MORAGODA ON MEETING LTTE IN OSLO: GUARDED OPTIMISM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001527

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA; LONDON FOR REIDEL; NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2012
TAGS: CE PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER LTTE
SUBJECT: MORAGODA ON MEETING LTTE IN OSLO: GUARDED OPTIMISM
RETURNS

REF: A. OSLO 1742

B. OSLO 1846

C. COLOMBO 1319

Classified By: Ambassador E. Ashley Wills; reasons 1.5 (b and d)

SUMMARY: PEACE TALKS MOMENTUM


1. (C) GSL Minister Moragoda appeared to have regained a bit
of optimism following his Oslo meeting (reftels) with LTTE
"theorist" Anton Balasingham. Moragoda said that Balasingham
seems serious about getting talks going, is very sensitive to
US and Indian attitudes re the LTTE, and concerned about the
LTTE's overall international image. According to Moragoda,
Balasingham has an understanding of GSL political
difficulties and appears willing to try not to add to them
unnecessarily. The long-stagnant "peace process" looks to
have regained its momentum. At the same time, Moragoda
expressed concerns over Balasingham's health, the potentially
complicating role of Muslim political leader Rauff Hakeem,
and the Byzantine nature of Sri Lankan politics, most notably
the very strained relationship between President Kumaratunga
and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Moragoda met the Ambassador and DCM on August 19 to
provide a read-out on the "peace process" in the wake of the
PM's visit to Washington and Moragoda's meetings with
Balasingham in Europe. Much of what Moragoda told us is
contained in reftels and we won't repeat. He did, however,
relate a few noteworthy items.


3. (C) Moragoda expressed a renewed sense of reserved
optimism that the long-stagnant "peace process" seems to have
picked up some steam and has begun moving in a positive
direction. Although Moragoda thought there was confusion
within the LTTE on how exactly to proceed, he said
Balasingham seems genuine in wanting to get the talks
underway. Balasingham told Moragoda that the LTTE was not
ready to discuss substance. Moragoda responded by saying
that the two sides would start "in the baby pool" and proceed
later to greater depths. For this reason, the first phase of
the talks will deal with practical issues of development and
commercial activity and will seek to establish the framework
for subsequent formal peace negotiations. Both sides are
under pressure to show the long-suffering population in the
north and east some immediate results in the development
area. Moragoda pressed Balasingham re the Scandinavian
monitors' reports of over fifty kidnappings/forcible
recruitments since the ceasefire. Balasingham, while not
necessarily accepting that number as accurate, recognized
that the LTTE has a problem with cadres leaving their units
and going home; he implied that the "kidnappings" were the
LTTE's bringing soldiers back to their units -- he tacitly
admitted that "peace" has created a desertion problem for the
LTTE. Balasingham promised that the LTTE would look into the
reported incidents.


4. (C) Moragoda said GSL spokesman and fellow Minister G.L.
Peiris had made a mistake by announcing publicly that Muslim
politician Rauff Hakeem would form part of the GSL
negotiating team. Moragoda said the announcement was
premature as the rest of the team has not yet been selected.
Moragoda said that Balasingham did not seem too happy about
Hakeem's being at the negotiations and questioned Hakeem's
ability to deliver Sri Lanka's Muslims, especially in the
East. Moragoda acknowledged that he, too, shared those
concerns and worried about what role Hakeem would play and
how Hakeem could be handled.


5. (C) Moragoda's greatest concern remained the complex, at
times bizarre politics of the Sinhalese south. He said
hardliners within the PM's UNF coalition are determined to
bring down President Kumaratunga. These hardliners are not
satisfied with getting a constitutional amendment passed that
would restrict the President's ability to dissolve parliament
-- they want Kumaratunga impeached and out of office.
Moragoda said that he and the Prime Minister recognize that
the UNF does not have the numbers to remove Kumaratunga, and
at most they will be able to pass the constitutional
amendment. Kumaratunga, Moragoda said, will remain a force
to be reckoned with for the next three years of her term.
Given the very poor state of relations between the President
and the Prime Minister, those three years are going to be
rocky ones and could affect the peace negotiations.
Fortunately, he said, Balasingham seems to appreciate the
GSL's internal difficulties and vowed not to make life any
more difficult than necessary for the GSL. The announcement
of peace talks for September reflects the LTTE's attempt to
help the PM. In fact, Balasingham apparently agreed to the
September announcement without first going to Sri Lanka to
consult LTTE Supremo Prabhakaran.


6. (C) Moragoda expressed serious concern over the state of
Balasingham's health and whether he would be able to see the
process through. Moragoda said Balasingham is the LTTE's eyes
and ears on the world. Balasingham understands the
importance of the LTTE's cleaning up its international image
and has a healthy respect for the positions of India and
especially the U.S. Balasingham would be hard to replace.


7. (C) COMMENT: The negotiations are going to be tough and
Sri Lanka will undoubtedly experience some tense moments in
the months ahead, particularly if the politics of the
Sinhalese South do not stabilize. In addition, no one knows
what exactly is going on within the LTTE and whether
Balasingham's more moderate stance can carry the day. There
are no guarantees. That said, the overall state of affairs in
Sri Lanka has experienced a dramatic turn for the better over
the past few months. Sri Lanka is a very different country
today than it was eight months ago. If the GSL can keep the
LTTE focused on practical issues of development, money, and
patronage, even without a final political settlement in the
near future, it would be difficult (though not impossible)
for the bad old days to return.
Wills