Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02KATHMANDU496
2002-03-08 11:47:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

LIVING IN TERROR IN WESTERN NEPAL'S PLAINS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL PINR NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000496 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR NP
SUBJECT: LIVING IN TERROR IN WESTERN NEPAL'S PLAINS

REFS: A) 377 KATHMANDU, B) 01 KATHMANDU 2383, C) 01
KATHMANDU 2292

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000496

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR NP
SUBJECT: LIVING IN TERROR IN WESTERN NEPAL'S PLAINS

REFS: A) 377 KATHMANDU, B) 01 KATHMANDU 2383, C) 01
KATHMANDU 2292


1. (SBU) Summary. Violence increased in two western Nepal
districts bordering India following the end of the Maoist-
government cease-fire in late November, 2001, but western
Nepal's largest city remained calm. Ambassador had
visited the area February 22 to 24 and Poloff revisited
the region in early March. Maoists usually operated when
and where security forces were absent, but villagers also
reported fearing the sweeps and sometimes heavy-handed
tactics used against the Maoists. Authorities complained
of a paucity of resources to fight the insurgency, and
expressed concern over a remote area of their district
where Maoists have reportedly been most active. The
insurgents seem to prey on the low social and economic
status of the minorities in the region more than on ethnic
or caste resentment. Officials and locals alike agreed on
the imperative of development. A member of the Tharu
ethnic elite doubted equally the ability of the government
or the Maoists to gain the upper hand. End Summary.


2. (SBU) During a February 28-March 3 mission to Banke and
Bardiya districts, Poloff revisited areas he had traveled
to in October, 2001 (Ref B). Ambassador had visited
Banke, Accham and Bardiya district February 22 to 24.
Banke and Bardiya are situated in the plains region
bordering India known as the Terai.

Violence in Rural Villages, but Situation "Normal"
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) Assistant Chief District Officer (ACDO) for
Banke, Laxman Sharan Ghimire, told Poloff that beatings
and murders - especially of Village Development Committee
(VDC) chairmen and Nepali Congress supporters - had become
commonplace in the villages outside Nepalgunj, the
district headquarters. The CDO's office received reports
of occasional Maoist incursions into Banke from the thick
forests in neighboring districts, but believed nonetheless
that conditions in their jurisdiction were much better
than in neighboring Bardiya district, where Maoist-related
incidents occurred nearly every day. Ghimire insisted
that the situation in his district was "normal." A
Nepalese UN staffer also related that security in outlying
villages was increasingly a problem, although little had

changed in Nepalgunj proper. [Note: During the
Ambassador's recent visit to Nepalgunj, a member of the
area's most prominent family related that his relatives
had discouraged him from visiting his orchards - only five
miles outside Nepalgunj - on account of the security risk.
End Note.]


4. (SBU) NGOs working in both Banke and Bardiya reported
that although built-up areas had become safer following
the end of the Maoist-government cease-fire and subsequent
government declaration of a state of emergency in late
November, 2001, the Maoists continued to terrorize
residents - beating and even killing people - in villages
where security personnel were not deployed or had only a
passing presence. Both the Maoists and security forces
were moving from village to village conducting search
operations, and as a result villagers feared both sides.
The UN staffer related that his brother, who works as a
teacher in a village about fifty minutes by motorcycle
outside Nepalgunj, had been confronted by Maoists on
several occasions. The men - strangers he did not
recognize - had ordered him to close the school. He
disobeyed, fearing that security forces would accuse him
of supporting the Maoists if he shut down.


5. (SBU) One NGO representative declared that many
villagers were confused about the state of emergency
because they did not know that it was directed against the
Maoists, and not them. A few felt terrorized by the
police or alienated by the sometimes heavy-handed tactics
used against the Maoists.

Western Nepal's Largest Town Quiet
--------------


6. (SBU) Following the government's declaration of a state
of emergency in late November, 2001, Maoists had not
engaged in violent activities in Nepalgunj, the largest
city in western Nepal, the Banke CDO's office insisted.
However, Maoist extortion of the city's businessmen and
industrialists had continued. The ACDO emphasized that
the overall crime rate in Nepalgunj had gone down since
the imposition of the state of emergency. [Note: Post
records confirm that no Maoist-related incidents occurred
in Nepalgunj following the emergency declaration. The
last violent incident in Nepalgunj occurred February 13,
2000, when a bomb went off on the roof of the Banke Land
Revenue Office, though a much-publicized incident occurred
in August, 2001, when Maoists firebombed a distillery
about twenty miles to the west of the city. Nepalgunj is
also the headquarters of the Royal Nepal Army and the
police in western Nepal. Both institutions maintain a
number of institutions in town. Several sources claimed
that the vast majority of people in Nepalgunj opposed the
Maoists, and Post has seen no evidence to suggest that the
Maoists have garnered support from urban Nepalese. End
Note.]

Resource Scarcity Greatest Problem
--------------


7. (SBU) ACDO Ghimire complained that the lack of
resources for security operations presented the greatest
challenge to authorities in his district. His office
maintained daily contact with the RNA Divisional HQ in
Nepalgunj to discuss this and other issues. He judged
that the RNA lacked resources to counter the Maoists, and
helicopters were especially needed, as without them it was
hard to respond when people were hurt or killed. [Note:
The RNA echoed this judgement in recent briefings for
visiting DOD staff (Septel).] Ghimire also said the
recent upgrade of the RNA base in Nepalgunj to a
divisional-level headquarters suggested to him that
resources were slowly arriving. The upgrade helped
psychologically, and locals had begun to feel a change for
the better. Ghimire also commented that the recent deaths
of two CDOs at the hands of the Maoists in Solukhumbu and
Accham districts (Refs A and C) had had a demoralizing
effect on civil service personnel.

Maoists Flourish in Remote Areas
--------------


8. (SBU) Of particular concern to Ghimire were nine Maoist-
affected villages in eastern Banke, cut off from the rest
of the district by the Rapti river. The Chairman of
Banke's District Development Committee (DDC) also
expressed worries about Maoist activity in the Kamaiya-
affected VDCs across the Rapti, and the head of the Land
Reform Office labeled the areas "dangerous" due to ongoing
Maoist activity. Access is difficult, and the government
has never had a firm presence there. During the dry
season the Rapti is fordable in places; otherwise the trip
requires a detour through India. Plans have been made for
a bridge over the Rapti, but the road department has yet
to settle the financing. Authorities shut down a
permanent police post deep in the area, but opened two
temporary police posts in more hospitable locations.
[Note: During the Ambassador's late February visit to
Nepalgunj, RNA top brass claimed to have information about
400 potential Maoists gathered east of the Rapti, but due
in part to a lack of good intelligence had decided not to
act against them. End Note.]

Maoists Keeping Clear Route to India?
--------------


9. (SBU) Ghimire mentioned rumors that the Maoists
maintain a hands-off policy in Banke in order to preserve
it as a route for supplies from India, but confessed that
he had no evidence that the insurgents conducted supply
operations through his district. At present, he went on,
Indians and Nepalese crossed the India-Nepal border
without showing identification, and that needed to change
to prevent terrorists from crossing back and forth.

Ethnic Relations a Symptom, But Not a Cause
--------------


10. (SBU) Ghimire judged that the Maoists had been able to
draw support from minorities in remote areas primarily on
account of their poverty, but also due to widespread
illiteracy and the lack of employment opportunities.
Furthermore, the Maoists seemed to be increasing their
numbers by force alone. Ghimire, who, like ninety-six
percent of Chief District Officers, is a high-caste
Brahman, stated that Tharus in the region have been
traditionally dominated by higher castes. [Comment:
Ghimire's clearly meant to suggest that the Tharus were
thus easily subjugated by the Maoists as well.] Banke's
DDC Chairman noted that the Maoists had exploited not only
the caste issue, but also divisions between haves and have-
nots; their strategy was to "divide and rule" by dividing
people along either caste or tribal lines or socio-
economic divides. At the Land Reform Office, Poloff heard
that the Maoists had set up a front organization, the
Tharu Liberation Front, and through it had begun to gain
support from a few Tharus. In that instance, the Maoists
were exploiting the Tharu's poverty, but not necessarily
ethnic or caste resentment, the Land Office head judged.

Desperately Seeking Development
--------------


11. (SBU) Ghimire felt that the government he himself
represented had not addressed the concerns of the poor and
unemployed. Poverty alleviation and employment generation
projects were still essential. Development should be
suited to local conditions, focussed on eliminating high-
level corruption and nepotism, and aimed at improving the
socio-economic sector, prescribed Ghimire.


12. (SBU) Fatte Singh Tharu, former MP and Communications
Minister and currently head of the rightist RPP party in
Banke, noted that his district hosts no large factories,
only small-scale enterprises, and its economy was
operating "day by day." Banke could support a sugar cane
or paper factory, either of which would give a boost to
the economy by providing employment and import
substitution opportunities. Irrigation, electrification
and roads were also needed, Singh told us.


13. (SBU) Other NGOs working in the region report that
before the declaration of the state of emergency they used
to meet with Maoists in order to find out what they were
thinking, inform them of their activities, and assure them
that they were working solely on projects to uplift the
most socially and economically disadvantage. After the
emergency, all such contacts ceased as the Maoists went
deeper underground and security forces kept a closer watch
on what was going on.

Panchayat-Era Tharu Leader's Reactions
--------------


14. (SBU) Fatte Singh Tharu concluded that because the
Maoists lacked public support they would be unable to win
the war. Unfortunately, the government could not win
either, because it too did not have the public's backing.
This was partly due to the fact that justice only served
the interests of the strong and powerful in Nepal. [Note:
Tharu was once prosecuted for corruption.] Moreover, the
government still had not developed a strategy to encourage
public participation in its efforts. Tharu added that
Nepalese appreciated USG support, but that it was late in
coming. [Comment: Fatte Singh Tharu, an accomplished
senior politician with rightist views, is living proof of
the diversity within the ethnic Tharu community. Although
widely viewed as backwards, uneducated peasants, in fact
the Tharus are a diverse community. End Comment


15. (SBU) Reflecting on the origins of the insurgency,
Tharu blamed the rise of the Maoists on misguided and
intrusive central government policies that undercut the
economies of the most heavily Maoist-affected hill
districts and gave the Maoists "room to develop." After
the government banned marijuana cultivation in the 1970s,
it never delivered on promised crop-substitution programs.
Small iron mines were closed due to the ecological harm
they caused. Finally, the Forest Department banned the
collection and export of wild herbs from public land,
cutting off a major source of income for many villagers.
Three decades ago Nepal exported agricultural products,
but as a result of these and similar policies that was no
longer the case. Tharu then went on to describe his plans
to save Nepal through a "green revolution," adding that
members of the current administration had thwarted his
plans.

Comment
--------------


16. (SBU) Nepalgunj proper has not seen a violent Maoist-
related incident in nearly two years, so it is not
surprising that authorities have managed to keep the city
under wraps in recent months. That area villages have
become less secure since the emergency declaration is a
cause for concern, however, and underlines Nepal's
desperate need for resources both to combat the Maoists
and to improve conditions in its villages. The visits to
Banke and Bardiya confirmed our suspicions that the
insurgency does not enjoy broad-based public support in
these districts, and highlighted the Maoists' use of
coercion and violence to obtain the limited support that
they do have.

MALINOWSKI