Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02KATHMANDU1797
2002-09-16 12:13:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: MAOIST STRIKE GENERALLY OBSERVED IN

Tags:  PTER ASEC PGOV NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001797 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/OP/NEA
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOIST STRIKE GENERALLY OBSERVED IN
KATHMANDU VALLEY

REF: KATHMANDU 1693 AND PREVIOUS

---------------------------
SHOPS CLOSED; VEHICLES IDLE
----------------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001797

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/OP/NEA
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOIST STRIKE GENERALLY OBSERVED IN
KATHMANDU VALLEY

REF: KATHMANDU 1693 AND PREVIOUS

--------------
SHOPS CLOSED; VEHICLES IDLE
--------------


1. (U) The general strike, or "bandh," called by Maoist
insurgents nationwide for September 16 appeared to have been
generally observed in the Kathmandu metropolitan area. Only
about five percent of the shops along main thoroughfares in
the city opened (although some along less-traveled side
streets defied the ban),and few private vehicles--with the
exception of a rare motorcycle or two--were observed plying
the streets. Even government vehicles, which had made a
point of traveling the roads during the five-day strike in
April, this time seemed few and far between. Foot traffic,
however, was heavy, and many Kathmanduites appeared to spend
the day sitting in front of their shuttered homes and shops,
chatting. Sources in the adjoining cities of Patan and
Bhaktapur reported a similar drop in traffic. A quick
telephone survey of five districts in different parts of the
country revealed that while some shops in district
headquarters had opened, private vehicles--including
long-distance buses--were not operating.

--------------
GENERAL CALM;
SOME BOMBS
--------------


2. (U) The streets of Kathmandu and adjoining cities were
generally reported calm throughout the day. Early in the
morning two bombs exploded in neighboring Bhaktapur, but no
casualties were reported. Security personnel defused another
would-be early-morning bomb near the entrance to a boys'
school in adjoining Lalitpur. One suspect was apprehended
after attempting to place a bomb near a popular Kathmandu
hotel at 6:00 a.m. September 16. A mid-day report over
Nepali radio that authorities had apprehended a suicide
bomber proved to be fictitious.


3. (U) The preceding day bombs were found at five different
locations across Kathmandu. Two of the bombs exploded, one
less than a kilometer from the British Embassy. (The
suspected target was a dairy corporation building; no
injuries were reported.) Another explosive, placed near a
police post, injured five when it detonated.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


4. (SBU) That the September 16 strike seems to have been
better observed, at least in the Kathmandu Valley, by a
greater portion of the general public than previous bandhs
over the past year may be attributed to several factors.
First, the two weeks preceding the bandh witnessed
intensified Maoist activity, particularly in the form of
scattered improvised explosive devices, within Kathmandu
proper (Reftel). Second, the insurgents' surprise attacks on
a police post and a district headquarters in different parts
of the country, in which more than 100 members of the
security forces were killed, undoubtedly scared people lulled
into a false sense of security by the monsoon moratorium on
hostilities. Third, the Maoists recently have stepped up
violent activities against civilian targets--usually
local-level political figures in rural areas--in an effort to
discourage participation in upcoming national elections.
Finally--and perhaps most decisive--was the Government of
Nepal (GON) approach to the bandh this time. Before the
April bandh, the GON launched a public relations offensive
against the strike, pledging openly to provide security to
any business that opened and encouraging private vehicles to
defy the bandh by running government-plated vehicles up and
down the streets. This time, however, the GON made a
conscious decision to adopt a low-profile reaction in order
to deny the insurgents any additional publicity for their
effort. But absent any clear signal from the GON, this time
many business owners apparently decided not to take a chance
and remained closed. We expect the Maoists to tout the high
observance of the bandh as a victory.
MALINOWSKI