Maoist Insurgency Exacts Heavy Toll on Food

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001537

SIPDIS

ROME FOR FODAG
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID EAGR PTER AORC ASEC PHUM NP
SUBJECT: Maoist Insurgency Exacts Heavy Toll on Food
Security in Rural Nepal

REF: A) Kathmandu 1477, B) KATHMANDU 1105,

C) KATHMANDU 871


1. (U) Summary: Nepal's Maoist insurgency poses a serious
threat to food security in many areas of Nepal, according
to UN officials and other experts. The effects of Maoist
raids on private food stores and food aid, military
efforts to restrict Maoist food supplies, and disruptions
in agriculture could lead to a major humanitarian crisis
if not reversed, they say. Insurgents have stolen
hundreds of metric tons of supplies provided by the World
Food Program (WFP) for areas of greatest food scarcity.
In response, WFP suspended programs in some areas and
attached conditions to their resumption, including
compensation and security guarantees. Nepal's armed
forces have restricted the transport of foodstuffs to
Maoist-controlled areas -- a strategy the WFP has
criticized -- and offered to provide security for UN food
shipments. The food security problem will likely worsen
unless the insurgency can be brought under control soon.
End Summary.

Crisis Looms Due to Crop Disruptions
--------------


2. (SBU) The ongoing violent Maoist insurgency has
disrupted agriculture throughout Nepal, endangering food
security for many rural communities, according to the
World Food Program (WFP) Country Director for Nepal, Doug
Coutts. WFP believes that the indicators of an impending
food crisis are already evident. Coutts points out that
"people die not because of a lack of food but because of
diseases they develop when they are weakened by inadequate
food." TB rates in the mountains have increased,
indicating that a problem has developed, Coutts concludes.
He and other observers argue that a major humanitarian
crisis will be unavoidable unless current trends are
reversed.


3. (SBU) Both looting by Maoists and government
restrictions on food transport to Maoist areas have
compromised food security, but disruptions in traditional
agricultural practices have had by far the most
devastating affect, Coutts explained. His assessment was
echoed by a human rights activist who traveled recently to
the heavily Maoist-affected districts of Rukum and Rolpa.
She noted that local villagers had stopped raising goats
and planting vegetables because these increasingly were
being confiscated by Maoist cadres. Many young men and
women had abandoned their villages either to join the
Maoists' ranks or to escape being dragooned or otherwise
victimized by the militants. An official from the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) confirmed that in many
areas most able-bodied people had left their farms, and
the land is unattended. As a result, less food was being
grown and crop yields were depressed.


4. (U) Because the conflict has restricted income-
generation activities in rural districts, the WFP assesses
that farmers have become increasingly dependent on their
own crops. A FAO official sees this combination of
increased dependence on farming along with a reduction in
yields as potentially creating a very serious problem.
(Note: Many of the worst affected groups, particularly in
the western hills and mountains, live in areas where food
deficits are chronic. Traditionally these populations
have been unable to live on what is produced locally,
depending on food purchased with income from seasonal
labor performed elsewhere in Nepal or in India. End
Note.)


5. (U) The WFP has heard reports that scarcity has led to
the displacement of some individuals, but so far it has
not obtained first-hand information on the numbers and
current locations of these migrants. A study sponsored by
USAID/Nepal found that large cities such as Nepalganj and
Kathmandu along with district headquarters in conflict-
affected areas have absorbed a large number of displaced
persons. The study also found evidence suggesting that
traditional seasonal migration patterns have changed as a
result of the conflict. A large number of individuals,
mainly male youths from conflict-affected districts in the
Mid- and Far Western regions, have crossed into India in
recent months to escape the depredations of both the
Maoists and security forces. Officials in the Terai
report a marked increase in demand for Nepalese identity
cards by aspiring emigrant workers to India. Moreover,
the traditional return of working men to their villages of
origin at the beginning of the rainy season (the season
for planting paddy) has not been observed this year.

Maoists Loot Food
--------------


6. (U) The WFP's unofficial records show that Maoist
insurgents have looted about 427 metric tons of program
food in the last year (Ref B). This constitutes three
percent of the WFP's total annual food aid through the
Rural Community Infrastructure Works Program, better known
as "Food for Work." Maoists have either robbed storage
facilities or seized the rations while they were en route
to project locations. The goods most commonly looted are
dry food grains, as these are the most useful for mobile
fighters. WFP also reports that of late cargo trucks
carrying food for the "Food for Work" program have been
unable to travel into several districts because of fear of
Maoist attacks.


7. (U) Varying amounts of food have been stolen also from
community stores and private homes. These food raids have
hit hardest in Western Nepal, where malnutrition and
limited food availability are most acute. The Maoists
have been roundly criticized for stealing food. In
particular, the domestic human rights community has
chastised them for stealing food from WFP aid supplies and
individual rural citizens.

WFP Responds by Suspending Programs, Demanding Assurances
-------------- --------------


8. (U) The WFP has responded to the Maoists' raids by
suspending its programs in five districts (Ref B).
Reinstatement of the programs is contingent on a set of
preconditions, which are the WFP's way of trying to
enforce some "basic ground rules" for the projects. WFP
says it intended the preconditions to push local
authorities to take the threats seriously and to
investigate them, as well as to correct weaknesses in the
management of the food supply, which is often unmarked and
unguarded.


9. (U) One of the WFP's demands is that some of the food
be recovered or that compensation be offered as a
demonstration of commitment. In Jajarkot and Mugu
districts (in the western hills),the WFP has insisted
that before programs can resume in October, the Maoists
and District Development Committees (DDCs) must ensure a
safe working environment, transportation, and storage.
DDCs in Kailali and Bardiya districts (in the western
Terai) have been required to provide a written guarantee
for the future safety of the food and compensation for the
food that was stolen. The criteria for reinstatement of
the program in Dailekh district is that the Maoists
provide labor of a value equal to the quantity looted,
albeit according to the Maoists' own valuation.

WFP's Strategy Enjoys Some Success
--------------


10. (U) The WFP's strategy has met with some success.
When the first looting incident occurred, in Dailekh, the
Maoists wrote a receipt for the food they took. Later
they apologized and proposed that they provide work to the
equivalent value of the seven tons looted. They completed
the work and gave assurances to the WFP that food supplies
in the district would be safe. The program then resumed.
In Jajarkot and Bardiya, the Maoists have made similar
commitments. And in all districts except Mugu, the DDC
has expressed a willingness to provide some compensation
and to take steps to ensure the safety of food stocks.
Under current conditions, the WFP hopes to resume programs
in Mugu and Jagarkot in October.

Military Bans Food Deliveries to Maoist Areas
--------------


11. (SBU) The military has responded to the Maoists'
actions by attempting to limit the amount of food going
into the most heavily Maoist-affected districts. One
ranking army official stated that the tactic was to "try
to starve out the terrorists." Restrictions on the
transportation of dry food goods have been imposed in at
least four districts. This "ban" affects Salyan, Rolpa,
Rukum, and Pyuthan districts in the Mid-West. Many food
suppliers have reportedly stopped deliveries as a result.

Army's Controversial Tactics
--------------


12. (SBU) The WFP opposes the army's strategy on the
principle that food should not be used as a currency of
coercion and that food supplies should not be restricted
under any circumstances. They consider the military
strategy doubly problematic in that it not only starves
the insurgents and but also aggravates the suffering of
rural non-combatants. Some observers have criticized the
restriction of food imports because it appears to increase
the pressure put on local people by the Maoists. One
ranking military officer says that a measure of the ban's
success is a reported increase in thefts of food from farm
families. There is anecdotal evidence that dwindling
supplies of food have hampered Maoist combat operations
and encouraged the desertion or surrender of Maoist
soldiers. Some personnel have indicated that the
depopulation of Maoist-controlled areas, as civilians
migrate to Government-controlled district centers, would
be viewed as a positive outcome for the GON's counter-
insurgency strategy.


13. (U) The WFP also claims that the military's ban has
impeded its ability to transport supplies for its school
feeding program and provide "wages" of rice for some Food
for Work laborers. However, WFP officials admit they
cannot say how large or how serious an impact the
military's actions have made.

Military Offers to Guard Food Aid
--------------


14. (U) The military has expressed a willingness to
provide protection for WFP food aid. For practical
reasons, however, this protection would be limited to
areas near an army post, and could not be provided in
remote areas in which the army is already spread thin.
Unfortunately, the WFP says, protection is needed the most
in those remote areas. The WFP maintains, moreover, that
the kind of support that the army can provide would not be
appropriate; while military protection for food supplies
can be beneficial, it could also make the stores more of a
target for the Maoists. As an alternative, WFP works with
local governments to establish responsible food management
practices that avoid security problems.

Comment
--------------


15. (U) The Maoist insurgency has taken a harsh toll on
food security in rural districts and has led to a marked
decrease in the rural food supply. The problem is
compounded by drought in many areas of western Nepal (Ref
A). As UN officials here have pointed out, while the
immediate effects of this decrease are difficult to
measure, a large-scale humanitarian crisis could result in
the months to come. Unless the Maoist conflict is ended
quickly, however, Nepal's food security problems for rural
residents can be expected to worsen, with severe
humanitarian consequences. End Comment.

BOGGS