Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02KATHMANDU1007
2002-05-23 14:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

PM: "NO ALTERNATIVE" BUT TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT

Tags:  PGOV PREL NP GON 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001007 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: PM: "NO ALTERNATIVE" BUT TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 995


B. (B) KATHMANDU 996

C. (C) KATHMANDU 1005

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5(B,D).

----------
SUMMARY
-----------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001007

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL NP GON
SUBJECT: PM: "NO ALTERNATIVE" BUT TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 995


B. (B) KATHMANDU 996

C. (C) KATHMANDU 1005

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5(B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a May 23 meeting with Prime Minister Sher Bahadur
Deuba, Ambassador Malinowski and British Charge Andrew
Mitchell emphasized that the dissolution of Parliament
presents the PM with a rare opportunity to form a technocrat,
reformist Cabinet that could re-institute good governance,
eliminate corruption, and improve the security situation
throughout the country. The PM acknowledged those points,
but seems more focused for now on regaining his party's good
graces and on initiating party preparations for elections.
The intra-party machinations of his political rival, former
PM G.P. Koirala, left him no alternative but to ask the
Cabinet to dissolve the Lower House. He plans to address the
nation on television the evening of May 24. He does not
intend to bring extension of the emergency before the
National Assembly (the as-yet undissolved Upper House of
Parliament) but will instead re-institute it through
ordinance for another three months. The Army has assured him
it can provide adequate security for the elections to take
place within six months. While he does not doubt the King's
commitment to democracy, he fears that some "people around
him" may harbor anti-democratic sentiments. End summary.

--------------
DISSOLUTION THE ONLY WAY
--------------


2. (C) On May 23 Ambassador Malinowski and British Charge
Andrew Mitchell called on Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba
to discuss implications of the May 22 decision to dissolve
the Lower House of Parliament (Ref C). Deuba told the envoys
the constant conniving of his political rival, ruling Nepali
Congress Party President and former PM G.P. Koirala, had left
him "no alternative" but to ask the Cabinet to recommend
dissolution. Koirala's allegations that the PM had not
adequately consulted with the party before pursuing extension
of the emergency were untrue; Deuba had met with party
leaders twice and the security chiefs once before he
introduced the extension proposal in the Parliamentary

Secretariat. None of the party chiefs contacted, including

SIPDIS
Koirala, had ever raised any objection to the extension, he
complained.


3. (C) Even though Deuba acknowledged that he has a (slight)
edge against Koirala among his party MPs, his long-time rival
"could move against me at any time and sack me from the
party." (Note: At the time of the meeting, Deuba had not
yet been suspended from the Nepali Congress Party. The
suspension order gave him three days in which to clarify his
decision to defy the party. End note.) "I have the votes in
Parliament, but for how long?" Koirala would never cease
trying to lure away Deuba supporters in Parliament. In fact,
Koirala had intended to bring a no-confidence motion against
him the very next day, Deuba learned. Prolonged political
in-fighting could demoralize the security forces and boost
Maoist insurgents' efforts to destabilize the country. Hence
his pre-emptive strike in dissolving Parliament.

--------------
NEXT STEPS?
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Malinowski noted the current situation,
while regrettable, afforded Deuba a valuable opportunity to
form a new, smaller Cabinet with well-regarded, talented
technocrats and members of other parties to address the many
pressing problems, such as the Maoist insurgency and rampant
corruption, that Koirala's constant back-biting had
distracted him from resolving. The Ambassador reported
raising the topic with Opposition Leader Madhav Nepal, along
with British CDA Mitchell, earlier in the day (Ref B),and
stressed the Opposition has "an open mind" about
participating in a national government. Deuba could address
the nation publicly on his plans, emphasizing that he was
putting politics aside during this time of national crisis
and would concentrate on these priorities during the six
months before the election. He should appeal to the nation's
voters to judge for themselves at election time whether or
not he had fulfilled his pledge, the Ambassador urged.


5. (C) Deuba concurred with the Ambassador's suggestion, but
noted that his first priority is to restore unity in the
Nepali Congress. "I'm a party person," he explained, "and so
I want a united party to go for the poll." After sorting out
the intra-party discord, he might explore the possibility of
a national Cabinet that could include the Opposition.


6. (C) British Charge Andrew Mitchell took up the theme of
Deuba seizing the chance to form a high-powered Cabinet that
could effectively address national problems. The dissolution
could actually be a great opportunity for Deuba to announce a
new Cabinet as a reforming government and demonstrate to
people that democracy can work. By appealing directly to
people's interests, he could win their support for the
upcoming elections. He asked what the PM's strategy over the
next few days would be.


7. (C) Deuba agreed with the sense of the British Charge's
points, but returned again to his central preoccupation: the
threat from within his own party. With the return of his
mentor and party patriarch K.P. Bhattarai from abroad the
following day, Deuba said he would be in a better position to
address that challenge. The Ambassador asked if he planned
to put his case before the nation; Deuba said he would do so
in a televised address May 24.

--------------
SECURITY
--------------


8. (C) With Parliament dissolved, the Ambassador asked, what
will happen to the emergency? Deuba said he would not bring
the motion before the National Assembly, the (as-yet)
undissolved Upper House of Parliament. (Comment: He does
not have sufficient support within the National Assembly to
win a two-thirds vote. King Gyanendra told the Ambassador
later in the day that the Cabinet had just asked him to
dissolve the Upper House. The King said he would do so the
next day--May 24. End comment.) Instead, he plans to allow
the emergency to lapse and then have it re-introduced by
ordinance. According to the Constitution, the emergency
could then last no more than three months. Deuba said that
he would not want a longer extension in any event--and might
actually abridge its duration to two months--since it would
interfere with campaigning for the November polls.


9. (C) The Ambassador asked if the Royal Nepal Army (RNA)
leadership is confident that it could provide adequate
security during the election period and if voter lists--some
of which may have been damaged during attacks on local
government offices--are intact. The PM replied yes to both
questions, noting that copies of voter lists have been
maintained at the Election Commission in Kathmandu. The
elections could also be staggered, Deuba said, with voting
taking place in certain districts on different days, but with
the final count taking place on the same day. There is
already such a precedent. He added that he was meeting with
the Chief of Army Staff later in the evening.

--------------
THE PALACE
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador advised the PM that he and the
British Charge would be meeting King Gyanendra later in the
evening. Deuba predicted that the King would assure them of
his staunch support of Constitutional democracy. Deuba asked
that the two envoys "suggest to the King that he should
cooperate with democracy." The PM said he isn't worried that
the King himself harbors any anti-democratic ambitions, but
rather that some "people around him" are "not in favor" of
democracy. The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. could only
provide assistance to Nepal if democracy remains intact.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Chronic political infighting, in our view, has been
the main impediment to Deuba's ability to demonstrate his
effectiveness as a leader. His critics, however, both within
his own party and in the Opposition, have long alleged that
he is unable to assert forcefully enough the power of the
civilian government. His insistence on continuing the
emergency, presumably at the behest of either or both the RNA
and the Palace, against the opposition of his own party will
only reinforce that perception in some quarters. While the
Prime Minister agreed with the Ambassador and the British
Charge's suggestions about the possible opportunities the
current crisis presents, his main attention was obviously
focused on saving his position within the party--and thus his
chances for a Nepali Congress nomination in the impending
elections. The party's decision just one hour later to
suspend him (Ref C)--with the ever-imminent threat of
ultimate expulsion--prove just how short-sighted his
preoccupation was. As a self-proclaimed "party person,"
Deuba risks being soon cut adrift from that political
mooring. The PM's slight edge in support among his party's
MPs is unlikely to survive his probable expulsion in a
society where virtually every association--from trade unions
to human rights groups to university clubs--has a partisan
affiliation. We have seen no evidence of anti-democratic
elements at work in the Palace, as Deuba speculated, but will
monitor the situation closely.
MALINOWSKI