Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ISTANBUL1933
2002-11-01 16:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

ISTANBUL'S MARKET ANALYSTS COME TO TERMS WITH

Tags:  PGOV ECON TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001933 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2012
TAGS: PGOV ECON TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL'S MARKET ANALYSTS COME TO TERMS WITH
PROSPECT OF AK


REF: A. ANKARA 7631

B. ANKARA 7681

C. ANKARA 7549

D. ISTANBUL 1923


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett. Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001933

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2012
TAGS: PGOV ECON TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL'S MARKET ANALYSTS COME TO TERMS WITH
PROSPECT OF AK


REF: A. ANKARA 7631

B. ANKARA 7681

C. ANKARA 7549

D. ISTANBUL 1923


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett. Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: While much of Istanbul's secular
establishment remains wary and suspicious of Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) party, soundings among
market insiders in Istanbul on the eve of Sunday's polls show
a more nuanced view among the city's business elite. In
contrast to the doom and gloom scenarios we heard earlier
this fall from market analysts who saw anything but a Kemal
Dervis-led post-election economic team as a catastrophe that
would swiftly lead to an economic meltdown, markets are
increasingly coming to terms with an AK government. The
decline in political uncertainty will likely help the current
market rally. But we have also heard concerns with the
economic policies of the new government, and with some of the
likely AK economic policy-makers. We believe that following
elections, and a short honeymoon, these concerns will start
to grow. End Summary.



2. (C) Watchful Waiting: As ref B related, Istanbul's secular
establishment is resigned to the prospect of an AK victory in
Sunday's election, but remains deeply troubled about what it
bodes for the future of Turkey's secular republic.
Surprisingly, however, given their worries earlier this fall
and their tendency at that time to see former Minister of
State Kemal Dervis as the Turkish economy's only potential
savior, Istanbul financial circles now appear to be
increasingly at ease with the prospect of AK's coming to
power. Analysts such as Global Director of Research Cem
Akyurek and Garanti Securities Executive Director David
Edgerly now indicate that an AK victory will not preclude a
short-term market rally, and can potentially even lead to a
"virtuous circle" in which interest rates decline and ease
the risk of a Turkish financing gap next year. Testimony to
the Istanbul financial community's coming to terms with the
prospect of AK are the recent performance of major market
indicators: the Istanbul Stock exchange and interest rates
have all remained relatively stable, even in the face of
occasional gaffes by Erdogan and his deputies. The market's

tolerant attitude has been, in the words of one banker, that
"better they make these mistakes before the election, than
after, when they might cause real trouble."



3. (C) "Market Friendly": Beyond the need to put the best
face on what appears to be inevitable, a number of factors
appear to be at play in the financial community's attitude
toward AK. Many believe (as Edgerly told us)
"philosophically AK is market friendly," and by nature and
inclination will be supportive of the securities market
(though perhaps "less so" of debt markets). A second factor
is the market's ever-present hope for stability, and desire
to avoid uncertainty, and the resultant genuine
attractiveness of the prospect of a strong one or at most
two-party government, even if it involves an untested player
like AK. Perhaps most importantly, there is also the hope
that AK understands that its economic options are limited,
and that it has no alternative to continuing to implement the
country's economic reform program. We heard this repeatedly:
from bankers, securities firms, and businessmen in the real
sector. They argued that "AK is not stupid" and will stick
with the program, since it has no alternative, and since it
will want to show it can govern responsibly. (Comment: Some
AK Economic officials, such as Vice Chairman Ali Coskun, do
not seem concerned that they have no alternative, per ref d.)
Dissent came only from the influential TUSIAD, where Deputy
Secretary General Umit Ismen reminded us of a board member's

SIPDIS
admonition to "remember that we are viewing things
rationally, while politics does not always follow those
rules."



4. (C) A Weak Bench?: A more widespread concern in business
circles here is whether AK has the economic bench strength to
manage a complex economic challenge. There is thus worry
about how sustainable any stability provided by an AK
government will be. Global's Cem Akyurek told us recently
that the answers to two questions he had recently suggested
that a New York colleague ask a visiting AK delegation had
only reinforced his skepticism about the party. When under
questioning the AK speaker indicated that he had been a REFAH
supporter and that his business experience consisted of a
brief stint in the textile industry, Akyurek's doubts were
confirmed. "These are not the people who can solve Turkey's
problems," he argued. There is some indication, however,
that AK's ability to move beyond its base and attract other
center-right wing supporters is easing this concern.

5. (C) Weak Opposition: Above all, AK is benefiting from its
opposition. To be sure, Dervis and his Republican People's
Party (CHP) allies remain the market's preference, though
disappointment is widespread that he has not been more
effective politically. Dervis' recent Radikal interview,
which Ismen characterized as the "talk of the town," appears
to have done particular damage, reinforcing his "statist"
image and leaving a bad taste even among his business
backers, particularly with his claim never to have supported
the privatization of Turk Telecom. AK has also benefited
from comparison to the other two parties that now appear to
have a chance to cross the threshold: Cem Uzan's Genc (Youth)
Party and Tansu Ciller's DYP (ref c). In contrast to these
two parties' populist promises and (in Ciller's case)
"stubborn refusal to learn from past mistakes" (by pledging
to return to a managed exchange rate),AK's campaign has
seemed "relatively responsible" in comparison. Hence Dervis'
charges that the party is using different messages for
different audiences has not resonated, as observers accept it
as part of politics, and in any case see AK's domestic
promises as much less dangerous than those of its rivals.
"Hurriyet" economic commentator Ege Cansen, for instance,
suggested recently in his column that Uzan is the pivotal
figure of this election, and that his most nefarious effect
has been to cause Ciller to adopt a similarly "pandering"
message. Amplifying on these comments at a recent dinner for
visiting Johns Hopkins professor Francis Fukuyama, he saw a
particular danger in these "negative political influences"
and the possibility they might impel Erdogan to adopt similar
policies.



6. (C) Comment: Beyond making a virtue of necessity,
financial markets will likely be cautiously optimistic
following elections, on the back of declining political
uncertainty. But at some point in the government formation
process, the concerns we are already hearing about likely GOT
policies (and about some of the likely AK policymakers) could
start to grow quickly. End Comment.
ARNETT