RAZALI: CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD CASE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001479

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP
USCINCPAC FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: RAZALI: CAUGHT BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD CASE


Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez. Reason: 1.5 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Razali told diplomats at an early evening
briefing today that the dialog between the NLD and the SPDC
appeared to be stalled as much by a personality conflict
between Aung San Suu Kyi and Than Shwe as anything else.
Each one is imperious in his own way and neither is ready to
compromise. The visit also made clear that Than Shwe was the
decision-maker in Burma; any commitments made by Khin Nyunt
had to be confirmed by Than Shwe. That said, Khin Nyunt had
broached the idea of reconvening a reformulated National
Convention -- a suggestion that is apparently acceptable, at
least in principle, to both ASSK and the ethnic parties.
Khin Nyunt also suggested that 200 to 300 additional
political prisoners and security detainees could be released
by the close of the year, though, again, as with all other
matters, Than Shwe failed to confirm the commitment. Finally,
Razali confirmed that he would continue as Special Envoy,
with his next visit possibly occurring early next year. End
Summary.


2. (C) UN Special Envoy Razali told diplomats November 15
that he would continue in his role as facilitator for the
talks between the NLD and the GOB. He was, he said,
beginning to get a feel for "the complexities of the
situation". He had met with Secretary 1 Khin Nyunt, Aung San
Suu Kyi representatives of the ethnic communities and Senior
General Than Shwe and understood now that there were at least
"two levels of decision-making" within the SPDC. Any
commitments by Khin Nyunt had to be confirmed by Senior
General Than Shwe. Furthermore, there was probably blame on
both sides for the lack of progress on the dialogue.


3. (C) Razali described his meeting with Khin Nyunt as "very
good, very candid and very relaxed." Razali took Khin Nyunt
up on his failure to deliver on his August promise to Razali
regarding the start of real dialog. Khin Nyunt said he was
doing his best, trying to act "as a catalyst between the NLD
and the SPDC."' However, every aspect of exchanges with the
NLD were examined every week in detail by the SPDC. As a
result, it was difficult to move forward on anything. Khin
Nyunt also told Razali that there was "a channel of
discussion" between the NLD and the SPDC. The Minister of
Education (a cousin of Than Shwe, he is also Secretary
General of the USDA),the Deputy Minister of Information and
Brigadier General Than Thun had met four times with Aung San
Suu Kyi in "round table discussions" which Khin Nyunt
described as "positive and constructive." in the same
breath, however, he also complained that ASSK had to take the
discussions more seriously. Seemingly, she was disdainful of
both the participants and the topics on the table. In fact,
Razali said, when he met with her, she was scornful of the
meetings with the Minister of Education et al.


4. (C) Khin Nyunt also told Razali that he is prepared to
reconvene the National Convention with adjustments in its
rules and procedures, though, when pushed on what adjustments
would be made, was vague. Similarly, Khin Nyunt also
suggested that as many as 300 additional political prisoners
and security detainees could be released before the close of
the year. Aung San Suu Kyi, Razali said, agreed that the NLD
would rejoin a properly reformulated National Convention.
According to Razali, representatives of ethnic parties also
accepted the idea of a reconvened Convention.


5. (C) Than Shwe gave Razali only fifteen minutes, but that
was enough to convince Razali that Khin Nyunt and Than Shwe
were not always on the same page. Than Shwe for instance did
not commit to reconvening the National Convention and,
according to Razali, even now he cannot say whether or not
the GOB will go that route. Similarly, when the topic turned
to consultations with the NLD regarding humanitarian
assistance for Burma -- an idea which Khin Nyunt had accepted
-- Than Shwe, while not saying a word, gave every indication
of acute discomfort. He also failed to confirm Khin Nyunt's
commitment on the release of political prisoners. The most
he would say is that he would "do the best for the country."
Than Shwe also vetoed Razali's final meeting with Aung San
Suu Kyi, which had been scheduled for Taungyi in Shan State,
where she is traveling on NLD business. According to Than
Shwe, ASSK was on a "political tour" and any meeting by
Razali with her while she was on that tour would show undue
favoritism for the NLD.


6. (C) In general, Razali concluded that the relationship
between ASSK and Than Shwe was extremely difficult. There
was a great deal of suspicion of ASSK's activities and
apparently Than Shwe felt that somehow, somewhere ASSK had
offended him on two occasions, though nobody would say
exactly what the offense was. As for ASSK, she simply had a
"hard personality" that Than Shwe (and others) had difficulty
dealing with.


7. (C) On other topics, Razali said that he had been warned
not to raise Burma's economic situation with Than Shwe.
Presumably, the senior general had gotten an earful from
other ASEAN members during the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh.
He also suggested that he might be back in January or
February for what will be his tenth visit.
Martinez