GSL MINISTOR MORAGODA SAYS INDIANS MAD AT JAPANESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002312

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL; NSC FOR

E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR PARM CE LTTE
SUBJECT: GSL MINISTOR MORAGODA SAYS INDIANS MAD AT JAPANESE
AND WORRIED ABOUT US ROLE IN NEPAL


Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ASHLEY WILLS. REASONS: 1.5 B, D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: GSL Minister Milinda Moragoda told me over
the weekend that the Indians are "really mad" over the
attempts by the Japanese to involve themselves in Sri Lanka's
negotiation to end the war. Moragoda said Indian Foreign
Secretary Sibal, who visited Colombo last week, was

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"comfortable" with U.S. interest and activities in Sri Lanka
but "very worried" about American military support to the
Government of Nepal. Moragoda also indicated that Indian
Secretary to the PM Brajesh Mishra had deliberately slowed

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down the GOI's move toward signing an ACSA with the U.S.G.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Moragoda called me over the weekend and asked for a
quick meeting before his trip this week to New Delhi and
Tokyo. We met at Jefferson House Sunday, December 15.

Resentment of the Japanese


3. (C) Moragoda reported that in his visits to New Delhi
before and after the last round of talks in Oslo early in
December, and again when Indian Foreign Secretary Sibal
visited Colombo last week, he had heard "an earful" about the
GOI's unhappiness with Japanese attempts to involve
themselves in Sri Lanka's negotiation to end the war. In his
meetings with Brajesh Mishra in the PMO, Foreign Minister
Sinha and Foreign Secretary Sibal, Moragoda found the Indians
"really mad" at alleged Japanese presumption. Moragoda
indicated that the Indians expressed general displeasure at
Japan's "insinuating" itself into a process being handled
"competently" by the Norwegians.


4. (C) As more specific examples of the Indian attitude,
Moragoda told me the GOJ had apparently proposed assigning
Japanese monitors to the Scandanavian-staffed Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission. When the Indians were consulted, they
nixed the proposal. Similarly, according to Moragoda, the
Japanese Foreign Minister had proposed stopping in Bangkok in
early January on her way to an official visit to Colombo.
She first proposed a side meeting with the GSL and LTTE
delegations in Bangkok, then backed off a bit and suggested a
cocktail. The GOI, which the GSL informed of the proposals,
again objected, apparently in strong terms. And Foreign
Secretary Sibal apparently expressed unhappiness over the

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decision to allow the Japanese to host a round of the peace
talks early next year. In the latter case, apparently, the
Indians were not consulted until after the decision was made
and announced publicly.


5. (C) I probed Moragoda a bit about why the Indians were
reacting so viscerally. He said he'd heard that the GOI was
"deeply annoyed" by Japanese opposition to an Indian motion
within the IAEA to draw attention to Pakistan's illicit
nuclear cooperation with North Korea. But there were other,
less proximate reasons as well. Mishra called the Japanese
"artless" and alleged that the GOJ was "heedless of vital
Indian security interests." Foreign Minister Sinha,
meanwhile, asked rhetorically "who is Japan to get involved
in our region?" The general view, according to Moragoda, was
that the Indians felt the Japanese were "overstepping".

More Tolerance for Us


6. (C) By contrast, Moragoda found the Indians more
"comfortable" with the US role in Sri Lanka. "We have a
dialogue with the Americans," Moragoda quoted Sibal, "and
although we may not agree on everything, we at least
consult." Moragoda claimed Mishra, Sinha and Sibal all felt
at ease with U.S. actions in Sri Lanka but also expressed the
need to be kept fully informed, by the GSL and the U.S.G.,
concerning our actions here.


7. (C) There was less ease in New Delhi about our policy in
Nepal, according to Moragoda. He said Sibal had been quite
explicit on this point. "The Americans tend toward military
solutions," he quoted Sibal. In Nepal's case, Sibal thought
this a big mistake. Moragoda said he decried our decision to
sell sophisticated weapons to an "unsophisticated" Nepalese
military. These weapons, the Indians feared, would end up
sooner or later, probably sooner, being captured by the
Maoists, who would in turn use them themselves or, even
worse, sell them to any of several separatist groups
operating in India.


8. (C) Although New Delhi was generally positive about the
U.S., Moragoda reported, he cited one exception: our attempt
to sign an ACSA with the GOI. This had come to Mishra's
attention, Moragoda told me, and he had deliberately ordered
the Indian bureaucracy to slow down its move toward signing
an ACSA with the U.S. Moragoda did not know if the Indians
would eventually sign.
COMMENT


9. (C) It did not surprise me that the Indians resent the
moves by the Japanese to involve themselves in Sri Lanka.
The Indians may have to reconcile themselves to our role
because we are the alpha dog, but the Japanese will find
themselves barked at and bitten by the Indians until they
show respect for Delhi's status. It would probably help
matters if the Japanese Foreign Minister or at least Special
Envoy Akashi were to visit New Delhi soon.
WILLS