Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02HARARE2372
2002-10-31 13:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

ZIMBABWE FACES MULTIPLE AND INTER-RELATED CRISES

Tags:  PGOV EAID ZI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002372 

SIPDIS

FOR AF/FO KANSTEINER AND BELLAMY AND DRL FOR A/S CRANER
NSC FOR AFRICA SRDIR FRAZER
AID FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS AND A/A NEWMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2012
TAGS: PGOV EAID ZI
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE FACES MULTIPLE AND INTER-RELATED CRISES

Classified By: JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 002372

SIPDIS

FOR AF/FO KANSTEINER AND BELLAMY AND DRL FOR A/S CRANER
NSC FOR AFRICA SRDIR FRAZER
AID FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS AND A/A NEWMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2012
TAGS: PGOV EAID ZI
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE FACES MULTIPLE AND INTER-RELATED CRISES

Classified By: JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D

1.(C) Summary: Zimbabwe is in the midst of inter-related and
deepening political, economic, social and humanitarian crises
which are steadily spiraling downward. We do not believe
that there are separate solutions to these crises and are
convinced that any effective remedy must address all the
crises, including the political one. The only consolation in
this sorry picture is that more top ZANU-PF leaders recognize
the seriousness of the crisis and comprehend that they might
not have the solutions to the problems working alone. There
is not yet any signal, however, that the top leadership is
prepared to address these deep crises in any way that might
compromise its increasingly absolutist power. Zimbabwe's
neighbors are increasingly cognizant of the depth of
Zimbabwe's crises and the potential implications for
themselves, but their responses remain mostly timid and
tentative. End Summary


2. (U) As detailed in other reporting, Zimbabwe's social,
humanitarian, economic and political crises continue to
deepen and are increasingly and inextricably related.

-- (U) Social Disintegration: The most quantifiable element
of this crisis is an HIV-AIDS rate among the adult population
of about 34 per cent, with over 3,000 AIDS related deaths per
week, 800,000 AIDS orphans and life expectancy shortened to
38 years. These horrific statistics relate closely to other
crises, since food shortages and impoverishment due to
economic decline ensure earlier deaths for the infected and
make the task of supporting HIV-infected families much more
difficult. The degradation of the health system, due to
emigration of skilled personnel and shortages of medicines,
is dramatic. Fixed pension rates and high inflation have
impoverished most pensioners. While family support networks
continue to function in many cases, they are being stretched
beyond the limits. There are previously unheard of cases of
city relatives unable to support their rural families or even
turning away their rural relatives coming to stay near town
and orphans being rejected by their extended families. The

part of the traditional family support network which is
probably most effective is the remittances sent home by
Zimbabweans working overseas. While the Government's
political rhetoric defends the poorest Zimbabweans,
ineffective economic policies are the largest contributors to
the population's poverty. All of these problems are
worsening, and are unlikely to improve absent a major
economic and political turnaround. Moreover,the Government's
single-minded political focus on the land issue, and
concomitantly to retaining power relegates its focus on
HIV/AIDS to a health problem to be dealt with by the Health
Ministry with only occasional lip service by higher-ups.

-- (U) Economic Collapse: Zimbabwe's economy is arguably in
the most rapid freefall of any country on earth not at war.
GDP has declined by about a quarter in the last three years
and GDP per capita has declined to levels below those of its
historically much poorer neighbor Mozambique. Inflation is
conservatively pegged at 140 per cent per annum and the
national currency has lost 77 per cent of its value in a
year. The GOZ is virtually bereft of foreign currency as the
tobacco season comes to an end, unable to pay for the fuel,
food and spare part imports it desperately needs.
Zimbabweans are demonstrating legendary resilience in coping
in their businesses and personal lives, and the informal
sector has exploded in recent years to compensate for the
tremendous decline in the formal economy and increased
unemployment. Even if Zimbabwe avoids another drought, next
year's tobacco crop will be drastically reduced and overall
agricultural production is crippled for years to come due to
the disruption of the commercial farms and the Government's
inability to provide necessary inputs to new farmers.
Similarly, Zimbabwe's wildlife resources and tourism sectors
are being depleted at alarming rates. The GOZ's "optimistic"
forecast for 2003 calls for a further 5 per cent GDP
retraction.

-- (U) Humanitarian crisis: Food shortages are the most
evident manifestation of an enormous humanitarian crisis.
Over half the Zimbabwean population is short of food. Almost
every area of the country will be needy in the months before
next March's maize harvest. The Government has long been
over-confident of its ability to import enough maize to meet
this emergency, but does not have the foreign exchange nor
the time/logisitics to meet the need. The GOZ has also
declined to change its monopolistic practices, its 40 per
cent duty on imported maize meal or its price controls on
cereals, or adjust exchange rate policies which currently
prevent the private sector from importing food for those
Zimbabweans who could buy their own maize. International
food assistance is also likely to fall considerably short of
WFP Director Morris's delivery target of 55,000 MT's per
month by December due to government obstacles to the presence
of NGO's, the delays resulting from controversy over biotech
food and mediocre donor response to a Zimbabwean food crisis
caused largely by retrograde Government policies. Government
policies driven by political considerations continue to
impede international assistance and to direct GOZ food in a
blatantly partisan manner. There are as yet no mass
migrations of hungry people, only a few of the swollen
bellies and emaciated children characteristic of famine and
only a small number of deaths clearly attributed to
starvation. We do believe, however, that there are numerous
people dying quietly in their villages from HIV- and non-HIV
related illnesses compounded by poor nutrition. And with the
worst five months in Zimbabwe's agricultural cycle still
ahead, these problems will grow more acute, with an as yet
unassessed risk of a much more serious humanitarian crisis.
-- (C) Political crisis: Zimbabwe's political crisis is
worsening steadily as the ZANU-PF utilizes the advantages of
governmental control to orchestrate a campaign of violence
and intimidation against the opposition leadership and
supporters, influential civic organizations, the judiciary
and all other individuals and institutions perceived as a
threat. The MDC is portrayed in the state media, to voters
and even to other Africans as an illegitimate,
foreign-sponsored party that can and will be defeated with
every imaginable method from violence and threats to
deprivation or reward with food and public projects
explicitly linked to the constituency's support for the
ZANU-PF. MDC leaders and parliamentarians are prosecuted on
trumped-up charges and lower-level MDC candidates or
supporters are beaten, threatened and, at times killed for
supporting the opposition. MDC rallies and political
campaigning are largely barred by new repressive legislation.
NGO's which have links to the MDC or provide the
documentation of GOZ human rights abuses are increasingly
under siege. Independent media are also under siege by the
state with editors and journalists being prosecuted on
multiple charges of violating repressive new media
legislation, which also increases government controls over
all journalists -- foreign or domestic. The message from
Government and ZANU leaders and from all-pervasive state
media is that support for the opposition, and even failure to
support the Government is illegitimate and will be punished
by either withdrawal of state benefits or more direct
measures.


3. (C) While Government leaders remain triumphalist in
public, some Party and Government heavies are beginning to
acknowledge privately the depth of the crisis they face and
their inability to resolve it themselves. While this is
progress, it comes late and is thus far inadequate to reflect
a serious opportunity for engagement. For instance, the GOZ
recently wrote the UN ResRep to suggest cooperation to assist
displaced commercial farm workers, compensate displaced
commercial farmers and provide agricultural assistance for
new farmers. Putative GOZ concern for displaced commercial
farm workers and farmers is both hypocritical and
transparent, but the appeal for agricultural assistance to
new farmers recognizes that the GOZ does not have the means
to support these new farmers to make the land resettlement
exercise a success. The UN will not take up this
half-hearted GOZ appeal but will continue to test when the
Government might be more sincere in its approaches. The GOZ,
which for some four months after the election appeared to
glory in its isolation and defiance of international opinion,
has been of late on a largely unsuccessful charm offensive to
show off its successes and to reopen channels of
communication. For instance, ZANU-PF recently reached out
through intermediaries to the Australian Government and the
Commonwealth; the GOZ welcomed South African re-engagement on
Zimbabwe perhaps through a November bilateral commission
(although it is unclear whether the GOZ will be any more
flexible than it has in the past) and the SADC Committee for
Zimbabwe is sue to visit in the coming months.


4. (C) Some influential members of the ruling party politburo
acknowledge privately that President Mugabe is a liability
and have quietly discussed a post-Mugabe era, but no one
seems willing to press the President too hard on his
retirement plans. Moreover, these discussions are mostly
focused on how to ensure ZANU-PF's hold on power rather than
on working with the MDC to extricate Zimbabwe from its
current predicament. Some high-ranking GOZ officials have
also reached out to us, directly and indirectly. We have
stressed to them the depth of the crises facing the country,
the need to address the political crisis in order to resolve
the country's other problems and the need to find solutions
together with other Zimbabweans rather than expect that a
separate deal is possible with the US or other countries.


5. (C) Comment: While it is encouraging that more GOZ and
ZANU officials have begun to recognize the depth of the
problems, we have not yet seen signals that they are prepared
to change their political approach of crushing the opposition
and ruling through whatever violent or repressive means are
necessary with increasing reliance on the security forces.
Nonetheless, the depth of the country's problems will make
this a calculation to be tested regularly in the months
ahead. As repression intensifies and the economy contracts,
prospects for civil unrest increase. Most Zimbabweans seem
more concerned, however, with keeping their heads down and
making ends meet. Ultimately, any sustainable solution to
this country's political crisis and the economic, social and
humanitarian crises it has spawned, must address the question
of the Government's legitimacy and ensure respect for genuine
political competition.

,
.
SULLIVAN