"WIN US OVER"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002272

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STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/12
TAGS: PREL EAID ETRD MARR VM CVR
SUBJECT: "WIN US OVER"
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REF: A. HANOI 2202 (NOTAL) B. HANOI 2259
- C. HANOI 2260 C. HANOI 2261


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT,
REASON: 1.5 (D)


2. (C) AMBASSADOR'S SCHEDULED SEPTEMBER 17 MEETING TO
DISCUSS CHINA (REF A) WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LE VAN
BANG (FORMERLY AMBASSADOR TO U.S., AND NOW RESPONSIBLE
FOR NORTHEAST ASIA) WAS UNAVOIDABLY DIVERTED INTO A
DISCUSSION OF PRESSING BILATERAL ISSUES (REFS C-D).


3. (C) BANG CAME PREPARED WITH SOME THOUGHTS ON THE
US-VIETNAM BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. READING FROM THREE
PAGES OF PRINTED NOTES, HE URGED THAT THE U.S. DO MORE
TO "BUILD TRUST," OFFERING THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS:
-- MORE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, HOWEVER SHORT, SUCH AS
THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT CALL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY
ARMITAGE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UPCOMING TALK (EVEN
TEN MINUTES) BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
PHAN VAN KHAI AT APEC;
-- CONTINUE DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL
ISSUES, AREAS OF ONGOING DISAGREEMENTS;
-- ESTABLISH A DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT (AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT
THE EXISTING BTA-RELATED MECHANISM ALREADY PROVIDES A
GOOD FORUM FOR THIS);
-- AVOID LETTING CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES SUCH AS ETHNIC
MINORITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BE
"PROMINENT" IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT INSTEAD SEEK
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WAYS TO SOLVE DISAGREEMENTS "CONSTRUCTIVELY, NOT AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP."


4. (C) VFM BANG EMPHASIZED THAT "FRANKLY, YOU MUST
HAVE A WAY TO WIN OVER VIETNAM" IN A MANNER THAT WOULD
BE "CONDUCIVE TO US POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA." (HE
USED THE SAME PHRASEOLOGY IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE
DCM AT POST'S 9/11 CEREMONY, WHERE HE ALSO SAID THAT
VIETNAM WANTS TO BE "WITH" THE U.S.) HE WELCOMED US
INTEREST IN A "STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND VIETNAM, AND REITERATED A NEED TO SOLVE SENSITIVE
ISSUES "QUIETLY." HE OFFERED THANKS FOR US AID
PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY RELATED TO LEGAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN
VIETNAM'S INCLUSION IN THE MILLENIUM CHALLENGE FUND.
AMBASSADOR NOTED OTHER US HUMANITARIAN AID PROGRAMS AS
WELL, AND DESCRIBED US FRUSTRATION AT DIFFICULTIES IN
INCREASING AID IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. VFM BANG
RETORTED THAT "SOMETIMES NOT TO HELP IS TO HELP."


5. (C) VFM BANG DESCRIBED BURGEONING RELATIONS
ELSEWHERE, POINTING TO COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL
SECRETARY NONG DUC MANH'S OCTOBER TRIP TO JAPAN, A

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"GOOD VISIT" BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN TAN DUNG
TO SOUTH KOREA RECENTLY, "GOOD RELATIONS" WITH TAIWAN
(NOW INCLUDING "65,000 SONS-IN-LAW"),"FRIENDLY"
RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND EXPANDED TIES WITHIN ASEAN
AND IN ASEM. HE STRESSED THAT VIETNAM ALSO "VERY MUCH
WANTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS" WITH THE U.S. TO A "HIGHER
LEVEL," AND ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL HELP IN
ACHIEVING THIS. HE URGED THAT VIETNAM AND THE U.S.
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WORK TOGETHER TOWARD IMPROVING THE STABILITY OF THE
WHOLE REGION, EVEN FARTHER AFIELD SUCH AS THE KOREAN
PENINSULA AND CHINA.


6. (C) AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THIS GOAL,
NOTING EFFORTS TO ARRANGE HIGH LEVEL TRIPS IN BOTH
DIRECTIONS, AND TO UTILIZE THESE MEETINGS TO RAISE THE
LEVEL OF DISCUSSION. VFM BANG NOTED THAT, WHILE THE
STATE DEPARTMENT AND MFA WERE OF SIMILAR MINDS ON THIS
GOAL, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONVINCE OTHER DEPARTMENTS --
NOTABLY THE PENTAGON AND THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE (MND) -- OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH TIES. HE
SUGGESTED THAT THE "ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT CONDUCIVE" FOR
FALL 2002 VISIT TO THE U.S. BY DEFENSE MINISTER TRA,
URGING THE U.S. INSTEAD TO "BUILD UP" MILITARY-TO-
MILITARY TIES FIRST. AMBASSADOR RECOUNTED EXISTING
FORMS OF MILITARY COOPERATION SUCH AS IN MEDICAL
RESEARCH, AS WELL AS ONGOING TALKS ON FUTURE SHIP
VISITS. (NOTE: THE LAST CONVERSATION BETWEEN DATT AND
MND REGARDING MINISTER TRA'S TRIP INDICATED THAT HE WAS
STILL HOPING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. IN THE LATE
NOVEMBER/EARLY DECEMBER TIMEFRAME. END NOTE)


7. (C) COMMENT: VFM BANG RETAINS A PROPRIETARY
INTEREST IN US-VIETNAM RELATIONS, GIVEN HIS PERSONAL

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ACTION EAP-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AIT-03 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00
COME-00 CTME-00 DOEE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EXIM-01
E-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-00 ITC-01 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
OES-01 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00
P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00
DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /013W
-------------- E909EB 181058Z /38
R 181049Z SEP 02
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7584
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AIT TAIPEI 0703
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 002272

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STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV

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ROLE OVER THE PAST DECADE IN SHEPHERDING THIS
RELATIONSHIP. HE IS LIKELY DISTURBED AT THE
POSSIBILITY THAT US-VIETNAM TIES ARE FAILING TO KEEP
PACE WITH THE SOMETIMES OVERWHELMING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STATES, AS WELL AS THE LARGER
ECONOMIC AND ASSISTANCE ROLES JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND
TAIWAN PLAY HERE. WE AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IT
IS IMPORTANT FOR THE USG NOT ONLY TO DO MORE
BILATERALLY, BUT ALSO TO BE SEEN AS DOING MORE HERE.
THIS IS A TOUGH TASK IN A COUNTRY WHERE THE MEDIA IS SO
CONTROLLED, OFTEN INDEED BY ELEMENTS OF THE CPV AND GVN
NOT ESPECIALLY INCLINED TO BE FAVORABLE TOWARD THE US.
DAS DALEY'S VISIT, THE PROBABLE OCTOBER POLITICAL
DIALOGUE, HOPEFULLY A PRESIDENTIAL PHOTO OP AT APEC
WITH THE PM, AND THE POSSIBLE DECEMBER VISIT HERE BY
THE MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT OFFER SOME SHORT-TERM
BOOSTS TO THE VISIBILITY OF OUR BILATERAL TIES. BUT,
AS BANG ACKNOWLEDGED, PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE TO BE
SLOWED BY LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS WHO ARE LESS ENTHUSIASTIC
ABOUT US-VIETNAM TIES THAN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. SOME
OF THESE PEOPLE -- IN THE MILITARY, PUBLIC SECURITY,
AND PROPAGANDA FIELDS, FOR EXAMPLE -- MAY ALSO BE MORE
RECEPTIVE TO BEIJING THAN BANG (REF A).
BURGHARDT

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