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02KUWAIT5528 2002-12-26 12:49:00 SECRET Embassy Kuwait
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					  S E C R E T KUWAIT 005528 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2012

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d)

1. (S) Summary: Minstate for Foreign Affairs Shaykh Dr.
Mohammed al-Sabah gave the Ambassador a readout on this
week,s GCC Summit during a December 25th meeting. While
billed as an opportunity to discuss internal GCC issues,
including the conclusion of a much-publicized customs
agreement, Dr. Mohammed said discussion at the conference
focused on Iraq, and that all participants were in agreement
that the Iraqi regime was &very dangerous,8 would not last,
and that military conflict in the near future was inevitable.
In addition to concluding a unanimous resolution condemning
Saddam,s December 7 speech, the participants also agreed to
hold two &secret8 meetings within the next two weeks: one
to discuss the coordination of security efforts among member
states and another to discuss GCC involvement in a
post-Saddam Iraq. End Summary.

GCC on Iraq

2. (S) According to Dr. Mohammed, Saddam Hussein,s December
speech had galvanized opposition to Saddam amongst the ranks
of GCC member states, and there was a realization among the
GCC that the speech should be denounced. To this end, he
said, the participants in the summit allowed the Kuwaiti
delegation to draft a resolution denouncing Saddam,s speech,
which was adopted without &a single dot changed.8 The
resolution was toughly worded, and included language
condemning the speech,s incitement against the Kuwaiti
government and support for terrorist acts in the country.

3. (S) Dr. Mohammed said all parties were in unanimous
agreement on a number of points regarding the Iraqi
situation: that Saddam,s regime poses a distinct danger to
the region; that it is highly unlikely that there will not be
military conflict and that in fact such conflict is imminent;
and that one way or another Saddam,s regime &is gone. It
cannot survive, and we must think of a post-Saddam Iraq.8

What now?

4. (S) Responding to the Ambassador,s question about whether
or not there had been substantive discussion about a
post-Saddam Iraq, Dr. Mohammed revealed that the GCC had
agreed to hold two &secret, unpublicized8 meetings on the
Iraq situation within the next two weeks.

5. (S) Realizing that the &transition period8 between a
Saddam-led Iraq and a future government there may be
dangerous, Dr. Mohammed said the GCC had agreed to hold a
meeting of the head of the various GCC state security
agencies to exchange information and coordinate security

6. (S) In addition, the GCC had adopted by-laws for a new
Joint Defense Committee, whose members will include GCC
Foreign and Defense Ministers. It will meet in Saudi Arabia
for the first time in the coming few weeks. The meeting will
focus on the future of Iraq, including discussion of likely
candidate(s) for leadership in a post-Saddam Iraq.

7. (S) Comment: Dr. Mohammed could not have been clearer
about GCC states' desire to be rid of Saddam once and for
all. This, coupled with their belief that a confrontation is
unavoidable anyway, has spurred them into action to prepare
for the inevitable. While this should facilitate somewhat
approval for U.S. requests for support as we build a
coalition and prepare for a possible confrontation, it also
means that we should be prepared to share our views with GCC
states on a post-Saddam Iraq as soon as possible. Otherwise,
they may go off in another direction, which could complicate
further cooperation.