Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02COLOMBO2133
2002-11-14 11:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

Tigers gradually expand network of control in

Tags:  PGOV PTER PHUM MOPS ECON SOCI CE LTTE 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002133 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR H. THOMAS;
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-14-12
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM MOPS ECON SOCI CE LTTE
SUBJECT: Tigers gradually expand network of control in
the east, as security forces watch and Muslims fret

Refs: (A) Colombo 2101

- (B) Colombo 1180, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. Reasons
1.5 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002133

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR H. THOMAS;
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-14-12
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM MOPS ECON SOCI CE LTTE
SUBJECT: Tigers gradually expand network of control in
the east, as security forces watch and Muslims fret

Refs: (A) Colombo 2101

- (B) Colombo 1180, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. Reasons
1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: A Mission team visited Sri Lanka's
Eastern Province on November 12. On the surface, the
situation in Batticaloa and Ampara Districts seemed
calm, with the ceasefire sparking increased business
activity and civilian bustle. Amid this positive news,
there were clear and troubling indications that the
Tamil Tigers are gradually strengthening their political
and military position. GSL security forces seemed
marginalized, with human rights observers expressing
deep concern about LTTE activities. Muslims were
increasingly worked up about the apparent surge in LTTE
influence. Given the disturbing trends acting under the
surface calm, continued communal friction and violence
appear a near certainty. END SUMMARY.

===============================
Calm on the Surface in the East
===============================


2. (SBU) DCM and polchief visited Sri Lanka's Eastern
Province on November 12. The visit focused on the
province's Batticaloa and Ampara Districts, with the
team stopping in the towns of Batticaloa, Karativu, and
Akkaraipattu. During the course of the visit, the team
also closely observed the prevailing situation along a
80-mile stretch of the main coastal road from Vandeloos
Bay in the north to Arugam Bay in the south.


3. (C) On the surface at least, the situation seemed
quite calm. Compared to visits by Mission teams earlier
this year (see Ref B),there were very few government
security forces patrolling the roads. Most of the
military checkpoints had also been dismantled, a factor
greatly easing freedom of movement for civilians.
Markets were bustling in all of the towns. A relatively

poorer area than Colombo, there remained very few cars
on the roads in the east, but there was significant
traffic in buses, tractors (often used to carry
passengers),and scooters. Due to an easing in
government regulations per the February ceasefire
accord, the fishing industry -- which is important in
the east -- was back on its feet to a large extent, a
factor contributing to an improved economic outlook.

============================================= ====
Tigers Strengthen Political and Military Position
============================================= ====


4. (C) Amid this positive news, there were clear and
troubling indications that the Tamil Tigers are
gradually expanding their network of political and
military control. In terms of the optics alone, the
Tiger presence was a bit jarring. The team, for
example, passed well over a dozen "political" offices
newly opened by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in Tamil-dominated towns. The offices were
clearly marked with large, professionally made signs
portraying a roaring Tiger flanked by two assault guns.
Red and yellow streamers (the LTTE colors) hung outside
the offices, boldly announcing their presence.


5. (C) Beyond the amazing optics, interlocutors also
told a tale of expanding Tiger control. Reciting for
the team a long litany of concerns about LTTE
activities, Colonel Silva, the Batticaloa-based
commander of the Sri Lankan Army's 233 Brigade,
confirmed recent newspaper reports that the LTTE was
opening up "courts" and "police posts" in areas the
group controls in the east. (Note: This a new trend.
The LTTE has been opening up such offices in the areas
it controls in the north for some time, but only lately
has it begun to do so in the east.) Silva confirmed
reports that the LTTE had basically intimidated Tamils
in the east to use its "police" and "court" system, even
kidnapping Tamils living in government-controlled areas
to ensure their appearance in "court." K.L.M.
Sarathchandra, the commander of the highly trained
Special Task Force (STF) police in the Batticaloa/Ampara
sector, told the team that Tamils -- a plurality of the
population in the east -- were basically avoiding the
GSL police and legal system. Sarathchandra and Silva
indicated that the security forces -- while concerned --
really could not do much to stop the LTTE from these
activities without undermining the ceasefire.


6. (C) In addition to its efforts to enhance its civil
apparatus, the LTTE also seems to be steadily augmenting
its military position. Colonel Silva estimated that
LTTE cadre numbers in the east had increased to 8,000 at
present from about 2,000 before the ceasefire went into
effect. Many of these cadre were dealing with political
matters, but all of them had received at least some
military training. In the meantime, the LTTE was also
working to strengthen its base fortifications,
stockpiling arms and ammunition, and expanding its
network of military bases. Sarathchandra noted that the
LTTE had recently constructed a new base in northern
Ampara, which was its closest yet to the coast. Despite
the apparent surge in LTTE military strength, Silva
indicated that he was confident that his forces could
defend their positions adequately if the Tigers were to
launch a surprise attack. Silva and Sarathchandra,
however, both allowed that government security forces
were stuck in static positions and increasingly
marginalized as a force in the east. DCM noted that any
notion that the Sri Lankan security forces would
completely withdraw from the north and east, as some
pro-LTTE Tamils were advocating, was a non-starter.

=============================
Human Rights Concerns re LTTE
=============================


7. (C) Human rights observers expressed deep concern
about LTTE activities. Father Harry Miller, an Amcit
Jesuit priest who has lived in the east since 1948, told
the team that the LTTE was steadily increasing its
pressure on the local Tamil population. The LTTE was
"taxing" Tamils and also forcibly recruiting youths. If
citizens objected to LTTE demands, they were threatened
and harassed into backing down. Miller related that the
school he teaches at had been a target: the LTTE had
recently dragooned a number of schoolchildren to do work
at one of its camps. The children had been released,
but one had died in a fall off a tractor.


8. (C) Confirming the thread of Miller's comments, Helen
Peters, the acting head of the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) office in Batticaloa, also
told the team that her office had received dozens of
reports that the LTTE had seized houses owned by Tamils
in the district. The LTTE's apparent belief was that no
one should have more than one house -- if they did, it
was important that they contribute it to the cause,
i.e., the LTTE and its push for Tamil rights. Peters
and Miller stressed that security forces were
essentially doing nothing to counter the LTTE's
activities. The SLMM was trying to keep track of the
situation and was raising concerns on human rights
issues during meetings with LTTE officials, however.
(Note: Miller's comments expressing concern that
government security forces were taking too soft an
approach were a bit of a change in tune for him. For
many years, he had consistently complained about GSL
human rights violations against Tamils and not about
LTTE activities.)

=================
Deep Muslim Anger
=================


9. (C) Muslims are increasingly worked up about the
apparent surge in LTTE influence. In a meeting with a
group of Muslims at Southeastern University, the team
was told that Muslims felt that the LTTE was slowly but
surely working to take over the Eastern Province.
M.L.A. Cader, the vice-chancellor of the university, was
adamant that eastern Muslims had to take steps to ensure
that the government in Colombo heard their concerns.
Muslims felt they were being "abandoned" and "sold out"
by a government eager to make peace at any price with
the LTTE. Cader bitterly criticized Rauf Hakeem, the
head of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC),asserting
that Hakeem did not care about eastern Muslims and was
only interested in maintaining his ministerial position
in the government. On the human rights side, Cader
admitted that "LTTE pressure" on Muslims was a bit less
of late. Cader thought that this was clearly a tactic
on the LTTE's part meant to quiet critics, while the
group continued its efforts to isolate Muslims and
marginalize the security forces. In response to Cader's
concerns, the U.S. team underscored strong support for
the peace process, stressing that the U.S. urged all
sides to work together and exercise restraint.


10. (C) (((Note: The U.S. team repeatedly asked
interlocutors about continuing reports of Muslim
extremism in the east. Most observers had little clear-
cut information about the matter and Muslim
interlocutors denied it was a factor. Nonetheless, the
team did notice many new mosques under construction and
various "Islamic foundation" offices operating in Muslim
towns. It is hard to see how eastern Muslims could
afford to pay for the construction of all the new
mosques, so it would seem possible that Middle Eastern
money is coming in, as some claim. When queried, Sri
Lankan security forces replied that they had not seen
any Arabs or Pakistanis visiting the region. GSL
officials added that they just were not sure what was
going on in Muslim areas, however. They had heard of
small extremist groups with names like "Jihad" and
"Osama" operating in the east, but did not think they
were much of a threat to the peace. Pro-LTTE Tamils
that the team met with repeatedly claimed that Muslims
were radicalized, and armed and dangerous. One pro-LTTE
figure, V. Kamaladas, the head of a local NGO Forum for
the east, basically indicated that the U.S. and the LTTE
should join together to defeat the Muslims! End
Note.)))

=======
COMMENT
=======


11. (C) It is good news that the ceasefire seems to be
working to allow increased economic activity in the
east, a factor which may act to reinforce the peace
process. Moreover, the LTTE seems to have loosened its
grip on the Muslim community to a large extent. These
factors are net positives, but given the disturbing
trends acting under the surface calm, most especially
the LTTE's surge in influence, renewed Muslim-LTTE
friction appears a near certainty. Communal battle
lines are hardening (as witnessed by the sprouting of
LTTE offices and new mosques) and it is probable that
flashpoints will erupt again soon. The GSL, meanwhile,
seems inclined to hope for the best, but its major focus
appears to be ensuring that the peace process with the
LTTE is not disrupted. That said, despite its apparent
marginalization, the government still seems intent on
remaining a force in the east. There is no indication
that it plans to withdraw its troops on the ground, for
example, a policy which if put in motion could prove
profoundly destabilizing. END COMMENT.

12. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS