AS LEADERSHIP DISPUTE FLARES, SRI LANKA'S MAJOR MUSLIM PARTY MARGINALIZED IN PEACE PROCESS DEBATE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002277

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA AND SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12-10-12
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, PHUM, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties
SUBJECT: As leadership dispute flares, Sri Lanka's
major Muslim party marginalized in peace process debate

Refs: Colombo 2267, and previous

(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Dissension within the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) continues to tear the party apart. The
two sides vying for leadership of the SLMC have taken
their increasingly fractious battle to court and to the
press. Initial fears that the SLMC's internal turmoil
would have a detrimental impact on the governing
coalition's stability and the peace process have proven
to be unfounded, thus far. Rather, the primary effect
of the turmoil appears to be the self-marginalization of
the Muslim voice in the peace process debate. END
SUMMARY.

2. (C) Legal Maneuvering. Dissension in the SLMC
continues to tear the principal Muslim party in Sri
Lanka apart. The most recent upsurge in tensions began
on December 1 when dissidents led by SLMC MPs A.L.M.
Athaulla and M. Hafrath acted to remove Rauf Hakeem as
party leader -- See Reftel. After it became clear that
both sides were not going to give in, the conflict moved
to the courts and on December 3 a Colombo court granted
an injunction request filed by the SLMC dissidents that
effectively suspended Hakeem as leader of the party. At
this point, Hakeem seemed to be on the way out. After
rushing back from Oslo (where he had been participating
in the third session of GSL-Tamil Tiger talks),Hakeem
made a comeback however. In response to a countersuit
filed by Hakeem's camp, an appeals court overruled the
initial decision and Hakeem was back as SLMC leader. On
December 13, another Colombo court is scheduled to hold
hearings to determine who the leader of the SLMC is. In
the meantime, Hakeem is claiming that the dissidents
have been expelled from the party.

3. (SBU) Battling in the Press. Aside from the legal
jousting, the two sides have increasingly taken their
struggle to the press. Barely a day goes by without
front-page articles highlighting the dueling press
conferences put on by the two sides. Articles have
cited the two camps as making the following shrill
attacks:

r />-- Hakeem has stated that the charges against him "are
only a pretext for certain self-serving people who are
bringing puerile arguments to get privileges and
benefits for themselves at the expense of the
community's long-term interest."

-- Hakeem has also stated that the rebels in the SLMC
are trying to "destabilize the government and the peace
process."

-- Athaulla on Hakeem: "He has a tendency of threatening
anybody who bravely indicated his stupidity."

-- Hafrath: "The party at present is in the hands of
sincere and honest workers. Several attempts have been
made in not so pleasant terms to undo the stability of
the party by certain elements."

4. (C) Ramifications for GSL and Peace Process. Initial
fears that the turmoil within the SLMC would have a
detrimental impact on the governing coalition's
stability (the SLMC is a key part of the United National
Front coalition) and the peace process have proven to be
unfounded, thus far. Although five of the 12 SLMC MPs
seem to be anti-Hakeem at this point, and the governing
coalition only holds a slim majority in Parliament, the
GSL is benefiting from the tacit support of the 16 MPs
loyal to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The TNA's
support gives the GSL a significant cushion in
Parliament and, as of yet, there is little sign that the
government is close to falling or that it might lose any
tight votes. In any case, although some observers
believe that they are in cahoots with the People's
Alliance (PA) opposition, the dissidents have indicated
that they would not abandon the government for now. At
the same time, while they have made some anti-peace
process statements, the dissidents have not focused
their fire on the government's peace initiative. As of
this point, their favorite target is Hakeem and what
they see as his abuse of power in running the SLMC --
not the peace process.

5. (C) COMMENT: The primary effect of the intra-SLMC
turmoil appears to be the self-marginalization of the
Muslim voice in the peace process debate. When Hakeem
was forced to withdraw from the Oslo talks, Muslims lost
their direct voice in the negotiations. In addition,
with the two sides so busy attacking each other, Muslims
have not fielded a coherent reaction to the Tigers'
recent announcement that they would explore federalism
options "in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-
speaking people" (See Reftels). Although Muslims as
Tamil speakers are included within the ambit of this
construct, there is no sign that they are prepared to
join the debate on federalism soon. This, despite the
fact that any decisions taken on this issue could have a
significant impact on the large community of Muslims in
the east. END COMMENT.

6. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS