DOWNER PUSHES REFORM DURING VISIT TO RANGOON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001293

SIPDIS

USCINCPAC FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2012
TAGS: PREL PHUM AU BM
SUBJECT: DOWNER PUSHES REFORM DURING VISIT TO RANGOON

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez. Reason: 1.5 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Australian Foreign Minister Downer told Than
Shwe and Khin Nyunt that the GOB should move convincingly to
open a political dialogue with the NLD "within the next one
to two weeks." He also urged the government to free all
political prisoners. Khin Nyunt replied that he "fully
subscribed" to Downer's views on the need for prompt action
on political transition; however, neither he nor Than Shwe
made any commitments regarding a timetable for dialogue or
the release of political prisoners. Aung San Suu Kyi
welcomed Downer's visit ("every bit of help was needed"),but
was resolutely skeptical about the GOB's plans for dialog.
She told Downer that there was no dialog with the government
and that she was not convinced that the GOB was committed to
political change. She was also skeptical about Australian
aid initiatives, including the Australian human rights
training program. She was not opposed to assistance per se,
provided it was "transparent, accountable, and independently
monitored." However, she did object to any assistance whose
"nature and manner" was determined by the government. End
Summary.


2. (C) Australian Ambassador Trevor Wilson told diplomats
October 4 that Australian Foreign Minister Downer had been
nervous about the public reaction to his decision to visit
Burma, but left satisfied with the results of the visit. He
had come at the urging of UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail and
wanted to convey Australia's views directly to Burma's
leaders. That plus the opportunity to form his own views
about the situation in Burma made for a good visit.

The Message


3. (C) Downer conveyed the same message in separate meetings
with Senior General Than Shwe, Secretary 1 Khin Nyunt,
Foreign Minister Win Aung, and Home Minister Tin Hlaing.
Australia was concerned about the slow pace of political and
economic change in Burma. It was essential, he said, that
Burma move as soon as possible ("within one to two weeks") on
political reform and transition in a way that was convincing
to the international community. This basically meant
substantive talks with the NLD on political transition. It
was also essential that Burma publicize those moves and
supplement them with measures to establish good faith,
basically through the release of all political prisoners.
Downer predicted that such moves would have "a big impact"
internationally, and would help restart foreign investment
flows for Burma.


4. (C) On the economy, Downer told both Than Shwe and Khin
Nyunt that Burma had to adapt to globalization; it could not
cut itself off from the world. It needed technocrats to run
the economy and assistance to deal with its many humanitarian
problems. Political transition, however, was the key. If it
did not move forward on political transition, it would not
get the support it needed from the world community.

Secretary One

SIPDIS


5. (C) In reply, Secretary 1 Khin Nyunt told Downer that he
"fully subscribed" to Downer's views about taking steps to
show that the process of political transition was on track.
He also stated that that he believed it was essential that
the GOB cooperate with UN Special Envoy Razali, UN Special
Rapporteur Pinheiro, and the ILO. However, neither he nor
Senior General Than Shwe made any commitments to Downer
regarding the timing of any steps in regard to political
transition. Neither did any member of the government make
any commitments regarding the release of political prisoners.


6. (C) Khin Nyunt did claim that the dialog with the NLD was
not stalled. He also called Aung San Suu Kyi's shift to "a
more constructive approach" a very positive step, one that
had allowed the government and the NLD to deal with each
other on a basis of mutual understanding "like members of one
family."

Than Shwe


7. (C) Than Shwe did not mention either the dialog or Aung
San Suu Kyi. However, he did emphasize that he did not want
the military to remain in power forever, or ever again have
to assume power in Burma. That was not good for the either
the country or the military. Rather, he wanted to build a
democratic system that would endure. For Burma, that
required national unity, education, and economic development.
Than Shwe did not respond to Downer's points regarding the
economy, but also did not object to Downer's grim description
of Burma's economic prospects, and did not ask for any type
of Australian assistance.

Home Minister Tin Hlaing


8. (C) Downer told Home Minister Tin Hlaing that there was no
reason for the GOB to hold any political prisoners and that
he hoped that all would be released quickly. He also told
Tin Hlaing that Australia was very satisfied with its
counternarcotics cooperation with Burma and had just decided
to assign a second liaison officer from the Australian
Federal Police to the Embassy in Rangoon. Australia was also
happy with its human rights training for Burmese police
officers, but wanted to expand the program to include
organizations like the NLD. Tin Hlaing said that the GOB was
"prepared to consider that," however, according to Ambassador
Wilson, details on the expanded program still have to be
worked out.

Aung San Suu Kyi


9. (C) Aung San Suu Kyi told Downer that she was glad he had
come. "Every bit of help was needed," she said, to move the
GOB forward on political transition. However, she stated
categorically that no dialog was taking place with the
government. She also said that there had been no significant
contacts between the GOB and the NLD, and that she was not
convinced that the GOB was committed to the process of
political change. In regard to aid, she also told Downer
that she was not opposed to any type of assistance for Burma,
provided that assistance was "transparent, accountable, and
independently monitored." However, she had reservations
about any assistance provided to the government and "would
not support" any assistance whose "nature and manner" was
determined by the government. She was also skeptical about
the value of Australia's human rights training for the
government. Progress on human rights, she said, would depend
on political change. No amount of training could substitute
for that. She also said that she prefers a coordinated
approach to aid; an approach that was coordinated among
donors would have more impact on the GOB; it would also leave
fewer "loopholes" for the government to exploit.

Comment


10. (C) It is hard to say what impact Downer's visit will
have on the reform process here. His comments regarding
political transition, the economy, and the growing
humanitarian problems in Burma were certainly on the mark.
However, it is hard to tell how seriously the government took
those remarks. While Khin Nyunt asserted that he "fully
subscribed" to Downer's views on the need for prompt and
convincing motion in regard to political transition, Than
Shwe did not take up that theme, nor did anyone else echo it.
As usual, we will simply have to wait and see whether there
is any significant motion over the next several weeks.


11. (C) The Australians' initiative on human rights training
for organizations "like the NLD," and the Home Minister's
response to that initiative, was also interesting. It may be
that the GOB is now ready to consider opening the doors
somewhat in regard to involving the NLD in assistance
programs, if only as recipients. If true, even that would be
a step forward, although the entire initiative still needs to
be discussed with the NLD. According to Ambassador Wilson,
Downer did not discuss Australia's plans for the program with
Aung San Suu Kyi.


12. (C) Finally, it was gratifying to hear how direct Downer
was with Than Shwe. According to Ambassador Wilson, Khin
Nyunt and Win Aung had both asked Downer to go easy on Than
Shwe and not be so rude as Japanese Foreign Minister
Kawaguchi in raising awkward issues. To his credit, Downer
ignored the GOB advice and followed Kawaguchi's example.
Than Shwe needs to hear what Downer had to say and, in Post's
view, it is good that Downer was willing to take the
political risks and political heat associated with this visit
in order to put his points across. End Comment.
Martinez