Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02RANGOON1292
2002-10-04 09:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA: BREADBASKET AND BASKET CASE

Tags:  ECON EAGR PHUM BM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001292 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP, EB
BANGKOK FOR AGCOUNSELOR
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
CINCPAC FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2012
TAGS: ECON EAGR PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: BREADBASKET AND BASKET CASE


Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001292

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP, EB
BANGKOK FOR AGCOUNSELOR
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
CINCPAC FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2012
TAGS: ECON EAGR PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: BREADBASKET AND BASKET CASE


Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: Persistent reports of unrest at food
warehouses and distribution points in Burma suggest the
government ration system may be breaking down. If true, then
food problems will only become worse for Burma's poorest in
coming months as inflation accelerates, the kyat continues
its free-fall, and corruption corrodes the government's
ability to deliver basic commodities at subsidized prices.
End summary.

Supply is Up, So is the Price


2. (SBU) Burma does not have a food shortage. While
government statistics are always suspect, the information
available suggests that Burma has consistently produced as
much or more rice per capita as any other country in the
world. According to local numbers compiled by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Burma annually produces about 800
pounds of rice per person, i.e., as much as Thailand, and
more than either Vietnam or Bangladesh.


3. (SBU) This year, Burma seems to be headed again for a
relatively good rice crop. While heavy rains have damaged
crops in central Burma and in the Irrawaddy delta, Burma
nevertheless appears headed for a wet season harvest that is
roughly equivalent to last year's 15 million tons.


4. (C) Stocks are also allegedly ample. By government fiat,
all rice merchants must retain a 120-250 bag surplus
(depending on each merchant's sales volume) that the regime
can order onto the market at a subsidized price through the
Rice Millers Association. In addition, government officials
claim to have "strategic" reserves for use during national
emergencies, though there are real questions as to how large
those strategic stocks are -- or if they even exist.

The Price of Tea in Burma


5. (C) Despite this evidence of adequate supply, there have
been persistent tales of hardship among poorer families and
rumors of sporadic unrest at rice distribution centers across
the country. These appear to be the result of three primary
problems. The first is wage and price pressures generated by
decades of bad economic management by the government. Forty

years of military rule has crippled economic activity, while
the government has supported itself in recent years
essentially with money printed at the Central Bank. For
workers, this translates into a combination of unemployment
and inflation that has held down wages and boosted prices.
Over the past 12 months, retail prices in Rangoon have
increased by approximately 60 percent, while wages have
remained stagnant. Right now rice in the open market in
Rangoon is going for 300 to 350 kyat per pyi (2.2 kilograms),
while factory workers make on average only 300 to 500 kyat
per day, government pensioners only 600 to 800 kyat per
month, and an average laborer or street merchant perhaps 100
to 200 kyat per day.


6. (C) The second factor is a poorly functioning public
ration system, which covers politically sensitive items like
rice, cooking oil (imported palm oil from Malaysia),
gasoline, and soap. Whenever rice prices begin to rise, the
government orders the Rice Millers Association to work with
local township authorities to determine the amount of rice
needed and then procure it at a subsidized price set by the
central government. The township authorities are then
responsible for distribution at this below market price to
local families.


7. (C) However, even the government's subsidized prices
(recently raised from 100 to 130 kyat per pyi for rice) are
too high for some. There is also no needs test; the ration
is available to all citizens regardless of their economic
circumstances. Consequently, many who do not need the
subsidized rice claim their ration anyway to resell on the
open market, exhausting stocks. Moreover, because
distribution centers are disorganized in checking
identification for disbursement of subsidized cooking oil, a
blossoming industry has emerged for those who are able to get
multiple rations to resell for a handsome profit. Finally,
supplies are uncertain thanks to corruption among the
township authorities. We have heard of two recent cases
where the police arrested local authorities for lying about
availability of subsidized rice so that they could resell it
in bulk on the black market.


8. (C) The third factor in the food problem is the obstacles
to the domestic rice trade that the government imposes in an
effort to stem the border trade in rice. Earlier this
summer, for instance, rice shipments from Magwe Division to
northern Rakhine State were reportedly cut off entirely in an
effort to stop cross-border sales to Bangladesh that are
stimulated by the subsidized prices in Burma. The result is
local shortages, usually in the border regions adjacent to
China, India, Bangladesh, and Thailand.

Comment


9. (C) The net result for the government of this system of
rations, subsidies, and trade barriers is a highly
politicized food distribution system that could backfire as
inflation continues to rise, and truly steep differentials
emerge between open market and subsidized prices. Thus far,
only the poorest in Burma have suffered very much. However,
if the system does break down and the government does find
itself incapable of keeping its implicit promise to deliver
food at "reasonable prices," especially in the major urban
areas, then real trouble could result. The government is
gambling that it can maintain control of the ration system
until the wet season harvest in October and November. If as
predicted the harvest is adequate, then the simple increased
availability of food should put a damper on rice price
pressures for a few months. However, if the harvest is below
expectations, there could be more widespread difficulties.
End comment.
Martinez