EMBASSY REVIEW OF NEPAL'S UN COUNTERTERRORISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000540

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/RA AND IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2012
TAGS: PTER PREL NEPAL'>NP UNSC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY REVIEW OF NEPAL'S UN COUNTERTERRORISM
REPORT

REF: STATE 11645

Classified By: POL/ECON:PMAHONEY. REASON 1.5(B,D)


1. (C) The Embassy has reviewed the Government of NEPAL
(GON) report on its implementation of UNSCR 1373. For many
of its responses, the GON cites the Terrorism and Disruptive
Activities Ordinance (TADO),which has not yet been passed by
Parliament and which narrowly interprets terrorism as acts of
damage or destruction that undermine the sovereignty, peace,
or security of the Kingdom of NEPAL. The TADO is directed at
containing a violent domestic Maoist insurgency whose
partisans seek to overthrow the constitutional monarchy.
Virtually all of NEPAL's limited security, law enforcement,
and intelligence facilities are likewise focused on
containing this domestic insurgency. Because implementation
of existing laws and regulations--whether related to
terrorism or not--is generally weak and ineffective, we
caution that adoption of new legislation does not necessarily
imply greater ability to address potential acts of terrorism.
We do not question the GON's willingness to fight
international terrorism; we question only its capacity to do
so.


2. (C) Response to Operative Paragraph 1:
The GON has not taken any legislative steps--other than
prohibiting extortion or robbery under the TADO--to suppress
the financing of terrorist acts. However, as we have passed
on successive lists of organizations and individuals
proscribed in Executive Order 13224, the GON, through its
Central Bank, has routinely acted quickly to circulate that
information, along with instructions to freeze any accounts
of customers discovered to be on the lists, to commercial
banks and other financial institutions. We are unaware of
any other action--other than passing on this information at
our request--that the GON has undertaken on its own
initiative in this regard. Officials at the Ministry of
Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Central Bank tell
us that no such accounts have been identified, and express
general doubt, given the size of the economy and the limited
nature of the banking system, that NEPAL is a channel for
terrorist financing. If such accounts were identified, the
Central Bank could, under existing regulations, freeze them.
The Ministry of Finance has told us that it is not currently
contemplating any new legislation to strengthen existing
controls against terrorist financing. In general, our sense
is that, if confronted by another friendly government with
compelling evidence of terrorist financing, the GON would
gladly cooperate but is unlikely to initiate such an
investigation or discover such evidence on its own.


3. (C) Operative Paragraph 2 (sub-paragraph a):
No existing legislation specifically prohibits recruitment by
terrorist organizations, other than broad prohibitions
against terrorist activities in the TADO. The Arms and
Ammunition Act restricts the use and availability of
firearms, but NEPAL's inability to police its lengthy border
with India and Tibet makes the smuggling of weapons
comparatively easy. Despite the report's claim that
"mechanisms to share information . . . with countries in the
region" are in place, we note that GON officials often
complain that their Indian counterparts fail to cooperate and
share information on NEPALi Maoist insurgents believed to be
living and/or traveling in India. There is no institutional
culture of intelligence sharing among the various security
forces within the GON, as well as none between the civilian
government and the military, a shortcoming that the newly
established (March 8) National Security Council, comprised of
representatives of the military, police, Armed Police Force,
and domestic intelligence service, is the most recent attempt
to overcome.


4. (C) Operative Paragraph 2 (sub-paragraphs b-f): Despite
GON's best efforts to prevent such activities, NEPAL's
territory has been used as a safe haven by terrorists.
Indian government officials routinely complain that Pakistani
terrorists use NEPAL as a channel. The GON has told us it
has assured India that, once provided with firm evidence of
such activities, the GON will take immediate action. In
fact, the GON has expelled three Pakistan Embassy staff
members since 2000, reportedly for possession of explosives
and/or counterfeit currency. NEPAL has cooperated with the
United States and India to render or extradite suspected
terrorists.


5. (C) Operative Paragraph 2 (sub-paragraph g): Border
controls between India and NEPAL are lax. At present, the
GON does not require any documentation from Indian citizens
crossing into NEPAL by land, although bilateral discussions
are currently underway, according to the head of the
Immigration Department, to institute such requirements.
Indian citizens arriving by air may present a citizenship
certificate, driver's license, or a certification from their
local District Administration Office, in lieu of a passport.
Indian citizens may stay in NEPAL indefinitely. There are
only 15 customs checkpoints along the border with India where
goods and luggage are checked. Indian citizens may also
cross at numerous other points, which are manned only by
police posts unequipped to check the integrity of travel
documents. The Immigration Department maintains a watchlist
of individuals--including, presumably, known terrorists--to
be denied entry into the country, but only immigration
officials at the international airports have access to this
database. NEPALi citizenship certificates, driver's
licenses, and District Administration Office certificates
contain no security features and could easily be forged,
according to an immigration official.



6. (C) Operative Paragraph 3: NEPAL has generally
demonstrated a willingness to be as helpful as possible in
combating terrorism, despite its limited capacity and
resources. The GON tells us it is actively reviewing the six
remaining Counter-terrorism Conventions it has not yet
signed; review of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism appears to be the
farthest along. NEPAL has not acceded to the UN Refugee
Convention and has no domestic laws related to refugees, and
thus has no legislative framework under which to address the
question of the abuse of refugee status by terrorists. In
NEPAL, refugee cases are handled under an informal agreement
with UNHCR.
MALINOWSKI