Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02KATHMANDU1781
2002-09-12 08:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL'S KING SAYS NOT YET TIME TO INTERVENE

Tags:  PGOV PREL NP GON 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001781 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL'S KING SAYS NOT YET TIME TO INTERVENE

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1772


B. (B) KATHMANDU 1762

C. (C) 120813Z SEP 02

D. (D) STATE 175352

Classified By: POL PMAHONEY. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

--------
SUMMARY
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001781

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL'S KING SAYS NOT YET TIME TO INTERVENE

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1772


B. (B) KATHMANDU 1762

C. (C) 120813Z SEP 02

D. (D) STATE 175352

Classified By: POL PMAHONEY. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a September 12 meeting, King Gyanendra assured the
Ambassador that he would not use his constitutional authority
to intervene in the government unless he gains public
national consensus on the move from all mainstream political
parties and unless all other constitutional remedies were
exhausted. That time has not yet arrived. He emphasized
that he would take such action only to preserve, rather than
undermine, democracy. Given the fractiousness and
self-interest that motivates many political leaders, the
King's refusal to act unless he has full public national
consensus is wise. End summary.

--------------
NOT YET TIME FOR ACTION
--------------


2. (U) On the evening of September 12, at the Palace's
request the Ambassador called on King Gyanendra. Ambassador
opened the meeting by giving the King the text of President
Bush's message of thanks for Government of Nepal (GON)
support in the global campaign against terrorism (Ref C).
The King was quite pleased by the letter and asked the
Ambassador to convey his thanks to the White House.


3. (C) The King asked for the Ambassador's assessment of the
state of affairs in Nepal. The Ambassador described the
situation as dire and expressed sympathy for the victims of
recent Maoist attacks. He noted that during his meeting with
Prime Minister Deuba earlier in the day (Ref A) the PM had
seemed worried for several reasons, including recent Maoist
successes in the field, ongoing intra-party strife, rumors of
corruption surrounding his closest advisors, and fear that he
may have lost the confidence of the King. The King
acknowledged that Deuba is under significant pressure, adding
that he had met the PM just the day before.


4. (C) Many people are claiming that "I'll do something" to
intervene, the King acknowledged, adding that numerous
individuals across the political spectrum had come to see him
recently to ask him to act. He emphasized that any action he

would take would be to preserve democracy, not to undermine
it. He plans to do nothing, however, until all existing
constitutional remedies are exhausted. That point has not
yet been reached. Despite the obvious problems that are
making elections appear less and less feasible, the King
assured the Ambassador that he will not act unless he obtains
public consensus from all the major political parties to
support such action. So far, no one has been willing to say
anything in public, he noted. "They want me to act on my
own" so that they criticize the move later if it suits their
political aims.

--------------
CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT ENVISIONED
--------------


5. (C) Should the King obtain such national consensus and
invoke his constitutional authority to intervene, the
Ambassador asked, what might an interim government look like?
The King replied that he envisions a national consensus
government, with representation from all political parties.
With the support of such national consensus, even the Maoists
might be invited to participate, provided they laid down
their arms first. Contrary to current rumors--and the PM's
own fears (Ref A)--the King said he had no particular person
in mind to head such a government. Instead, the person
should be chosen by the leaders of all the political parties
to ensure national consensus.


6. (C) Ambassador delivered Ref D talking points,
emphasizing that elections should be pursued if at all
possible, and stressing that any action taken by the King
should be done in strict accord with constitutional
provisions and supported by broad political consensus. The
King agreed that he should first seek advice from the Supreme
Court before taking any action. (Note: According to the
British Ambassador, who met the King one hour earlier, the
King disagreed when the UK Ambassador made the same point,
reportedly arguing that he had no need to consult the Court.
The British Ambassador's talking points for his meeting with
the King were virtually identical to ours. End note.) He
noted again that he did not contemplate action soon, but said
that people should not be surprised if they wake up one
morning and read about it in the newspapers.

--------------
PM SHOULD CLEAN HOUSE FIRST
--------------


7. (C) The King described the Prime Minister as "overly
concerned." The only words of caution he has given Deuba so
far is that "he should be clean." The Ambassador pointed out
that many of the most powerful and influential members of the
PM's cabinet are also those tainted by corruption, and
suggested that Deuba may be reluctant to alienate them. The
King said he had assured Deuba if he cleans up his Cabinet,
he could guarantee that the (ostensibly autonomous)
anti-corruption commission would defer investigating the
ousted ministers for a year. The Prime Minister is a good
man, the King reflected, but he seems to be poorly advised.
He needs to plan more ahead. Instead, he is too narrowly
focused on intra-party power struggles. He has not thought
ahead, for example, on what he will do if the Election
Commission decides not to award his faction use of the Nepali
Congress Party symbol during elections. The PM's wife, Arzu
Deuba, could be a source of good advice for him, the King
concluded.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) The King is clearly considering taking action, but
is wisely waiting for broad-based and public cover before
doing so. A tacit consensus seems to be mounting that the
elections cannot be held for security reasons, and royal
intervention could provide a face-saving way out for
politicos unwilling to risk life and limb on the campaign
trail. But if the leaders of various political parties have
decided among themselves that elections are not feasible and
are hoping for the King to give them a way, they will have to
come together publicly to ask him to do so. If elections
indeed cannot be held, a national consensus government,
headed by a person chosen by all mainstream political
parties, may be the best interim option available.


MALINOWSKI