HUMANITARIAN COSTS OF MAOIST INSURGENCY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000515

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USAID -DCHA/OFDA -RAY DIONNE

LONDON FOR RIEGEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PTER PGOV NP
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN COSTS OF MAOIST INSURGENCY

REF: KATHMANDU 0450


1. Since early 1996, Maoist insurgents have been waging
an increasingly bloody "People's War" aimed at toppling
the constitutional monarchy and democratically elected
government of Nepal. Although initially centered in
impoverished, underdeveloped districts of the west and
mid-west regions, the insurgents have successfully
spread their violent campaign to affect all of Nepal's
75 districts, including those long considered "safe"
from Maoist influence.


2. Besides attacking members of the security forces,
the Maoists have traditionally also targeted local
government officials, teachers, mainstream party
activists, and other perceived representatives of
central government authority living and working in the
remote, rural areas where insurgent activity and
influence have typically been heaviest. In addition,
the insurgents impress children into service as porters,
cooks, and sometimes as armed cadre. In some cases,
girls so conscripted have been sexually assaulted by
Maoist cadre (Reftel) and are unwilling or unable to
return home. Maoist threats, extortion, arson,
abductions, beatings, torture, and murder have long
spread terror through such communities, creating untold-
-and undocumented--numbers of displaced persons unable
to return to their homes. Countermeasures by the
security forces have also contributed to the involuntary
movement of people.


3. Since halting negotiations with Prime Minister Sher
Bahadur Deuba and unilaterally breaking a four-month
ceasefire November 23, however, the Maoists have sharply
increased both the frequency and the intensity of such
attacks against military, police, and civilian targets.
The Human Rights Report for 2001 documents the
increasing number of incidents and their victims.
Every day, Tribhuvan University Hospital in Kathmandu
admits an average of two victims of Maoist violence from
across the country; an unknown number of others are
treated in smaller district hospitals. Many of the
victims suffer from shattered limbs, multiple stab
wounds, and even amputations. Of the more than 3,000
people killed by both sides in the insurgency over the
past six years, over half have been killed in just the
three months since the ceasefire was broken.


4. The families of those killed, injured, or otherwise
intimidated often flee their homes in fear, leaving
behind their property and businesses, to seek the
comparative safety of the district headquarters, the
capital, or the homes of relatives in other areas. In
the face of severe budgetary constraints, the Government
of Nepal (GON) makes no provision for such individuals,
who must depend on relatives or the limited number of
charitable institutions active in Nepal for assistance.
No GON office--including the Disaster Management unit in
the Home Ministry--has set up a central system to
register such cases or to maintain data on the number of
such internally displaced persons, but anecdotal
evidence suggests a conservative estimate could reach
well over the thousands.


5. The Embassy's own quick survey of conditions in
selected districts revealed the following. The Chief
District Officer (CDO) in Baglung knows of 70 families
who have left their homes and are now staying at
district headquarters; the CDO in Salyan knows of 100;
while in Surkhet there are 128 known cases. The local
chapter of the Red Cross in Rukum, meanwhile, counts 90
displaced families. The CDO in Lalitpur in Kathmandu
Valley (where many displaced persons seeking refuge in
the capital turn up) says about 80 people from across
the country have registered with his office. Since
civil servants often live above their offices in the
districts, a number of families were made homeless when
the insurgents burned down government buildings and some
private homes in the Feb. 17 attack in Achham District.
The Nepal Maoist Victim Association, a charity
affiliated with the Nepali Congress Party, meanwhile,
has documented 452 killings and 916 injuries of
civilians by Maoists. At least 1,000 individuals have
sought the Association's support over the past few
years. The Embassy was unable to verify statistics in
another 12 heavily affected districts, where telephone
service has been cut by Maoist attacks on repeater
stations.


6. T.R. Onta, Executive Director of the Nepal Red Cross
Society, says his organization has provided assistance
to some of the victims of Maoist-related violence,
including to 300 families in Achham. He would like to
do more to help the displaced, but is constrained by a
lack of resources, as well as by the lack of information
from the GON. Onta has asked the local Nepal Red Cross
chapters, which operate in all 75 districts, to carry
out an assessment of the number of displaced and their
needs so that the Society can better plan its efforts to
respond. While generally responsive and proactive in
the event of natural disasters, the Home Ministry does
not recognize the chronic displacement of average
Nepalis from their homes as a disaster and has therefore
not responded.


6. Comment: Spectacular Maoist assaults like the
attack on Achham receive wide press coverage here, and
the GON has publicly appealed for aid to rebuild the
demolished district headquarters. But little is being
done to address the quieter, more pervasive everyday
tragedy of individual families being forced from their
homes because their government can no longer guarantee
their safety. Families fleeing violence lose their
livelihoods, their property, and, often, the chance to
educate their children. Other casualties of the
conflict, like children recruited--and, in some cases,
sexually abused--by the Maoists also suffer
displacement. Civilian survivors of violence cannot
count on GON support to cover medical costs, many of
which include long-term hospital stays. The number of
these victims is likely to continue to climb as security
forces expand cordon and search operations and as the
Maoists, under pressure from security forces on the more
conventional battlefield, resort to increased terror and
intimidation among helpless civilian populations. The
GON is clearly not equipped to address the mounting
needs of these victims and must work with the donor
community to take immediate action to stem this
humanitarian crisis.

MALINOWSKI