NEPAL: ARMY PLAN TO INITIATE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002264

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2012
TAGS: MARR MOPS ECON PGOV NEPAL'>NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: ARMY PLAN TO INITIATE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
FORCE

REF: KATHMANDU 2169

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a November 21 meeting with Ambassadors and NEPALi
business leaders, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Pyar Jung
Thapa announced plans to form a 3,000-man "industrial
security force" within the Royal NEPAL Army (RNA). If
approved by the Cabinet, this new force, which he expects to
be operational with the next six months, will be dedicated to
providing security for sensitive business and industrial
operations. The General also discussed the possible creation
of "village defense forces," or local militias, in remote
areas, a proposal not favored by other senior military
leaders. End summary.

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INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE ANNOUNCED
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2. (SBU) On November 21 Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Pyar
Jung Thapa briefed business leaders, heads of binational
Chambers of Commerce, and foreign ambassadors on plans to
form an "industrial security force" within the Royal NEPAL
Army (RNA). The mission of the new unit will be to provide
security to sensitive business and industrial establishments.
Thapa proposed that 3,000 of the 10,000 new RNA recruits
will form the core of the new force. The new force could be
trained and ready for deployment by May. The proposal to
form the force is now before the Cabinet, he said.


3. (SBU) According to the proposal, the RNA will provide
the manpower, training and equipment for the force, Thapa
said, but private businesses benefiting from the enhanced
protection will be expected to provide food, uniforms, and
housing for the troops. Thus all new business projects
should factor security costs into their budgets, he
cautioned. (Note: He did not provide estimated annual costs
for maintaining the force. End note.) Despite being tied
down with the tasks of providing security to 75 district
headquarters, sensitive infrastructure like airports and
hydroelectric plants, and key personnel and facilities within
the capital, the RNA must take on this additional role
because the civil police and Armed Police Force (APF) are
unable to do so at this time. The RNA does not enjoy
performing such "peripheral duties," but recognizes its duty
to do so, Thapa said, noting the Army's patrolling of customs
checkpoints had resulted in a 30-40 percent increase in
revenue collection. The RNA will begin the task of protecting
businesses; the civil police and APF will then pick up their
share of the burden later as their capability improves. The
RNA can advise investors and entrepreneurs on site selection
for new projects, he added. Ambassador Malinowski suggested
that the RNA designate a point of contact for businessmen
with questions or concerns regarding security. Thapa agreed
to do so.

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VILLAGE DEFENSE FORCES
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4. (C) The military alone, stretched as it is with
"peripheral duties" and maintaining security at key sites,
cannot counter the insurgency, Thapa warned. The APF is not
yet adequately trained, and is "only taking up resources
right now." The RNA is thus considering developing "a new
strategy" of employing "village defense forces" to supplement
security in remote areas. Villagers would be trained and
armed with shotguns and muskets. The villagers would be the
first line of defense under this strategy, while the RNA
would provide "a reaction force." Members of the new
militias could also provide information on Maoist activities
and plans so the RNA could mount large-scale attacks. For
this strategy to work, formation of the militias must also be
linked up with solid rural development plans for these areas,
Thapa noted. The UK Ambassador suggested that his goverment
might be able to provide some experts on civil defense forces
to assist with this strategy.

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HOW ARE THE MAOISTS DOING?
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5. (C) The Maoists' savage tactics have eroded their
erstwhile popular support, Thapa declared. Only about 20-30
percent of their current forces are "hard-core," he
estimated, while another 50 percent may have been conscripted
forcibly into their ranks. Rural areas have been depopulated
as one-time residents flee forced conscription. The Maoists'
new strategy is to target schoolchildren for recruitment,
Thapa said.


6. (C) The RNA controls the headquarters of all 75
districts. Outside district headquarters, however, is
another matter, Thapa acknowledged. Some districts, such as
Rolpa, are almost completely Maoist. He speculated that the
Maoists may be attempting to move south of their original
power base in Rukum-Rolpa-Jajarkot, where most of the people
are ethnic Magar, toward Dang, where much of the population
are disaffected Tharus and Kamaiyas, the former bonded
laborer class. The Maoists appear better armed than before,
he continued, and undoubtedly have better weapons and
training than the civilian police. In the battle in Jumla,
for example (Reftel),they fired 81 mm mortars at close
range. The insurgents occupied civilian homes in their
effort to take the district headquarters, making it difficult
for the RNA to return fire. Nonetheless, the RNA battalion
succeeded in turning back a Maoist attack at the brigade
level. The RNA had improved perimeter defenses around the
headquarters. In the past, the Maoists have successfully
used hooks to pull apart barbed wire defenses. In Jumla,
however, the RNA had used double and triple strands of barbed
wire that the Maoists had been unable to penetrate.


7. (C) The Maoists are not sincere about dialogue, Thapa
asserted, adding the RNA had captured Maoist documents
indicating that talks were to be used only as a ploy.
Nonetheless, talks can be a good thing, he suggested, and the
Government must remain open to them. Altogether, 16,000
Maoists have surrendered, he noted, but the Government still
lacks an effective program for their rehabilitation. Right
now, surrendered Maoists are put on parole, whence they
frequently disappear. Thapa said he has raised with the
Government the possibility of setting up rehabilitation
camps, as had been operational in Sri Lanka. Such camps
could also be a magnet to draw in others debating whether to
surrender, he said.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) The business community, caught between frequent
general strikes and even more frequent extortion demands, has
been pleading with the RNA to augment its protection of key
business and investment enterprises. The RNA, strapped for
both human and financial resources, is clearly looking to the
business community to fill at least part of the budgetary
shortfall. Gen. Thapa's presentation is the first indication
of any RNA enthusiasm we have heard for the concept of local
militias. Clearly a village defense force is a difficult
program to implement successfully for a variety of reasons,
including caste and educational disparities, logistical
factors, and security concerns. The RNA and the Government
will have to plan very carefully how to train, equip, and
employ this local militia, lest it become a hapless victim of
the Maoists and a source of additional weapons for them.
Other senior military leaders have told us that they have
serious doubts about this proposal. When informed of the
concept, IGP Shrestha of the APF quipped that it would be
better to supply the villagers with cell phones (which
Shrestha knows would not work in most of NEPAL) than arms.
What the Government most needs from the villagers is timely
intelligence, Shrestha said.


MALINOWSKI