Breaking down possible cohabitation scenarios

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001433

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL; NSC
FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-05-12
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR PREL CE
SUBJECT: Breaking down possible cohabitation scenarios

Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 050127Z Aug 02

- (B) Colombo 1422
- (C) Colombo 1403, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Colombo is aswirl in reports that the
tense cohabitation relationship between President
Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe is coming
to a head. At this point, three possible scenarios seem
to be emerging, all of them equally plausible. The
first scenario is that both sides muddle through and
desist from aggravating the situation. The second has
Kumaratunga suspending Parliament and calling elections
later this year. The third has the PM calling snap
elections in order to bolster his position. This
volatile situation is not positive news for the peace
process, which is at a sensitive stage. The best
posture for the U.S. is to continue to urge the parties
to exercise restraint. End Summary.

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Inching toward Confrontation
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2. (C) Colombo is abuzz with reports that the tense
cohabitation relationship between President Kumaratunga
and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe is coming to a head.
Newspapers over the last several days have been full of
reports that the two sides are planning to take this or
that action in order to corner the other side. August 5
news stories, for example, report that members of the
United National Front (UNF) government met August 4 and
discussed the possibility of a snap election (see Ref A
and Para 4 for more on this report).


3. (C) The UNF meeting came in response to a widely
publicized letter dated July 29 from Kumaratunga to the
PM in which she claimed that his ministers were working
to undermine her position. In the letter, which was
extremely harsh in tone, she also reiterated that she
had the legal right to fire ministers (see Ref C). This
letter followed an earlier exchange of letters dated
July 19 between the two in which Wickremesinghe rejected
Kumraratunga's demand that he fire Commerce Minister
Ravi Karunanayake. (Note: Joined by a handful of other
ministers, Karunanayake, a fierce opponent of the
president, has repeatedly goaded Kumaratunga over a
number of issues. In her July 19 letter, Kumaratunga
had alleged that Karunanayake had publicly accused her
of bringing a handbag equipped with a bomb to cabinet
meetings. The PM denied that Karunanayake had made this
specific accusation. End Note.)

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Outlining Possible Scenarios
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4. (C) As tensions spike up, three possible scenarios
seem to be emerging, all equally plausible. These
scenarios are:

-- Muddling Through: In this scenario, both sides
decide to desist from taking steps that exacerbate the
situation. Desmond Fernando, a well-known local lawyer,
told us that he thought that this scenario was a real
possibility. He noted that there was a tradition in Sri
Lankan politics of tensions spiking up very quickly, as
emotions get out of hand over small issues. Tempers
soon calm down, he added, and the people involved get
back to more-or-less regular business. Along the lines
Fernando mentioned, there have been some tentative
signals that there may be a willingness by some members
of both camps to cool off temperatures, perhaps by
agreeing to some sort of formal or informal compromise
solution. In an August 5 meeting with the Ambassador,
for example, Nimal S. De Silva, a senior People's
Alliance (PA) MP, said Kumaratunga was willing to back
down if the UNF stopped verbally attacking her in
cabinet meetings and stopped harassing PA party members.
Milinda Moragoda, a senior UNF minister, has also told
the Ambassador that he was advising other party members
to seek a compromise solution, perhaps one that was
written down and then signed by both parties. Another
aspect that makes this scenario a real possibility is
that the two other likely scenarios involve the calling
of elections. Elections are something most MPs do not
want to happen, as campaigns are very expensive and
elections have already been held each of the past two
years.

-- Kumaratunga Suspends Parliament: Under this
scenario, President Kumaratunga suddenly fires the Prime
Minister, suspends Parliament for three months (the
constitutional limit),and calls for new elections late
this year. (Note: Per her constitutional right, the
president could call for new elections at any point one
year after the December 2001 election.) Neither the
president nor her supporters have publicly indicated
that this scenario is in the cards. That said, leaks to
the press -- apparently from PA sources -- have
indicated that the president and her advisers are
seriously mulling over this possibility. One newspaper
on August 4, for example, published a memo purportedly
prepared by one of the president's advisers that set out
this scenario as something that was under active
consideration. (Note: PA MP De Silva told the
Aambassador that Kumaratunga, in fact, did not plan to
suspend Parliament.) In another indication of a
possible PA inclination toward confrontation, the
radical Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party has of
late urged the president to sack the government.
Several PA senior MPs, including Anura Bandaranaike, the
president's brother, have been reportedly developing
close ties with the JVP. Some observers wonder whether
the JVP's hard-line stance on cohabitation has the
blessing of these PA MPs.

-- UNF calls a Snap Election: As noted above, reports
are rolling in that the UNF may be considering calling
snap polls in order to bolster its position. (Note:
The PM has the right to call new elections if he obtains
the support of a majority of MP's sitting in Parliament.
Elections would take place from six weeks to two months
after being called.) According to one report, the UNF
would call a snap election if the president did not
agree to a series of demands. These demands would
reportedly include that she agree to give up her right
to call elections one year after the last election and
that she agree to allow crossover voting in Parliament.
(Note: The UNF has been discussing pursuing both of
these proposals via a constitutional amendment for
several months now -- see Ref C.) The PM and ministers
such as Milinda Moragoda are believed to be reluctant to
call snap elections, which they believe would only serve
to divert attention from the peace process. There is a
hard-line group in the UNF, however, which is believed
to be pressing for a confrontation. This group believes
the UNF would bolster its position in Parliament via an
election, leaving it better positioned vis-a-vis the
president, and possibly with the support of enough MPs
to try to impeach her for corruption and abuse of power.

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Not Positive News for the Peace Process
--------------


5. (C) The ongoing volatility in Sri Lankan politics is
not positive news for the peace process. The process is
entering an especially sensitive stage, with both the
GSL and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
preparing for possible face-to-face talks (see Ref B).
The continuance of instability in Colombo would almost
certainly make the LTTE reluctant to deal with a
government that may not be able to carry through on its
promises. Tamil politicians, for example, have often
(and accurately) claimed that past governments have gone
back on agreements reached with Tamils -- and they are
allergic to any possibility that this might happen
again. Compounding the situation is the fact that a
suspension of Parliament or the calling of an election
would lead to serious disruptions in which politicians
would not be able to give their full attention to the
peace process.


6. (C) Given this situation, continued volatility in
Colombo could easily lead to a significant delay in
talks (which now seem possible in September or October),
as the GSL gets its act in order. If Kumaratunga and
her supporters -- who are generally more hard-line on
the LTTE -- get the upper hand in elections or some
other way, the peace process as it is now configured
could also be sidetracked for some period. At best, if
the UNF did well in an election, the results might be
seen as a vote of confidence in its peace initiative,
allowing it to move forward toward talks. All this
said, there are many risks for the peace process
inherent in the currently fluid situation that make it
important that tensions abate soon.

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Comment and Recommendations for U.S. Policy
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7. (C) At this point, it is difficult to guess which of
the three scenarios reviewed above will eventuate.
Tensions between the two sides appear so intense that it
is possible that either side may make a sudden lunge at
the other. Any such action would, in turn, provoke a
negative response in kind. That said, the situation may
not be as dire as it seems on the surface, i.e., as part
and parcel of the country's political culture, there may
be a lot of hot air being emitted along with the harsh
broadsides.


8. (C) We think the best posture for the U.S. is to
continue to urge the parties to exercise restraint,
steering them back toward a focus on the national
interest in moving forward with the peace process. It
is important that the politicians not lose sight of the
incontestable fact that the vast majority of Sri Lankans
support the peace process and do not want this rare
chance to slip away due to partisan infighting.
Depending upon events, we may recommend that a senior
official -- the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary or
Assistant Secretary Rocca -- call one or both party
leaders to convey a message of concern, but it is too
early to take such an action now. End Comment.


9. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS