ENGAGING THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY AFTER DOD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001995

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, T AND SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2012
TAGS: MARR PREL MASS PGOV PTER PHUM CE LTTE
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY AFTER DOD
ASSESSMENTS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR E.A. WILLS; REASONS 1.5 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (S) DOD has just completed three major assessments of
the SL military. These assessments make plain that the Sri
Lankan military forms a central component of the GSL's
strategy to secure peace in the country after 20 years of
civil war. The GSL needs the support of the military to make
peace work here. The GSL, in turn, wants and needs American
engagement with the military to help ensure that support, and
to make Sri Lanka's armed services more professional, more
respectful of human rights and less vulnerable to the
blandishments of Sinhalese extremists. End Summary.


2. (C) Over the past several weeks, three separate DOD
assessment teams have visited Sri Lanka: NDU, which looked
at military education; PACCOM, which assessed operational and
equipment matters; and DPE, which evaluated doctrinal issues.
Although we await submission of the teams' final reports,
some dominant themes have emerged from the preliminary
assessments as they were briefed to the CT:

-- the GSL has no national security or national military
strategy;

-- the military has pursued a war-fighting strategy almost
devoid of accurate, real-time tactical intelligence;

-- widespread recognition exists that the SL military has
followed outdated doctrines and a defensive strategy,
including maritime interdiction, for which it is ill-equipped
and undermanned;

--the military has been severely handicapped by the lack of a
merit-based personnel system and by very limited professional
education opportunities.


3. (C) As we have noted in our prior reporting, the
military plays a key role in the GSL's ongoing peace effort.
The military's support of or at least acquiescence to the
ceasefire, negotiations with the LTTE, and loosening of the
once-restrictive security environment that characterized Sri
Lanka is essential for the GSL to keep the Sinhalese majority
on-side. The GSL, again as we have reported at length, has
come to us for help in maintaining the military's support, by
holding out to it the hope of having its serious deficiencies
rectified. The GSL wants a modern, confident military
willing to take a chance on peace because it knows it could
prevail, or come a lot closer to prevailing than it ever has
before, if war resumed. In addition, of course, the presence
of such a military induces the LTTE to continue down the path
of peace. Velluparai Prabhakaran only respects strength and
exploits weakness. Thus, it is in the GSL's interest, and
ours, to have a strong Sri Lankan military.


4. (S) If we intend to help the GSL modernize and
professionalize its military, we need to respond to
reasonable requests for military assistance. The ongoing and
very effective JCET and other exercise/training/education
programs, including in human rights, need to continue and
even pick up. But even more critical, we will need to help
the military deal with at least some of the deficiencies our
assessment teams have identified. Most of those deficiencies
have to do with structure, doctrine, and training. To
address some, however, the SL military needs modern military
equipment, some of which the US is best positioned to
provide. In particular, the Navy needs a variety of gear
that will enable it to patrol and protect the country's
coastline and territorial waters from poachers, smugglers,
and LTTE resupply efforts. The Air Force and Navy need
proper training and equipment to conduct SAR operations in
case of a downed aircraft (military or civilian) or a
foundered ship.


5. (S) There are many, many more examples of potential
equipment needs that the assessment report from PACCOM will
cite. We know that we cannot address all of the deficiencies
and that the GSL military will never become a "Mini-Me"
version of the US military. We do, however, think that with
appropriate help from us (and, perhaps others) the SL
military can continue to evolve into a pro-American
institution that respects human rights and is ready, willing
and able to play a full and effective role in Sri Lanka's
national security strategy and, later on, in international
peacekeeping efforts.


6. (C) As soon as we have received all the assessments we
would like to re-engage with Washington agencies on how best
to address the SL military's pressing needs. We understand
the the 04 budget allotments for FMF for Sri Lanka are fixed.
But we wonder whether an 03 supplemental could include
additional FMF funds to permit the USG to engage with the GSL
military.
WILLS