SRI LANKA: DAS CAMP AFFIRMS U.S. SUPPORT FOR PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 002003

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2012
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS EAID ELAB CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DAS CAMP AFFIRMS U.S. SUPPORT FOR PEACE
PROCESS

REF: (A) COLOMBO 2000 (B) COLOMBO 1992 (C) COLOMBO 1858

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission W. Lewis Amselem: Reasons 1.5 (b
,d)


1. (C) Summary: During his October 24-27 visit to Sri Lanka,
South Asia Bureau DAS Donald Camp delivered a message of firm
U.S. support for the peace process. At the same time, Camp
encouraged both government and opposition leaders not to let
cohabitation stresses threaten the progress made thus far
toward peace. Pressing the GSL to sign an ICC Article 98
Agreement, Camp received continued assurances from the Prime
Minister that Sri Lanka would sign the agreement soon. End
Summary.

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The PM on Peace and Internal Politics
--------------


2. (C) DAS Camp and the Ambassador called on Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremesinghe on October 24. Camp opened the meeting
by expressing the high level of hope in the USG for Sri
Lanka's peace process. As impressed as the U.S. is with what
Sri Lanka has achieved on peace, Camp continued, we are
concerned that internal politics might threaten the progress
made. As reported ref A, Wickremesinghe then reviewed his
take on the current rift within the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
(not a problem) and cohabitation strains with President
Kumaratunga (still a problem). Camp asked Wickremesinghe
what his government could do to get the President's
unequivocal support for the peace process. Wickremesinghe
said there was little hope of getting the President on board,
but asserted that his government for its part would continue
to try to work with her.


3. (C) Camp told the PM he welcomed the appointment of
Devinda Subasinghe as Sri Lankan Ambassador in Washington.
Camp said he had known Subasinghe for years and that
Subasinghe himself knows Washington well; he would be an
asset to Sri Lanka. The Ambassador suggested, as he has in
the past, that GSL might find it useful to post a Defense
Attache in Washington, in light of increasing military
exchanges between our two governments. Wickremesighe said he
thought it was a good idea and would look into it further.

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Article 98 Agreement
--------------


4. (C) Camp thanked Wickremesinghe for his government's
"political decision" to sign an ICC Article 98 agreement, and
asked when Sri Lanka would be ready to sign. Wickremesinghe
recalled that he had assured A/S Rocca in New York (during a
meeting on the margins of the UNGA) that Sri Lanka would
sign; it is now just a question of getting the Foreign
Ministry bureaucracy to move. Camp noted that many nations
had already signed Article 98 agreements with us. Signing
soon would win GSL valuable positive attention among
Washington decision-makers; waiting too long could result in
other countries stealing Sri Lanka's thunder. Wickremesinghe
assured Camp that he would push the MFA to sign soon.


5. (C) Camp raised Article 98 in a meeting with Foreign
Minister Tyronne Fernando the following day, reiterating the
same points he made to the PM. Fernando noted that the MFA
legal division had proposed an additional paragraph for the
agreement (ref B) that would make it easier for GSL to sign.
The Ambassador expressed skepticism that the additional
paragraph would be acceptable to Washington, saying that
Washington had put a lot of work into the text of the
agreement and that many other countries had signed it without
modifications. Fernando asked Camp and the Ambassador to
await Washington's official response to the proposed
additional text and revisit the issue afterward, if necessary.

-------------- --
Key Ministers, GoN Ambassador Discuss Situation
-------------- --


6. (C) Over drinks at the Ambassador's Residence on October
25, DAS Camp met with G.L. Peiris and Milinda Moragoda, two
key ministers, and Norwegian Ambassador Jon Westborg. G.L.
Peiris kicked off the discussion with a long discourse
focused on how much he distrusted President Kumaratunga. On
this point, Peiris said the President wanted to destroy the
peace process to ensure her own political gain. Her (October
24) speech made clear that she was laying the basis to
undermine government's peace initiative and also its economic
policies. Peiris said this latter issue, in particular, was
of concern because the government was picking up much
criticism over cost of living increases and cuts in welfare
subsidies which had been mandated by the IMF. He said he had
little doubt that the President was working in tandem with
the radical JVP (Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna) party to drive
home such points with the public in an effort to completely
undermine the PM. Despite all the problems he had with the
President, Peiris said he still supported trying to work with
her in some way, including through regular briefings on the
status of the peace process, but he was not optimistic of
success.


7. (C) Moragoda noted that it was this sort of criticism on
the economic front that made the government propose the
conference in Oslo in late November. Moragoda added that the
GSL hoped that donors could announce "quick impact" projects
at the conference that would support the peace process in
this time of difficulty. Westborg agreed that the conference
was critical, particularly as it came at a time when the
government was having a tough time getting the "economic
wheels turning." Questioned about participation by other
countries, Moragoda said British Minister Clare Short had
indicated that she might be able to attend. Norway and Sri
Lanka continued to work with India on the issue. India was
naturally concerned about the issue of Tiger participation,
but Moragoda said he was reasonably confident that something
could be worked out. Westborg confirmed that Anton
Balasingham, the Tigers' spokesman and lead negotiator, would
represent the group in Oslo. He noted that the Tigers had
been talked out of demanding "an equal seat at the table"
with the government in Oslo. All they really wanted,
Westborg related, was to be "treated with dignity." Both
Moragoda and Westborg expressed appreciation to Deputy
Secretary Armitage for his commitment to participate at the

SIPDIS
Oslo conference.


8. (C) Asked about criticism from the President's party (such
as that from former Foreign Minister Kadirgamar) that the
government was not dealing with the tough issues in its talks
with the Tigers, Peiris replied that the government had no
intention of following a "failed" model. Explaining his
point, Peiris said the previous government had wasted great
time (in 1999-2001) by demanding that the Tigers agree to
this or that point before agreeing to come to face-to-face
negotiations and in fact talks never did take place. The
current government, however, was elected on a platform
committing itself to trying to end the war. To implement
this objective, the government had decided to get to talks as
soon as possible, including by removing the legal ban on the
Tigers. Peiris remarked that the government was committed to
a course of "consistent confidence-building" with the Tigers.
Once "confidence had been built," then the tough issues
could be grappled with -- "You cannot put the cart before the
horse in these matters," he underlined.


9. (C) In a separate meeting with Minister for Employment and
Labor and Chief Whip Mahinda Samarasinghe, DAS Camp heard
that the majority of MPs are committed to peace, and though
elections may consolidate the UNF's position, the negative
effects on the peace process would be unacceptable.
Samarasinghe criticized President Kumaratunga's actions,
saying that she is not acting in a way that recognizes that
she must get along with the PM. He praised the Ambassador's
public and private support of the peace process and USAID's
assistance with his Productivity Policy. Samarasinghe
discussed the strong role of labor unions and the difficulty
he is experiencing in passing labor reforms. Camp explained
that the USG wants to support the peace process, as well as
economic and labor reforms, and that we will be as helpful as
we can. Samarasinghe concluded with specific requests for
Dept. of Labor assistance to establish a Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and for USAID assistance to monitor the
implementation of the National Productivity Policy.

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Muslim Leader Reviews Party Infighting, Talks
--------------


10. (C) DAS Camp and DCM also met with Rauf Hakeem, the
Minister of Ports and Shipping, and head of the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress (SLMC). Asked about the troubled situation
in his party (see ref A),Hakeem admitted that he was having
serious problems controlling a group of rebel SLMC MPs. He
complained that the rebels had little understanding of the
complexities of negotiating with the Tamil Tigers, but
insisted on making demands that would make it impossible to
continue negotiations. Hakeem said he understood that
Muslims in the east were worried about their situation given
the pressure they were under from the Tamil Tigers. The
answer to their problems, however, was not to destroy the
peace process with unreasonable demands, but to work the
process so that Muslim views were truly heard. In doing
this, Muslims should continue to demand and expect that
pressure would be put on the Tigers to honor the February
cease-fire accord. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
had to do a better job of holding the Tigers accountable for
their actions, particularly the Tiger-instigated hartals
(strikes),which were very destructive for Muslim businesses,
Hakeem stressed.


11. (C) Queried about the second round of talks scheduled to
begin on October 31 in Thailand, Hakeem remarked that he
might not be attending. His SLMC opponents would criticize
him no matter what he did and he was reluctant to give them
any openings at this time. On the other hand, Hakeem
continued, he wanted to ensure that Muslims were not
forgotten in the peace process and that fact might motivate
him to attend. Given all the pros-and-cons, he had not
finally made up his mind on the question of attending and
planned to meet the PM on October 26 to discuss the issue.
Hakeem added that it was also not clear when or whether he
would be meeting Tamil Tiger leader V. Prabhakaran. (Note:
After the conclusion of the first round of talks in
mid-September, it was announced that Hakeem would meet with
Prabhakaran soon.) Hakeem said the Tigers were giving
signals that they did not want the meeting to take place at
this time, perhaps because of the problems in the SLMC.
Hakeem said he was still willing to meet Prabhakaran, but was
not sure that a meeting would take place anytime soon.

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Meetings with the Opposition
--------------


12. (C) DAS Camp focused on peace process and cohabitation
issues during his October 25 meeting with Mahinda Rajapakse,
Leader of the Opposition People's Alliance (PA). Camp
queried Rajapakse on what the UNP has to do on the peace
process to satisfy the PA. Rajapakse commented that the
President thinks the peace process "is her baby" and she
wants credit for it. Camp cited a number of speeches made by
the Prime Minister acknowledging the President's early
efforts at peace. Rajapakse said recognition is not enough;
the President and her party deserve a representative at the
talks.


13. (C) Camp emphasized to Rajapakse the USG's hope that the
peace process not founder because of political problems in
Colombo. The USG would like to see the parties cooperate on
the issue of peace, Camp said. Rajapakse agreed, but
highlighted some concerns of the opposition. First and
foremost, the LTTE is still recruiting and fundraising.
Second, many Sinhalese are convinced that the Norwegians are
too sympathetic to the LTTE, and many in the PA share that
concern. Finally, the proposed Joint Task Force that is to
oversee development spending in the north and east must be
accountable to the Parliament, Rajapakse said; the people
will not be willing to let the LTTE control development
money. Camp responded that the U.S. believes the Norwegians
are working in good faith for peace. Regarding the Joint
Task Force, Camp said the U.S. always insists on proper
accountability procedures for its development assistance and
Sri Lanka will be no exception.


14. (C) DAS Camp and Ambassador Wills met with former foreign
minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, a key adviser of President
Kumaratunga, on October 25. Asked about the nationally
televised speech given by the President on October 24 (see
ref A),Kadirgamar commented that the President had had to
give the speech in order to highlight her concerns about the
direction of the peace process. The President strongly
supported the objective of peace, but was concerned that the
government was not informing the country of exactly what it
had in mind. Indeed, the government and the Norwegian
facilitators have noted that the GSL and the Tigers might
take "years" to reach substantive agreement on what a final
settlement might look like. That is much too long. The
government should tell the country by "mid-year next year
(2003)" precisely what it has in mind, Kadirgamar asserted.
If the government fails to do this, the President will be
forced to make an issue of it, he averred. DAS Camp
underscored the USG's strong support for peace process. It
was vital that the PM and the President work together in the
national interest, DAS Camp stressed. Ambassador Wills
emphasized that Sri Lanka had a "once in a generation chance
for peace" and it was important that this opportunity not be
squandered due to political infighting.


15. (C) In response to a query on how cohabitation was
working, Kadirgamar replied that President Kumaratunga
accepted the current situation and had made clear she was
willing to reach out to the government in her October 24
speech. Cohabitation was here to stay in Sri Lanka just as
it was a permanent feature of politics in some European
countries, and both parties had to get used to that fact.
The President had no intention of calling elections and the
government should accept that, Kadirgamar stated. Kadirgamar
went on to note that a good model for future cohabitation
cooperation was the semi-regular schedule of meetings the two
sides had agreed to on peace process and national security
issues (see ref C). Wrapping up, Kadirgamar related that the
government had to understand that any agreements it reached
with the Tamil Tigers would be subject to parliamentary
approval and perhaps even a referendum. It would be best if
it worked with the President and her party now on these
issues, and not surprise them with the unexpected, he noted.


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Comment
--------------


16. (C) DAS Camp's visit reinforced the message of U.S.
support for the peace process delivered earlier by Deputy
Secretary Armitage (in August) and SA A/S Rocca (in March).

SIPDIS
The GSL and the opposition also heard clearly his message
that the U.S. does not want to see the peace process derailed
by internal politics. Fortunately the peace process appears
to be gaining strength, in spite of cohabitation tensions and
strains within the government coalition.


17. (C) The GSL remains committed at the political level to
signing an Article 98 agreement, and DAS Camp's visit did
much to help push this forward. Winning over the bureaucrats
at the MFA, especially the lawyers, will take additional
work. Post is confident that GSL will sign the kind of
Article 98 agreement that we want; we are working to ensure
that happens sooner rather than later.


18. (U) DAS Camp did not have the opportunity to clear this
message prior to departing Colombo.
WILLS