President backs military on Jaffna security

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002355

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12-30-12
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS ECPS CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: President backs military on Jaffna security
zones; GSL defends role in import of equipment for LTTE

Refs: Colombo 2353, and previous

(U) Classified by Long Lee, Acting Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga has come out
strongly in favor of the Sri Lankan military's position
on the need to maintain "high security zones" in Jaffna.
For its part, the LTTE has announced that it wants to
discuss the security zone issue at the next round of
political-level talks. In the meantime, the GSL has
issued a long document defending its role in the recent
import of radio equipment for the LTTE. At this point,
despite real friction over the security zones, it is
positive that the GSL and the LTTE have so far indicated
a willingness to discuss the issue further. END
SUMMARY.

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Kumaratunga Enters the Fray
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2. (C) President Kumaratunga has come out strongly in
favor of the Sri Lankan military's position on the "high
security zones" in Jaffna. (Note: In a proposal
rejected by the LTTE late last week, the military
advocated that the zones only be opened to resettlement
if the LTTE agrees to strict conditions, including
disarming of any LTTE cadre entering them -- See
Reftels. Mission is faxing SA/INS a map of the zones.)
Kumaratunga's involvement in the issue began late
December 27 when her office issued a press release
expressing concern about the LTTE's position and
announcing that she was cutting short her vacation in
order to return to Colombo to deal with the situation.
In dramatic tones, the statement ended by saying, "The
President's Office will keep the public further informed
as events unfold." On December 28, Kumaratunga met Army
Commander Lt. General Balagalle and Major General
Fonseka, the Jaffna Army commander, to review the
matter. According to leaks of what happened at the
meeting, Kumaratunga told the two that she was strongly
in support of the military's position that the security
zones were critical to the defense of Jaffna and should
not be dramatically reduced in size.


3. (C) Queried about Kumaratunga's intervention, Jehan
Perera, the head of a local think-tank, told us that she
seemed to be "angling for cohabitation advantage."
Kumaratunga, he said, was clearly trying to create "a
crisis atmosphere" by warning the government that it
should not undermine the military's position by going
too far to accommodate the LTTE. By publicizing her
position, Perera remarked that Kumaratunga had probably
"scored some political points" on the government. He
thought that any damage to the GSL was limited, however,
as most people realized that the issue of the security
zones needed to be discussed with the LTTE. It was not
enough simply to try to turn off debate, which was what
Kumaratunga seemed to be trying to do.

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LTTE Backs Further Discussion
--------------


4. (C) After issuing its strongly worded rejection of
the military's proposal on the security zones (see
Reftel),the LTTE seems to be taking a more moderate
tack at this time. In comments posted on the pro-LTTE
website "TamilNet" on December 29, LTTE senior
negotiator Anton Balasingham aimed some fire at the Sri
Lankan military, which he said was taking a "hard-line
attitude" on the security zone matter. By taking its
stand, Balasingham asserted, the military was preventing
the resettlement of Tamil civilians in Jaffna. That
said, Balasingham went on to stress that the LTTE was
still strongly in support of the peace process and
looked forward to discussing the security zone issue at
the January 6-9 round of talks in Thailand. Queried
about a proposal put forward by the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM),Balasingham said he did not know whether
a meeting of the Sub-Committee on De-Escalation and
Normalization focused on discussing the security zone
issue would "materialize." He indicated that the LTTE
believed the sub-committee was "defunct," as it had
failed to make progress in solving the issue. The group
now preferred to discuss the matter at the political-
level talks.

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GSL Defends Import of Radio Equipment
--------------


5. (SBU) Turning to another contentious issue, the
government has issued a long document explaining its
decision to allow the import of equipment upgrading the
LTTE's radio capabilities (See Reftels). The document,
which received significant media coverage, stated that
the GSL allowed the import of the equipment only after
the LTTE agreed to apply for a license and to broadcast
subject to Sri Lankan government regulations. The
document went on to note that: "The public will
appreciate that the willingness of the LTTE to submit
itself to the authority of the government is a 180
degree change from that which prevailed earlier when the
LTTE ran an illegal and unauthorized radio operation."
Responding to allegations that the Norwegian Embassy
should not have been involved in the import of the
equipment (it was consignee),the document made clear
that it was the GSL that asked the GoN to get involved
in the matter. The document added that the Norwegians
only became involved when they became convinced that
helping facilitate the import of the equipment was in
the best interests of the peace process.


6. (C) The government's document seems to have gone
some way in explaining to the public the circumstances
surrounding the import of the equipment. Jehan Perera
said he thought that the controversy over the issue
would now die down to a large extent. Perera added that
the government had handled the issue "clumsily" by not
taking the issue public earlier. By its failure to get
its side of the story out earlier, the government had
also hurt the Norwegian facilitators, who had been made
to seem almost pro-LTTE by some elements in the press.
In a sign that the issue may not be going away soon,
Harim Peiris, a spokesman for President Kumaratunga,
told us that the government's explanation of its
involvement was "too little and too late." Peiris added
that Kumaratunga wanted a "full accounting" and might
write to the Norwegian PM requesting an explanation of
the GoN role in the matter.

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COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) As it tries to manage the blowups over the radio
equipment and Jaffna security zones, the GSL seems a bit
on the defensive. With Kumaratunga and others hitting
out hard against the LTTE, the government is finding its
room for maneuver narrowing to some extent. At this
point, however, it is positive that the GSL and the LTTE
have so far indicated a willingness to discuss the
security zone issue further, despite real friction over
how to resolve it. Still acting in almost a binary
manner as far as the peace process is concerned, neither
side seems to want things to come to a crisis point
where they cannot negotiate a way out. END COMMENT.


8. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS