MDC LEADER TSVANGIRAI ON THE WAY FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001151

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC LEADER TSVANGIRAI ON THE WAY FORWARD

REF: HARARE 1136 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political section chief Matt Harrington.
Reasons: 1.5 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai told us his
party is pursuing a four-pronged strategy in the election
aftermath: participating in the (now stalled) inter-party
dialogue; challenging the election result in court;
organizing mass action; and encouraging increased
international pressure on the Mugabe regime. President
Obasanjo reportedly told the MDC the talks would continue
despite ZANU-PF's request for a suspension, even if he had to
travel to Harare personally. Tsvangirai is skeptical the
court case will result in overturning the election result,
but will expose the fraudulent tactics the ruling party
employed to win. The party's supporters are waiting for
Tsvangirai's word to proceed with strikes and peaceful

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demonstrations, but the MDC leader wants to ensure the timing
is right before giving such an instruction. Tsvangirai
acknowledged that some radical elements have encouraged the
party to engage in violent resistance, but he claims to have
discouraged them and appears genuinely committed to peaceful
change. End Summary.

Inter-party talks
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2. (C) In a May 14 breakfast with MDC leader Morgan
Tsvangirai, the Ambassador, joined by polchief, asked about

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the opposition's thinking on the way forward. Tsvangirai
replied that the MDC is pursuing a four-pronged strategy
focused on increasing the pressure on President Mugabe and
ZANU-PF. The first element is the (stalled) inter-party
dialogue. Tsvangirai expressed his belief that Mugabe had
instructed his negotiating team to pull back because he
feared he would not be able to control where the talks led.
He reported that Nigerian President Obasanjo had told MDC
Vice-President Gibson Sibanda several days before in Abuja
that the talks would go on even if Obasanjo had to travel
personally to Harare to make that happen. Although the
facilitators are trying to convince ZANU-PF to reverse its
position, the MDC, he said, is now operating on the
assumption that the talks will not resume. To reengage, the
MDC would have to be convinced that the ruling party was
sincere about making progress, and did not insist on
precondictions for dialogue. "Look," Tsvangirai stressed,
"I've come under significant pressure for participating in
these talks at all," given the serious doubts about Mugabe's
legitimacy. "Many of our supporters are afraid we're going
to get hoodwinked." (Comment: later on May 14, the Nigerian
High Commissioner told us the facilitators are actively
pressing for resumption of the talks and were scheduled to
meet with President Mugabe at noon. They were strung along
by the ruling party side without a definitive answer most of
May 13.)

Legal challenge
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3. (C) The second element of the MDC's post-election
strategy is the recently-filed court challenge of the
election results. ZANU-PF, he said, seems at a loss as to
how to respond. He is dubious that the election result will
be overturned, asking "who would have the courage to deliver
such a ruling?" The real value of the legal case, however,
is that it provides a public forum for the exposure of the
ruling party's electoral tactics.

Mass action
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4. (C) Ultimately, Tsvangirai thought peaceful mass action
in the form of strikes and demonstrations might be the most
effective course of action. He noted that he has been
holding well-attended rallies around the country, where the
crowds have pressed hard for the party to "do something" to
stanch the continued political and economic decline. The
Ambassador asked whether the MDC would lead such an effort,
or whether it would be more appropriate or effective for an
organization such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU) to be in the forefront. The MDC is the appropriate
actor, he replied, as the Zimbabwean crisis is caused by
broad political and economic issues and is not, at its core,
a labor problem. People around the country are waiting for
his word to launch mass action, Tsvangirai said, but he wants
to ensure the timing is right. Asked whether such action
could be imminent, the MDC leader replied in the affirmative.
(Note: Tsvangirai's special advisor, Gandi Mudzingwa, told
us several days earlier that mass action could begin as early
as late May. End Note.)
International pressure
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5. (C) Continued international pressure on the Mugabe regime
is crucial to a positive resolution of the crisis here,
Tsvangirai insisted. Targeted sanctions were helpful, and he

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urged that those measures currently in place be broadened and
toughened. The degree of international attention on Zimbabwe
would also be an important factor in the timing of mass
action. Tsvangirai said he wanted to avoid giving the
instruction to proceed if the international community was, at
that moment, consumed by major developments or crises in
another part of the world.

Paramilitary planning
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6. (C) The Ambassador told Tsvangirai that some people --
most of them outside the MDC's formal party structure --
have, in recent conversations with us, advocated an
unconventional paramilitary campaign against the government.
Such an approach, he warned, could give the government the
excuse it has long sought to crush the MDC. It would also
have little prospect of success, since the instruments of
force are overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the
ruling party. The Ambassador said we had strongly
discouraged these interlocutors from engaging in such
activity and he hoped that Tsvangirai would do the same if
approached. The MDC leader replied that every party contains
radical elements, and he acknowledged that some had urged him
to pursue the road of violent resistance. He said that some
ex-Rhodesians who wanted the MDC to adopt their violent ideas
were also being turned aside. Tsvangirai agreed that such an
approach could have disastrous consequences and, despite
criticism from some quarters that he is a weak leader,
continues to believe in and press for peaceful change.

Less violence, but more discrimination in food distribution
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7. (C) Tsvangirai believed that violence against MDC
supporters in rural areas has begun to ease. His primary
worry in rural areas is the political manipulation of food,
particularly that MDC supporters are being denied access to
scarce food supplies controlled by the government's Grain
Marketing Board.

Comment
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8. (C) Tsvangirai did not seem disappointed by ZANU-PF's
reluctance to continue with the inter-party dialogue. He had
low expectations anyway, and ZANU-PF's apparent intransigence
can only help the MDC's diplomatic efforts to ramp up the
pressure on the Mugabe regime. However, if the facilitators
convince the ruling party to come back to the table, the MDC
will feel immense pressure to follow suit, notwithstanding
Tsvangirai's rejection of preconditions. The opposition

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party has been working actively with its structures around
the country to organize mass action, but it is not clear to
us how successful those efforts have been. MDC rallies have
had good turnouts for a non-election period. We believe
Tsvangirai remains convinced for now that peaceful resistance

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is the best way to effect positive change and we will
continue to strongly counsel him in this direction.
SULLIVAN