Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02KATHMANDU2245
2002-11-25 10:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

U.S. ARMS SALES TO NEPALI ARMY MAKES FRONT-PAGE

Tags:  MASS PREL PTER KPAO CASC NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002245 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS, SA/RA, DS/IP/SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2012
TAGS: MASS PREL PTER KPAO CASC NP
SUBJECT: U.S. ARMS SALES TO NEPALI ARMY MAKES FRONT-PAGE
NEWS

REF: KATHMANDU 2171

Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002245

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS, SA/RA, DS/IP/SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2012
TAGS: MASS PREL PTER KPAO CASC NP
SUBJECT: U.S. ARMS SALES TO NEPALI ARMY MAKES FRONT-PAGE
NEWS

REF: KATHMANDU 2171

Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).


1. (SBU) Reports on U.S. sales of M-16 rifles to the Royal
Nepal Army (RNA) appeared on the front pages of the November
23 editions of leading newspapers. Disclosure of this
information, apparently leaked by the RNA itself, follows a
November 15 Maoist statement claiming responsibility for the
killings of two Embassy guards and warning that diplomatic
missions working against the Maoists "will not be spared by
our party." Suggested press guidance follows in Para 4
below. End summary.


2. (U) On November 23, the Kathmandu Post, the
largest-circulation English daily, and its vernacular
counterpart, Kantipur, ran front-page reports on U.S. sales
of M-16 rifles to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). The story,
quoting unidentified "RNA sources," reported RNA plans over
the next three years to provide every soldier with an M-16.
(Note: A statement in the fourth paragraph of the story,
alleging that a first tranche of 5,000 of the weapons were
received in August, is incorrect. No weapons have yet been
received by the RNA. End note.) The RNA decision to
purchase the rifles is explicitly linked to "escalating
Maoist violence."


3. (C) Comment: Until now, the Embassy has successfully
deflected specific queries from the public and the press
about details of our security assistance to the Government of
Nepal and the RNA. It will be difficult for us to continue
to do so, at least with respect to our sales of M-16s.
Delivery of the first 1,500 may take place as early as
December, with the balance of the delivery in March. The
story follows a November 15 press release from the Maoists
claiming responsibility for the slayings of two U.S. Embassy
guards (both Nepali) on December 15, 2001, and on November 9,
2002 (Reftel). The press release sparked concern because of
its explicit warning that members of the U.S. and other
diplomatic missions "working against the Maoist party or . .
. to destroy the people's war . . . will not be spared by our
party. . . . We do not have the policy of fighting against
them unless they come to fight with us." We suspect the
Maoists may well have known the rifles were coming, although
information about exact numbers and delivery dates may have
been sketchy. Now that the story is out, we think it is
important that it be couched in a manner that the USG policy
decision to expand its military-to-military relationship with
Nepal be linked publicly to Maoist terror. At the same time,
we plan to emphasize the unprecedented levels of our
development assistance and note that the arms sales in no way
undercut our previously stated support for a negotiated
resolution to the conflict.


4. (SBU) Begin text of suggested, if-asked press guidance:

IF ASKED ABOUT WEAPONS SALES:

--The USG has agreed to sell M-16 rifles to the Royal Nepal
Army. We have provided such rifles in the past for
international peacekeeping.

--This agreement follows a USG policy decision to support the
Government of Nepal in its fight against Maoist terror and
violence against innocent civilians. This violence has
obstructed international development programs--including
decades of US assistance--and severely undermined Nepal's
economic growth and social welfare.

--Our security assistance to Nepal has expanded in direct
response to the unprecedented expansion of Maoist violence.

--This assistance will include equipment, supplies, and
training, with particular emphasis on human rights training
for Royal Nepal Army soldiers.

--We know that resolving the insurgency will require more
than security assistance. Our government has increased
development assistance to Nepal to the unprecedented level of
almost USD 38 million--more than double the amount of our
security assistance.

--More important than either security or development
assistance from foreign donors is commitment from the
government, the insurgents and the Nepali people to finding a
peaceful resolution to the conflict that upholds
constitutional multi-party democracy.

--We call on the Maoists to cease their campaign of violence
and terror and accept the government's call for dialogue.

MALINOWSKI