 172305Z /40
O 171625Z OCT 02
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6400
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 005090
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL IT IR IT IR IT IR IT IR IZ IZPREL IZPREL IZPREL
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI-PUTIN MEETING: ITALIAN READOUT
SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF TWO RESOLUTIONS; BERLUSCONI REPLIED
"NO, I DO NOT."
--------------
EQUATING IRAQ WITH CHECHNYA
--------------
7. (S) CASTELANETTA REPORTED THAT PUTIN ARGUED STRONGLY TO
BERLUSCONI THAT HIS PROBLEMS WITH GEORGIA AND CHECHNYA WERE
SECRET
PAGE 02 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 172305Z
ISSUES OF TERRORISM, NOT POLITICS, AND HAD TO BE RECOGNIZED
AS SUCH BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD BE A "DOUBLE STANDARD." BERLUSCONI COMMENTED THAT
RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE PROOF OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN
CHECHNYA, TO WHICH PUTIN REPLIED THAT HE ALREADY HAD PROOF:
RUSSIAN SECURITY FORCES HAD CAPTURED NUMEROUS FOREIGN
TERRORISTS AND EVEN RECOVERED THE DEAD BODY OF A BRITISH
CITIZEN FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE "TERRORISTS." PUTIN
STRESSED THAT IF THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE GIVEN A
GREEN LIGHT TO DEAL WITH THEIR PROBLEM IN IRAQ, HE SHOULD
HAVE SIMILAR ACQUIESCENCE FOR DEALING WITH HIS TERRORIST
PROBLEM IN CHECHNYA AND GEORGIA.
--------------
IRAN
--------------
8. (S) CASTELLANETA REPORTED THAT THE ITALIAN SIDE HAD
RAISED IRAN AS REQUESTED BY THE USG (REFTEL),BUT BECAUSE THE
DISCUSSION ON IRAQ HAD GONE ON FOR SO LONG THE IRAN PORTION
OF THE CONVERSATION WAS ABBREVIATED. PUTIN MAINTAINED THAT
RUSSIA WAS INVOLVED ONLY IN IRAN'S CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
AND HAD NO INTENTION OF SUPPORTING A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM
OR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHAHAB III MISSILE; TO DO OTHERWISE
WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR RUSSIA AND CLEARLY NOT IN ITS
INTEREST. CASTELLANETA VOLUNTEERED TO DCM THAT PUTIN
APPEARED SINCERE IN HIS STATEMENT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO
BACK THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN WMD OR TEHRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM (ALTHOUGH CASTELLANETA ALSO COMMENTED THAT PUTIN
MIGHT NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF SOME OF THE GRAY AND BLACK MARKET
DEALS ORIGINATING IN RUSSIA).
SECRET
PAGE 03 ROME 05090 02 OF 02 172305Z
--------------
NATO SUMMIT
--------------
9. (S) ACCORDING TO CASTELLANETA, BERLUSCONI RECEIVED A
FLATLY NEGATIVE REPLY WHEN HE ASKED PUTIN IF HE WOULD ATTEND
THE NATO PRAGUE SUMMIT; THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT INTENDED TO
SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER INSTEAD.
--------------
PUTIN'S VIEW OF U.S.
--------------
10. (S) BERLUSCONI TOLD AMBASSADOR SEMBLER THAT HE HAD
STRESSED TO PUTIN THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S DETERMINATION TO DEAL
WITH IRAQ REFLECTED THE DEEP FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
ABOUT FACING UP TO POTENTIAL THREATS IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER
11. THE ITALIAN PM HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT PUTIN WAS
SURPRISED TO HEAR THIS ASSESSMENT, AND APPEARED NOT TO BE
AWARE THAT PRESIDENT BUSH'S STAND ENJOYED WIDE PUBLIC BACKING
WITHIN THE U.S. CASTELLANETA TOLD DCM THAT PUTIN MADE CLEAR
TO HIS ITALIAN GUESTS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING DISAGREEMENTS
OVER THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS IRAQ, HE BELIEVED
PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE A SINCERE LEADER WHO HE TRUSTED AND WITH
WHOM HE ENJOYED WORKING.
SEMBLER
SECRET
>
2002ROME05090 - Classification: SECRET