(C) TALABANI PLEASED WITH KUWAITI RECEPTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 005261

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA, IO/UNP, EUR/UBI
GENEVA FOR STONECIPHER
LONDON FOR GOLDRICH
PARIS FOR OFRIEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2012
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ KU
SUBJECT: (C) TALABANI PLEASED WITH KUWAITI RECEPTION

Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Jalal Talabani, leader of the Iraqi Kurdish
PUK, told Ambassador December 3 he had been well received by
the GOK, which promised to engage with other Iraqi opposition
groups as well, and to facilitate contacts with other Gulf
states. Kuwait's National Assembly had proposed to host a
small conference on the future of Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations, as
early as next month. Talabani expressed assurances that the
PUK was committed to a federal, democratic Iraq respectful of
human rights, with much smaller armed forces. He said he had
also had good meetings with the French government in Paris.
END SUMMARY.


2. (U) At his request (conveyed via NEA/NGA),Jalal
Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK),called on the Ambassador December 3, accompanied by
Adnan Mufti and Adel Murad. PolChief sat in as Notetaker.


3. (C) HIGH-LEVEL WELCOME: Talabani, who arrived at the
Embassy with a substantial Kuwaiti security escort, noted
that this was his second visit to Kuwait since the liberation
in 1991. He was very pleased with the welcome he had
received from the GOK, including a symbolic meeting with the
Crown Prince/Prime Minister, whose debility precludes him
from carrying out official duties in any substantive way. He
had also met with the man who actually runs the country,
First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah
al-Ahmed, as well as with Deputy Prime Minister and Interior
Minister Shaykh Mohammed al-Khaled al-Sabah, Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Shaykh Dr. Mohammed al-Sabah,
Speaker of the National Assembly Jassem al-Khorafi, and
Chairman of the Assembly's Foreign Relations Committee
Mohammed al-Saqer. A planned courtesy call on the Amir was
scrapped at the last minute on the advice of the ruler's
doctor.


4. (C) SUBSTANCE OF TALKS: Talabani told the Ambassador that
Shaykh Sabah was keen to cooperate with the US to get rid of
Saddam, and did not express any need for a UNSCR authorizing
use of force. Shaykh Sabah promised to engage with other
Iraqi opposition groups and facilitate contacts between the
opposition and other Gulf states. The National Assembly's
al-Saqer had promised to attend the upcoming London
conference of the Iraqi opposition, and Shaykh Sabah had
promised to send an observer as well. (Talabani summarized
the purposes of that conferences as follows: unite all Iraqi
opposition groups' appeals to the population; discuss how to
reshape Iraq as a democratic country after Saddam; establish
a coordinating/steering committee.) The Kuwaiti National
Assembly proposed to host a small conference on the future of
Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations, perhaps as early as next month. If
the event took place in January, Talabani said, he would plan
to participate in person; if later, he would send Mufti and
Murad.


5. (C) COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY: Talabani stressed to the
Ambassador, as he said he had done to the Kuwaitis, his
commitment to democratization of Iraq, preservation of
national unity in a federal system, and respect for human
rights. He said it was important to cultivate political ties
across ethnic and religious lines in advance of regime
change, in order to avoid problems afterwards. In this
spirit, the PUK had decided to give 8 of its seats at the
London Conference to Sunni Arabs. Even though the Kurds had
suffered casualties equal to the total number of Kuwaiti
citizens, they did not hate the Iraqi people, just the
regime. Talabani agreed with the Ambassador that Iraq needs
strong institutions and the rule of law, not a strong man.
He thought a three-person presidential council should be part
of the new political structure of the Iraqi state. Noting
that there are already 4 million Iraqis outside the country,
he made the point that national unity has already been
broken; regime change will help restore it. In his view,
Iraq needs no more than about 50,000 troops, i.e. about a
tenth of the current level. A well-trained police force will
be an early and essential need.


6. (C) DEALING WITH TURKEY: Talabani said he had assured
the Turkish Government that "we don't want or need an
independent Kurdish state," but a "better life and our
rights." He said the GOT had decided to talk to the Iraqi
opposition. He described the new Turkish Cabinet as people
he knew, who were committed to raising democracy to European
standards, amending the Constitution to prohibit torture,
promoting political and press freedoms, and giving the Kurds
more space: recognizing their language, ending the 4-year
curfew in Kurdish areas. As for ex-PM Ecevit, Talabani said
he was a paid agent of Saddam and deserved his recent
electoral come-uppance.


7. (C) MEETINGS WITH FRENCH: Noting that he had just come
from Paris, Talabani said he had had "very good meetings"
with French officials including the Interior Minister,
MinState for Foreign Affairs, Speaker of the Senate, and
ex-FM Vedrine. All had supported regime change and democracy
in Iraq, expressing hatred of Saddam, he said. Vedrine had
publicly proposed at an international conference that Saddam
be replaced even if he gives up all WMD.


8. (C) ON TO WASHINGTON: After the London conference,
Talabani said, he would go on to Washington with the other
top Iraqi Kurdish leader, the KDP's Barzani. He praised US
Ambassador to Egypt David Welch for his role in brokering the
Washington Agreement, which he said was being implemented:
"we are uniting our positions, and deportees have begun to
return."
RJONES