Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02HANOI1666
2002-07-02 10:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:
PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP STABILITY IN VIETNAM
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 021001Z Jul 02 2002HANOI01666 - CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7791 PAGE 01 HANOI 01666 020959Z ACTION EAP-00 INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DINT-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-00 VCE-00 MOFM-05 MOF-01 AC-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 IRM-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 R-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /012W ------------------C55692 021000Z /38 FM AMEMBASSY HANOI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6903 INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE SECDEF WASHDC//ISA USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 001666
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/12
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR VM DPOL
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP STABILITY IN VIETNAM
REF: HANOI 1517
C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 001666
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/12
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR VM DPOL
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP STABILITY IN VIETNAM
REF: HANOI 1517
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT,
REASON: 1.5 (D)
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HANOI 01666 020959Z
2. (C) SUMMARY. A PARTY PLENUM AND NEW NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WILL DECIDE ON
SEVERAL NEW KEY LEADERS. WHILE SOME PERSONNEL
JOCKEYING PROBABLY CONTINUES, WE DETECT FEW, IF ANY,
GENUINE DEBATES ON POLICY DIRECTION. WE ANTICIPATE
THAT THE NEW LINE-UP WILL CONTINUE TO BE LARGELY
COLLECTIVE AND PRAGMATIC IN DECISION-MAKING AS WELL AS
GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF ECONOMIC REFORM AND DIPLOMATIC
INTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE
BELIEVE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO BUILD ON THE POSITIVE
MOMENTUM IN BILATERAL TIES WITH AN ACTIVE SERIES OF
HIGH LEVEL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OVER THE NEXT YEAR
AND BEYOND. END SUMMARY.
3. (C) THE EXPECTED SIXTH PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF VIETNAM (CPV) JULY 4-15 AND THE OPENING OF THE 11TH
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA) ON JULY 19 WILL LEAD TO A NEW
ROUND OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP SHIFTS WITHIN THE GVN
(REFTEL). AMONG THE LIKELY CHANGES WILL BE ONE OR TWO
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, AS MANY AS HALF A DOZEN
MINISTERS, POSSIBLY THE SUPREME PROCURATOR, AND SEVERAL
NA COMMITTEE CHIEFS, INCLUDING FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
ECONOMIC AND BUDGET AFFAIRS. THE PRESIDENT, PRIME
MINISTER, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE
EXPECTED TO WIN RE-ELECTION EASILY.
4. (C) MUCH OF THE BACK-DOOR BARGAINING ON PERSONNEL
SHIFTS HAS PROBABLY ALREADY CONCLUDED, WITH THE PLENUM
EXPECTED TO GIVE ITS FINAL BLESSING IN PRIVATE TO THE
NEW SLATE AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AFTER TOKEN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HANOI 01666 020959Z
DISCUSSION, TO RATIFY THESE CHOICES OBEDIENTLY. UNLIKE
THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THEN-GENERAL SECRETARY LE KHA PHIEU
AND EVENTUAL GENERAL SECRETARY NONG DUC MANH IN THE
RUN-UP TO THE 2001 NINTH PARTY CONGRESS, HOWEVER, THESE
PERSONNEL DECISIONS APPEAR TO HAVE VERY LITTLE TO DO
WITH IDEOLOGY OR SETTING A DIFFERENT POLICY COURSE FOR
VIETNAM OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.
5. (C) THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS ESSENTIALLY MADE THE
BOTTOM LINE CHOICES IN FAVOR OF EXPANDED ECONOMIC
REFORM, HIGHER PRIORITY TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MAINTENANCE OF DOMESTIC STABILITY,
AND CONTINUED INTEGRATION INTO THE REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE SEE NO ONE ON THE HORIZON
WITHIN THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP OR POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP
RANKS WHO IS STAKING AN OPPOSITION TO THIS POLICY
FRAMEWORK OR WHO MIGHT WISH TO BACKTRACK ON NINTH PARTY
CONGRESS PRIORITIES. INDEED, SOME OF THE POTENTIAL
WINNERS FROM THE LEADERSHIP SWEEPSTAKES, SUCH AS
CURRENT MINISTER OF TRADE VU KHOAN (A LIKELY DPM) OR HO
CHI MINH CITY PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN MINH TRIET (STILL A
DARK HORSE CANDIDATE AS DPM) MIGHT SEEK FURTHER TO
ENERGIZE THE GVN'S ECONOMIC REFORM PROCESS ONCE IN
OFFICE. NO ONE IN SIGHT, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE
ADVOCATING FOR SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL REFORM, APART FROM
AN ONGOING IF SEEMINGLY STERILE CAMPAIGN TO STRENGTHEN
"GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY" AND NUMEROUS SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS
(INCLUDING WITH USG SUPPORT) ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE
OF LAW.
6. (C) THE CPV AND GVN LEADERSHIP HAS WEATHERED
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HANOI 01666 020959Z
NUMEROUS CHALLENGES SINCE NATIONAL UNIFICATION IN 1975,
PARTICULARLY THE DARK DAYS OF ISOLATION AND ECONOMIC
DISASTER IN THE 1980'S AND THE FALL-OUT FROM THE 1997
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS. WHAT WE ARE LEFT WITH IS NOT A
GENERATION OF RISK TAKERS OR VISIONARIES, BUT RATHER A
MORE OR LESS GENUINELY COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP (WITHOUT
ANY HOTSHOTS OR STARS) THAT IS INCREASINGLY PRAGMATIC
RATHER THAN DOGMATIC. THESE INDIVIDUALS APPARENTLY
UNDERSTAND AND AGREE ON THE CRITICAL NEED FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND JOB CREATION, WHILE NONETHELESS
STRIVING TO MINIMIZE THREATS TO SOCIAL ORDER, DOMESTIC
STABILITY, AND MAINTENANCE OF CPV POLITICAL POWER.
7. (C) EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL
CONTINUE TO BE COMPOSED OF INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM THE
USG CAN WORK PRODUCTIVELY. WE LOOK FORWARD TO
COORDINATING WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES ON AN ACTIVE
SCHEDULE OF VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OVER THE NEXT
YEAR AND BEYOND IN ORDER TO BUILD ON THE POSITIVE
MOMENTUM IN OUR BILATERAL TIES.
BURGHARDT
CONFIDENTIAL
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/12
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR VM DPOL
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP STABILITY IN VIETNAM
REF: HANOI 1517
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT,
REASON: 1.5 (D)
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HANOI 01666 020959Z
2. (C) SUMMARY. A PARTY PLENUM AND NEW NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WILL DECIDE ON
SEVERAL NEW KEY LEADERS. WHILE SOME PERSONNEL
JOCKEYING PROBABLY CONTINUES, WE DETECT FEW, IF ANY,
GENUINE DEBATES ON POLICY DIRECTION. WE ANTICIPATE
THAT THE NEW LINE-UP WILL CONTINUE TO BE LARGELY
COLLECTIVE AND PRAGMATIC IN DECISION-MAKING AS WELL AS
GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF ECONOMIC REFORM AND DIPLOMATIC
INTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE
BELIEVE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO BUILD ON THE POSITIVE
MOMENTUM IN BILATERAL TIES WITH AN ACTIVE SERIES OF
HIGH LEVEL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OVER THE NEXT YEAR
AND BEYOND. END SUMMARY.
3. (C) THE EXPECTED SIXTH PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF VIETNAM (CPV) JULY 4-15 AND THE OPENING OF THE 11TH
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA) ON JULY 19 WILL LEAD TO A NEW
ROUND OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP SHIFTS WITHIN THE GVN
(REFTEL). AMONG THE LIKELY CHANGES WILL BE ONE OR TWO
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, AS MANY AS HALF A DOZEN
MINISTERS, POSSIBLY THE SUPREME PROCURATOR, AND SEVERAL
NA COMMITTEE CHIEFS, INCLUDING FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
ECONOMIC AND BUDGET AFFAIRS. THE PRESIDENT, PRIME
MINISTER, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE
EXPECTED TO WIN RE-ELECTION EASILY.
4. (C) MUCH OF THE BACK-DOOR BARGAINING ON PERSONNEL
SHIFTS HAS PROBABLY ALREADY CONCLUDED, WITH THE PLENUM
EXPECTED TO GIVE ITS FINAL BLESSING IN PRIVATE TO THE
NEW SLATE AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AFTER TOKEN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HANOI 01666 020959Z
DISCUSSION, TO RATIFY THESE CHOICES OBEDIENTLY. UNLIKE
THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THEN-GENERAL SECRETARY LE KHA PHIEU
AND EVENTUAL GENERAL SECRETARY NONG DUC MANH IN THE
RUN-UP TO THE 2001 NINTH PARTY CONGRESS, HOWEVER, THESE
PERSONNEL DECISIONS APPEAR TO HAVE VERY LITTLE TO DO
WITH IDEOLOGY OR SETTING A DIFFERENT POLICY COURSE FOR
VIETNAM OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.
5. (C) THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS ESSENTIALLY MADE THE
BOTTOM LINE CHOICES IN FAVOR OF EXPANDED ECONOMIC
REFORM, HIGHER PRIORITY TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, MAINTENANCE OF DOMESTIC STABILITY,
AND CONTINUED INTEGRATION INTO THE REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE SEE NO ONE ON THE HORIZON
WITHIN THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP OR POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP
RANKS WHO IS STAKING AN OPPOSITION TO THIS POLICY
FRAMEWORK OR WHO MIGHT WISH TO BACKTRACK ON NINTH PARTY
CONGRESS PRIORITIES. INDEED, SOME OF THE POTENTIAL
WINNERS FROM THE LEADERSHIP SWEEPSTAKES, SUCH AS
CURRENT MINISTER OF TRADE VU KHOAN (A LIKELY DPM) OR HO
CHI MINH CITY PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN MINH TRIET (STILL A
DARK HORSE CANDIDATE AS DPM) MIGHT SEEK FURTHER TO
ENERGIZE THE GVN'S ECONOMIC REFORM PROCESS ONCE IN
OFFICE. NO ONE IN SIGHT, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE
ADVOCATING FOR SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL REFORM, APART FROM
AN ONGOING IF SEEMINGLY STERILE CAMPAIGN TO STRENGTHEN
"GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY" AND NUMEROUS SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS
(INCLUDING WITH USG SUPPORT) ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE
OF LAW.
6. (C) THE CPV AND GVN LEADERSHIP HAS WEATHERED
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HANOI 01666 020959Z
NUMEROUS CHALLENGES SINCE NATIONAL UNIFICATION IN 1975,
PARTICULARLY THE DARK DAYS OF ISOLATION AND ECONOMIC
DISASTER IN THE 1980'S AND THE FALL-OUT FROM THE 1997
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS. WHAT WE ARE LEFT WITH IS NOT A
GENERATION OF RISK TAKERS OR VISIONARIES, BUT RATHER A
MORE OR LESS GENUINELY COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP (WITHOUT
ANY HOTSHOTS OR STARS) THAT IS INCREASINGLY PRAGMATIC
RATHER THAN DOGMATIC. THESE INDIVIDUALS APPARENTLY
UNDERSTAND AND AGREE ON THE CRITICAL NEED FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND JOB CREATION, WHILE NONETHELESS
STRIVING TO MINIMIZE THREATS TO SOCIAL ORDER, DOMESTIC
STABILITY, AND MAINTENANCE OF CPV POLITICAL POWER.
7. (C) EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL
CONTINUE TO BE COMPOSED OF INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM THE
USG CAN WORK PRODUCTIVELY. WE LOOK FORWARD TO
COORDINATING WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES ON AN ACTIVE
SCHEDULE OF VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS OVER THE NEXT
YEAR AND BEYOND IN ORDER TO BUILD ON THE POSITIVE
MOMENTUM IN OUR BILATERAL TIES.
BURGHARDT
CONFIDENTIAL