VIETNAM'S POLITICAL FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 002345

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/12
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL ECON SOCI PHUM VM DPOL HUMANR
SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S POLITICAL FUTURE


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT,
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REASON: 1.5 (D)


2. (C) SUMMARY. THE EXPANSION OF PERSONAL FREEDOMS
AND DIMINISHMENT OF CPV AND STATE CONTROL OVER
INDIVIDUAL LIVES HAVE BEEN WELCOME TRENDS OVER THE PAST
TWO DECADES. NEW INITIATIVES TO DEVELOP RULE OF LAW
ARE ALSO HOPEFUL SIGNS OF CHANGE AS WELL AS ESSENTIAL
COMPONENTS OF VIETNAM'S CONTINUED INTEGRATION INTO THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKET ECONOMY. STRENGTHENED, MORE
GENUINE LEGAL SYSTEMS WILL EVENTUALLY CHALLENGE THE
CPV'S EFFECTIVE ABILITY TO RETAIN FINAL SAY ON ALL
MAJOR POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES, HOWEVER. THE CURRENT
GENERATION OF LEADERSHIP IS PROBABLY TOO BUSY
SUSTAINING THE NEEDED MOMENTUM OF ECONOMIC GROWTH TO
COPE WITH THIS DILEMMA. MORE RESULTS-ORIENTED AND/OR
WESTERN-EDUCATED OFFICIALS FIVE OR TEN YEARS FROM NOW
MAY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT -- OR POSSIBLY EVEN INSIST ON --
A MORE PASSIVE CPV ROLE. LESS PROGRESSIVE LOCAL
OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS CONSERVATIVE AND FRUSTRATED
ELEMENTS WITHIN THE MILITARY, MAY CONTINUE TO BE DRAGS
ON ANY EVENTUAL POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION, HOWEVER. END
SUMMARY.

THE GOOD NEWS
--------------


3. (C) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND SOCIETY
IN VIETNAM HAS UNDERGONE SIGNIFICANT -- AND MOSTLY
WELCOME -- CHANGE OVER THE SIXTEEN YEARS SINCE THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV) AND GOVERNMENT OF
VIETNAM (GVN) INSTITUTED THE "DOI MOI" POLICY OF
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RENOVATION (MORE LITERALLY, "NEW CHANGE"). THE OVERALL
THRUST HAS BEEN TO REDUCE THE MICRO-MANAGEMENT BY THE
STATE NOT ONLY IN ECONOMIC PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE BUT
ALSO IN THE PERSONAL LIVES OF ITS CITIZENS.


4. (U) VIETNAMESE NOW HAVE DRAMATICALLY MORE PERSONAL
FREEDOMS THAN THEY DID TWO DECADES AGO. THEY CAN
TRAVEL ESSENTIALLY WITHOUT RESTRICTION DOMESTICALLY,
AND GO OVERSEAS WITH CONSIDERABLE EASE -- AS LONG AS
THEY CAN GET A FOREIGN VISA AND HAVE ACCESS TO
SUFFICIENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES (THEIR OWN OR THEIR VIET
KIEU RELATIVES). FARMERS LARGELY DECIDE ON THEIR OWN
WHAT CROPS TO GROW AS WELL AS HOW, WHERE, AND FOR HOW
MUCH TO SELL THEM. NEW ENTRANTS INTO THE JOB MARKET
MOSTLY FIND THEIR OWN JOBS, INCREASINGLY IN NON-STATE
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT. (ACCORDING TO WORLD BANK ESTIMATES,
THE PRIVATE SECTOR WILL HAVE TO CREATE MORE OR LESS ALL
OF THE APPROXIMATELY 2 MILLION NEW JOBS NEEDED ANNUALLY
OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS.) MOST -- IF NOT VIRTUALLY
ALL -- RURAL CITIZENS LIVE IN THEIR OWN HOMES, WHICH
THEY BUILD AND/OR EXPAND AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE. A
SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF URBAN RESIDENTS INCREASINGLY
DO THE SAME. MORE CHURCHES AND TEMPLES ARE AVAILABLE
FOR ROUTINE USE BY THE FAITHFUL -- ALBEIT UNDER THE
SUPERVISION OF GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANS -- AND THE NUMBERS OF RELIGIOUS WORKERS ARE
STEADILY INCREASINGLY AGAIN AS RELIGIOUS SEMINARIES
HAVE BEEN RE-OPENED AND EXPANDED.


5. (C) THE INTRUSIONS INTO INDIVIDUAL LIVES BY PUBLIC
SECURITY FORCES HAVE DIMINISHED, ALTHOUGH THE GVN
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RETAINS THE CAPABILITY OF MONITORING MAIL, TELEPHONES,
AND E-MAIL, AS WELL AS WATCHING VISITORS FOR THOSE
CITIZENS WHOSE LOYALTY IS IN DOUBT OR ARE BELIEVED TO
BE ENGAGED IN SUSPICIOUS OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.
VISIBLE SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGNERS HAS DECLINED. THE
PENALTIES OR HARASSMENT OF VIETNAMESE CITIZENS WHO
BEFRIEND FOREIGNERS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATS, SEEM TO BE
MORE RARELY INVOKED. DISCUSSIONS, EVEN ON POLITICAL
ISSUES, AT HANOI'S UBIQUITOUS BEER HALLS ARE MORE AND
MORE FREE-WHEELING, ALTHOUGH ALMOST INEVITABLY STOPPING
SHORT OF ANY DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE CPV OR CALLING FOR
MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY.

THE BAD NEWS
--------------


6. (C) CPV LEADERS CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE ZERO
TOLERANCE OF POLITICAL PLURALISM OR ANY INTENTION TO
LOOSEN THEIR GRIP ON THE MONOPOLY OF POLITICAL POWER.
THE CPV'S POLITBURO, AND TO A LESSER DEGREE THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, REMAIN THE NEXUS OF ALL IMPORTANT DECISION-
MAKING. IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 11ST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
INAUGURAL SESSION IN JULY AND AUGUST 2002, FOR EXAMPLE,
POLITBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS ARE BELIEVED
TO HAVE HAMMERED OUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT LINE-UP THAT
WAS THEN DULY RATIFIED BY THE NA DELEGATES. SIMILARLY,
THE ELABORATE VETTING PROCESS FOR NA CANDIDATES FOR THE

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MAY 2002 ELECTIONS GAVE THE CPV AND ITS VIETNAM
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FATHERLAND FRONT AN EXPLICIT VETO POWER. THE NEW SLATE
OF NA DELEGATES ACTUALLY INCREASED THE PERCENTAGE OF
CPV MEMBERS IN THE NA, REVERSING WHAT HAD APPEARED TO
BE A DIFFERENT TREND IN THE ELECTIONS FIVE YEARS AGO
AND FOILING THE NA'S OWN ANNOUNCED INTENTIONS.


7. (C) CPV PLENUM DOCUMENTS OVER THE PAST MANY MONTHS
HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED TO IMPROVE "GRASSROOTS
DEMOCRACY," BUT THIS HAS NOT LED TO AN EXPLOSION OF
EMPOWERMENT OR PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL. INSTEAD, THE PUSH APPEARS TO BE ON
REINVIGORATING AND STRENGTHENING CPV LEADERSHIP DOWN TO
THE LOWEST LEVELS IN ORDER TO COMMUNICATE THE CPV'S
WILL DOWNWARD -- NOT TO ENSURE THAT OPINIONS AND
POPULAR WISHES ARE CHANNELED UPWARD. THE CPV IS ALSO
POISED -- OR AT LEAST IT SAYS IT IS -- TO IMPLEMENT
MORE SYSTEMATIC ROTATION OF CPV AND GVN OFFICIALS AMONG
PROVINCES AS WELL AS BETWEEN PROVINCES AND THE CENTER
IN ORDER TO UPROOT ENDEMIC CORRUPTION AND TO LESSEN
LOCAL FIEFDOMS THAT SOMETIMES THREATEN EFFECTIVE
CENTRAL CPV LEADERSHIP. IT IS ALSO ENGAGING IN A NEW
PUSH TO RE-EMPHASIZE IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN THE
NATION'S ALREADY NONE-TOO-STRONG EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM,
WHERE STUDENTS ARE FALLING FURTHER AND FURTHER BEHIND
IN ENGLISH AND COMPUTER SKILLS -- AMONG OTHER ESSENTIAL
TOPICS -- COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.


8. (C) THE LEGAL SYSTEM REMAINS AT BEST IN ITS
INFANCY, ALTHOUGH PROGRAMS FUNDED BY THE USG, UNDP, AND
OTHER DONORS HAVE BEGUN TO PAY OFF IN TERMS OF CAPACITY
BUILDING WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE JUDICIARY,
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AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. DESPITE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES THAT ALL DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE PRESUMED
INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY, HOWEVER, AS MANY AS 95
PCT OF ALL CASES RESULT IN CONVICTION. THIS IS
UNLIKELY EITHER TO BE A COINCIDENCE OR A TRIBUTE TO
EFFECTIVE PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES. JUDGES IN VIETNAM
WERE NOT EVEN REQUIRED TO HAVE A BACHELOR'S DEGREE
UNTIL 1999. NO LEGAL TRAINING WAS OFFERED IN THIS
COUNTRY BETWEEN 1954 AND 1976. THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
DID NOT EVEN EXIST BETWEEN 1960 AND 1984. CPV CELLS
CONTINUE TO EXIST IN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, AS AT ALL
OTHER MINISTRIES, AS WELL AS WITHIN THE JUDICIARY; THE
COMMON PERCEPTION IS THAT THESE CELLS HAVE THE FINAL
SAY ON ANY REMOTELY SENSITIVE CASE.

RULE BY PARTY VS. RULE BY LAW
--------------


9. (C) ARGUABLY, IT IS THE CPV-BLESSED TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AIMED AT CREATING OR IMPROVING RULE
OF LAW -- OR AT LEAST WHAT MANY DEMOCRATIC ACTIVISTS
DISMISSIVELY LABEL "RULE BY LAW" -- THAT MAY LEAD TO
POLITICAL COLLISIONS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. THE CPV
WILL FACE TOUGH CHOICES ABOUT ITS OWN FUTURE ROLE. THE
CONCEPTS OF TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, PRIMACY OF
LEGAL PRECEDENCE, EQUAL APPLICATION OF LAW AND
REGULATION, AND NATIONAL TREATMENT FLY IN THE FACE OF
TIME-HONORED CPV TRADITIONS OF SECRECY, PATERNALISTIC
GOVERNANCE, AND FAVORITISM FOR STATE ENTITIES. MANY
VIETNAMESE OPENLY ASSUME THAT SENIOR CPV LEADERS ARE
VIRTUALLY IMMUNE FROM LEGAL PROSECUTION, APART FROM THE
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OCCASIONAL SCAPEGOATS (MOST RECENTLY IN THE NAM CAM
CORRUPTION CASE THAT LED TO THE OUSTER -- BUT NOT
PROSECUTION SO FAR -- OF ONE VICE MINISTER OF PUBLIC
SECURITY AND THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE VOICE OF
VIETNAM RADIO). FOR RULE OF LAW TO WORK, THE CPV
CANNOT RETAIN THE FINAL SAY, EVEN ON A PICK-AND-CHOOSE
BASIS. TRUE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WOULD UNDERMINE THE
CPV'S CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED ROLE AS THE LEADING
FORCE OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY.


10. (C) FOR VIETNAM TO BECOME AND REMAIN TRULY
COMPETITIVE IN THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET-
BASED ECONOMY AND TO ATTRACT NEEDED FOREIGN INVESTMENT
CAPITAL, HOWEVER, THE GVN HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO PROCEED
WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LEGAL SYSTEM AND BUILDING
OF RULE OF LAW. IT CANNOT HOPE TO IMPLEMENT THE US-
VIETNAM BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT WITHOUT DOING SO, NOR
CAN IT DREAM OF WTO ACCESSION OTHERWISE. IT CANNOT
SUSTAIN THE JOB CREATION MOMENTUM NEEDED TO EMPLOY ITS
YOUNG AND GROWING POPULATION WITHOUT THE LEGAL
GUARANTEES AND SAFEGUARDS THAT ENABLE PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE TO FLOURISH. IT IS TRUE THAT VIETNAM'S
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY HAVE NOT FARED AT ALL BADLY OVER
THE PAST DECADE EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A GENUINE LEGAL
SYSTEM. BUT THE "EASY" REFORMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE.
THE COMPETITION FOR MARKETS AND INVESTMENT
INTERNATIONALLY OVER THE NEXT DECADE WILL BE MUCH

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L-00 VCE-00 MOFM-05 MOF-01 AC-01 DCP-01 NRRC-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00
PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 STR-00
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 HANOI 002345

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TOUGHER THAN ANYTHING VIETNAM HAS YET EXPERIENCED, AND
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MUST BE RULES-BASED.


11. (C) SIMILARLY, AS PERSONAL FREEDOMS HAVE EXPANDED
AND AS THE YOUNGER GENERATION KNOWS MORE ABOUT FREER
SOCIETIES BEYOND THESE BORDERS AND KNOWS LESS ABOUT
VIETNAM'S OWN RIGID PAST, THESE TRENDS HAVE BECOME
IRREVERSIBLE. WITHOUT A MANDATE OF CPV MEMBERSHIP TO
MOVE UPWARD IN A STATE-CONTROLLED SYSTEM, FEWER YOUNG
PEOPLE HAVE THE TIME AND INCLINATION TO DEVOTE TO CPV
MEMBERSHIP, WITH ITS ENDLESS MEETINGS AND IDEOLOGICAL
CAMPAIGNS. ONE SAVING GRACE FOR THE CPV IS THAT FEW
PEOPLE SEEM ACTIVELY TO MIND CPV POLITICAL DOMINANCE,
AND MANY APPEAR TO ACCEPT WITHOUT QUESTION THE
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A ONE-PARTY STATE.

HOLD YOUR BREATH
--------------


12. (C) NONG DUC MANH'S TENURE AS NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
CHAIRMAN, CHARACTERIZED BY EFFORTS TO ENLARGE NA
INFLUENCE AND OPEN UP ITS DELIBERATIONS, LED MANY
OBSERVERS TO ASSUME HE WOULD CONTINUE THESE TRENDS AS
CPV GENERAL SECRETARY. HOWEVER, CPV PLENUMS BEFORE THE
DECEMBER 2001 NA CONSIDERATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGES AND BEFORE THE JULY 2002 NA VOTES ON THE NEW
GOVERNMENT LINE-UP PROVIDED QUITE EXPLICIT
"RECOMMENDATIONS" ON WHAT THE NA SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT
DO, AND REINFORCED THAT NA DECISION-MAKING SHOULD BE
NEATLY UNDER THE CPV LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE. SO FAR,
NOTHING IN MANH'S TRACK RECORD AS GENERAL SECRETARY
SUGGESTS AN INTEREST IN POLITICAL REFORM, APART FROM
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THE SEEMINGLY BACKWARD STEPS OF THE "GRASSROOTS
DEMOCRACY" AND RENEWED IDEOLOGICAL EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS.


13. (C) THE CURRENT CONSENSUS-DRIVEN POLITBURO IS
UNLIKELY TO AGREE ON MUCH BEYOND THE PRIMACY OF
SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT, NEED FOR
DOMESTIC SOCIAL ORDER (AKA "STABILITY"),AND PROTECTION
OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND "SOLIDARITY." TINKERING
WITH THE CPV'S LEADING ROLE, BLESSING NEW POLITICAL
PARTIES, OR EVEN ENFORCING ALL OF THE RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS ELOQUENTLY EXPRESSED IN THE CONSTITUTION ARE
UNLIKELY TO BE ON THE RADAR SCOPE OF THE POLIBURO.
CREATING ENOUGH JOBS AND ENSURING THAT URBAN AND RURAL
INCOMES CONTINUE TO RISE WILL KEEP THE CPV LEADERSHIP
PREOCCUPIED FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS.


14. (C) BUT IN FIVE OR TEN YEARS, AS MORE RESULTS-
ORIENTED AND/OR WESTERN-EDUCATED OFFICIALS COME TO THE
FORE IN ALL THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES AND NA, AND AS THE
PRIVATE SECTOR CONTINUES TO GROW, THE NEED FOR A
SHARPER SEPARATION BETWEEN THE CPV AND THE GVN AS WELL
AS FOR HEIGHTENED RESPECT FOR RULE OF/BY LAW IN LIEU OF
CPV DOMINATION WILL BE CLEARER. BARRING MAJOR DOMESTIC
UNREST OR FOREIGN INVASIONS, THE NEXT GENERATION MAY BE
READY TO ACQUIESCE IN MORE OF A BACKSEAT ROLE FOR THE
CPV. MORE THAN THIS, THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEADERS
MAY INSIST ON SUCH A CHANGE. EVEN SO, SUCH CHANGES ARE
LIKELY TO BE TOP-DOWN RATHER THAN IN REACTION TO A
CLAMOR FROM THE "MASSES," WHO ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN
WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT VOICE IN THEIR OWN GOVERNANCE FOR
THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. LESS EDUCATED LOCAL GVN AND
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CPV OFFICIALS LIKELY WILL EXERT A SIGNIFICANT DRAG ON
THIS TRANSFORMATION, HOWEVER. HOLDING OUR FIGURATIVE
BREATH FOR A FREER SOCIETY AND LESSENED CPV ROLE HERE
MAKES SOME SENSE; WAITING FOR A GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC
VIETNAM TO EMERGE STILL DOES NOT.


15. (C) THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND SENIOR MND
LEADERSHIP IN PARTICULAR REMAINS A MINOR WILDCARD.
MND'S ROLE IN VIETNAM'S POLITICAL LIFE APPEARS TO HAVE
DIMINISHED SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE DOI MOI PERIOD; SOME
OBSERVERS WOULD ARGUE THAT THE MILITARY HAS INDEED BEEN
MARGINALIZED DESPITE ITS SIZE AS WELL AS ITS NUMEROUS
ECONOMIC INTERESTS. IF IT FAILS TO FIND A BETTER
NICHE, MND COULD PLAY A SPOILER ROLE IN ANY EVENTUAL
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND REFORM, OR AT LEAST BLOCK
THE EMERGENCE OF ANY NEW CONSENSUS ON STATE/SOCIETY
RELATIONS.
BURGHARDT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 HANOI 002345

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BURGHARDT

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