Sri Lanka: Muslim leader Rauf Hakeem's

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002293

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, AND INR/NESA; NSC FOR E.
MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12-12-12
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS CE
SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Muslim leader Rauf Hakeem's
problems come into tighter focus

Refs: Colombo 2277, and previous

(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: With his party fragmenting around him,
Rauf Hakeem of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC)
finds himself in a very precarious position. While he
is respected in Colombo circles for his support of the
peace process, Hakeem is considered a lightweight
politician. The fact that he is not from the east where
a plurality of Sri Lankan Muslims live is also a serious
liability. With his political survival at stake, Hakeem
has to make a comeback soon or face probable
marginalization. Another factor hurting Hakeem is the
emerging view that it might not be bad for the peace
process if he is cut out of the scene. END SUMMARY.

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Hakeem in a Bind
================


2. (C) Rauf Hakeem, the leader of the SLMC, finds
himself in a very precarious position. (Note: Hakeem
also serves the governing coalition as Minister of Ports
and Shipping.) As reported in Reftels, his party has
recently fragmented into hostile camps, one remaining
loyal to his authority and the other rejecting him out
of hand. Both factions appear relatively evenly
balanced, although Hakeem seems to be able to rely on
the support of a bare majority of the party's 12 MPs and
SLMC governing committee members.


3. (C) If the dispute is not settled in some way soon,
Hakeem will be tested in coming weeks (and perhaps
months) in the court system, as party dissidents
continue their effort to remove him as party leader.
(Note: The next legal hearing is scheduled for
December 13 in Colombo. Party dissidents, who assert
that Hakeem has abused his power, claim that they
removed Hakeem as leader on December 1 per proper SLMC
procedure.) Aside from the legal case against him,
Hakeem is also being challenged politically: As
reviewed in Reftels, he is under attack in the press by
his rivals virtually every day. In addition, we have
been told by contacts that party dissidents are trying
to rally the populace against Hakeem in Muslim areas in
the Eastern Province. (Note: Hakeem has also been
touring the east trying to garner support.)

========================
A Lightweight Politician
========================


4. (C) It is not clear that Hakeem is up to the
challenge he is facing. Most contacts agree that Hakeem
is polite, thoughtful, and intelligent. In Colombo
circles, the mild-mannered Hakeem is also respected for
his support of the peace process. (Note: His main SLMC
opponent, MP A.L.M. Athaulla, is basically against the
GSL's peace initiative -- see below.) That said,
Hakeem's recent problems have solidified his reputation
as being essentially a lightweight politician, lacking
the leadership skills required to succeed in the rough-
and-tumble world of Sri Lankan politics.


5. (C) In respect to leadership skills, Hakeem has also
been compared unfavorably to the founder of the party,
M.H.M. Ashraff, who died in a helicopter crash in
October 2000. (Note: Hakeem assumed control of the
party in early 2001, after winning a fierce leadership
battle.) Ashraff was seen as a strong, charismatic
leader, who could reach out to the common man. Hakeem,
however, is widely seen as somewhat aloof and lacking in
energy. (Note: In meetings with Mission officers, he
sometimes appears listless.) This lack of political
verve and ability to articulate his views to the party
faithful, coupled with his apparent inability to cut
political deals, has left many observers wondering
whether Hakeem has the tools to survive as SLMC leader.

===================
The Eastern Problem
===================


6. (C) The fact that Hakeem is not from the east where
a plurality of Sri Lankan Muslims live is also coming
into clearer focus as a serious liability. (Note:
Hakeem, 42, is from central Sri Lanka, but has spent
much of his life in Colombo. Up to 40 percent of Sri
Lanka's Muslims live in the Eastern Province.) With the
peace process focusing inexorably on possible GSL-Tamil
Tiger power-sharing arrangements, the multi-ethnic east
is correctly considered the thorniest issue needing
settlement. Many eastern Muslims simply do not trust
Hakeem to negotiate for them, seeing him has too willing
to compromise with the government and the Tigers.
Indeed, Hakeem's pro-peace process views are generally
at odds with those held by many eastern Muslims, who are
deeply skeptical of Tamil Tiger intentions.


7. (C) In addition, Hakeem's personal characteristics
--as touched on above--are off-putting to many
easterners, who find him too urbane and totally unlike
the roughhewn, "man-of-the-people" politicians they are
used to dealing with. (Note: Hakeem, a natty dresser,
is wealthy and was educated in Sri Lanka's best schools.
Muslims in the east, however, are generally poorer than
their co-religionists elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Many of
them are farmers and fishermen.) Again, Hakeem's
failings raise the specter of Ashraff, who was from the
east, and was extremely popular with Muslims in that
region.

=======
COMMENT
=======


8. (C) With his political survival at stake, Hakeem has
to make a comeback soon or face probable
marginalization. Thus far, the odds do not look good,
although Hakeem has been in some tight spots before and
gotten out of them. (Note: There remains the
possibility that the two sides may work out some sort of
settlement. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe has weighed
in, urging compromise.) Another factor hurting Hakeem
is the emerging view that it might not be bad for the
peace process if he is cut out of the scene. While this
perspective is a bit ironic given Hakeem's pro-peace
process stance, Hakeem is probably not the deus ex
machina needed to bring eastern Muslims on board with
the peace process. The problem is finding someone who
can play that role -- and it is not clear anyone in the
Muslim community can. END COMMENT.


9. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS