Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ISTANBUL2107
2002-12-04 10:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

ANNAN CYPRUS PLAN: ISTANBUL COMMENTATORS

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU GR CY UN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 002107 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU GR CY UN
SUBJECT: ANNAN CYPRUS PLAN: ISTANBUL COMMENTATORS
ASK WHETHER IT'S TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE


REF: A) ANKARA 8778 B) ATHENS 4121


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).




C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 002107

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU GR CY UN
SUBJECT: ANNAN CYPRUS PLAN: ISTANBUL COMMENTATORS
ASK WHETHER IT'S TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE


REF: A) ANKARA 8778 B) ATHENS 4121


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).





1. (C) Summary: Turks in Istanbul continue to debate the
merits and drawbacks of a possible Cyprus settlement in the
wake of Denktas's acceptance of the UN plan as a "basis for
negotiations." Consensus among the experts with whom we
have spoken in Istanbul (including Turkish Cypriots,
journalists, and academics) is that the plan is a good one,
albeit with some serious flaws. All of them look first and
foremost to Ankara for clues on how Turkey will act in the
coming weeks and months. They believe that Denktas's
conditional approval of the plan was inevitable (he could
not afford to appear obstructionist in the face of pressure
from the new Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government),but that the Turkish side (and perhaps the
Greek) will not be prepared to negotiate a plan for
signature before the December 12 Copenhagen Summit.
Furthermore, most of our interlocutors are convinced that
the signals that the EU gives Turkey with regard to its
membership bid at the summit are likely to have a major
impact on Turkey's position in the upcoming Cyprus
negotiations. In the end, however, many of those we spoke
to believe that the Annan plan is simply too good to be
true -- the Greek Cypriots will ultimately either reject
the deal outright or throw up unrealistic demands to ensure
that no final agreement is reached. End Summary.


The Most Pro-Turkish Plan Ever
--------------

2. (C) Murat Munir, a well-regarded journalist for Sabah
newspaper (and a Turkish-Cypriot himself) told poloff that
the Annan proposal was the "most pro-Turkish plan" ever
presented. He and others had only high praise for how the
plan meets Turkish demands for sovereignty and equality in
its "common-state" formula. Kemal Kirisci, an expert on
international affairs at Bogazici University, was also
impressed by many of the details, including provisions for
ensuring that Cyprus not be in a position to block Turkey's
EU bid and for extending to both Greek and Turkish
nationals the same entry and residency rights (a major

concession, he noted, in light of Turkey's position outside
the EU). Oddly enough, one of the only criticisms we heard
of the administrative arrangements was that the "component
states" (as opposed to the "common state") were given too
much authority. Niyazi Bekiroglu, President of the
Association of Turkish Cypriots in Turkey, explained to
poloff that Greek immigration to the Turkish side may
ultimately enable them to wrest control of local
administration.


We Give up Beaches, Farmland -- and are left with Mountains
-------------- --------------

3. (C) For the most part, criticism of the plan has
focused not on the administrative arrangements, but on the
territorial concessions and provisions for refugee return.
"We are being asked to give up the pristine beaches, the
fertile farmland, and the port and water resources of
Guzelyurt (Morphou). What are we left with?... The
mountains," Bekiroglu lamented (Note: Bekiroglu claims that
his views largely reflect those of the 150,000 Turkish
Cypriots living in Turkey). Cyprus watchers in Istanbul
are still buzzing about the recent public remarks by former
Turkish President Kenan Evren about how the Turkish
military in 1974 never intended to take as much territory
as they did and that they did so with the expectation that
such land be used as a bargaining chip at the negotiating
table. When pressed on the issue of territory, all of
those we spoke to admitted that such concessions (subject
to some minor changes to the maps and special provisions
regarding water and port rights in Guzelyurt) are possible.


A Flood of Greek Refugees?
--------------

4. (C) Conceding that the territorial concessions might
ultimately be acceptable, Bekiroglu admitted that he was
more concerned about the provisions allowing for the return
of Greek refugees. According to Bekiroglu's calculations,
the territorial concessions, the return of Greek refugees,
the concurrent displacement of Turkish Cypriots, and the
need for many non-Cypriot mainland Turks to return home
will lead to the unacceptable displacement of a majority of
the existing population in the TRNC. Additionally, even
with the annual limitations provided for in the plan,
Bekiroglu worries that Greek immigration combined with
Turkish emigration will quickly lead to unacceptably large
Greek minorities (or even majorities) in certain areas on
the Turkish side of the island. Munir, too, argued that
allowing Greeks to return to the north may ultimately
undermine the viability of an agreement. Although Munir
concedes that the principle of refugee return may be
necessary (although he suspects few will rush back),
neither of the publics on either side of the Green Line is
psychologically prepared to lower that long-standing
barrier. Munir said that his personal experience on the
island suggests to him that the suspicion and distrust
harbored in equal measure on both parts of the island would
lead quickly to renewed violence if the communities are
brought together too quickly.


Ankara Calls the Shots
--------------

5. (C) Even assuming that the two publics come to support a
settlement, Munir argues that it will require concerted
pressure from Ankara to overcome those in the TRNC that
have a vested economic interest in maintaining the status
quo. Most of our interlocutors seem convinced that the new
AKP government would like to see a settlement. The
million-dollar questions, however, are: What does the
Turkish deep state think? Is AK's recent electoral mandate
sufficient to sway the National Security Council (NSC)
debates? Kirisci and a former Turkish diplomat both argued
that the military and more conservative elements of the
secular establishment will be heavily influenced by the
signals that Turkey gets on its membership bid from the
December 12 EU Copenhagen Summit. If (as Turkish President
Sezer suggested in his remarks at the end of the NATO
Prague Summit) the Europeans are engaging in "double-talk,"
Turkey may feel that they cannot abandon the Turkish
Cypriots to a double-dealing, anti-Turkish EU. Note: Both
also feel that Turkey may have made a tactical error in
pushing for a "date" for negotiations. It may be possible,
they claim, to come up with some other sufficiently
positive message that might convince the Euro-skeptics in
Turkey. End Note.


Doomed to Failure?
--------------

6. (C) Our more pessimistic interlocutors believe that the
deal will either be dashed to pieces on the rocks of the
Copenhagen Summit or will founder on the shoals of Greek
Cypriot opposition. Bekiroglu, for example, suspects that
the entire Annan plan is an EU trap. Having "bought" the
support of a select group of influential Turkish
journalists (including Mehmet Ali Birand and Murat Munir),
the EU seeks only to secure Turkish acquiescence and a
Greek vote for EU enlargement at Copenhagen. Others,
including Bogazici University Professor Gun Kut, argued
that the plan is simply to pro-Turkish to ever be approved
by the Greek Cypriots. Even assuming that Ankara throws
its weight behind a settlement, they expect the Greek
Cypriots to reject the plan in the proposed referendum (the
publication of a recent poll showing that 64 percent of
Greek Cypriots oppose the plan has not gone unnoticed in
Istanbul) or simply put forth unacceptable demands to
ensure a breakdown in negotiations.
ARNETT