TURKEY POST-COPENHAGEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008976

SIPDIS


CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY POST-COPENHAGEN

REF: ANKARA 8881


Classified by CDA Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5:(b)(d)



1. (C) Summary: Turkey is reacting with disappointment and
resignation to the EU's decision at the Dec. 12-13 Copenhagen
summit: 1) to review Turkey's EU accession bid in December
2004, withholding a definite date to start formal accession
talks; and 2) to admit Cyprus as a member before a settlement
has been reached on the island. At the same time, the Turks
are beginning to walk back from some of their more dire
pronouncements of catastrophe in the event things didn't go
exactly as they hoped. Indeed, while the outcome of
Copenhagen is short of Turkey's over-inflated expectations,
it marks a real improvement in Turkey's prospects for
eventual membership. Our task will be to help the GOT avoid
getting bogged down in a search for scapegoats -- including
the U.S., despite strong USG support for Turkey's cause. Our
public and private statements therefore, should exude
confidence that the results -- while not everything Turkey
wanted -- reinforce Turkey's inevitable move toward EU. End
summary.


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Reaction: More Determination, "No Anger"
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2. (U) Speaking at a joint press conference from Copenhagen
Dec. 13, AK Chairman R. Tayyip Erdogan and P.M. Gul conveyed
disappointment but determination to continue along the EU
path.


-- Gul adopted a low-key approach. While offering obliquely
that "some new conditions were added to the Copenhagen
Criteria," Gul reiterated that Turkey had done everything in
its power to press for an early date for formal EU accession
talks. Noting that Turkey had "many potentialities" in
foreign policy, he asserted that "the place of the
(pro-)European perspective will be preserved," and that his
Government remains firmly on the path to reform. "Our target
is definite."


-- Erdogan noted that Turkey had been seeking to begin formal
accession talks with the EU in 2003, but that the EU "delayed
this a little...We will start accession talks in 2004" on the
basis of the Copenhagen Criteria; any other condition...is
out of the question." He added that "anger is unacceptable
in politics."


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The Blame Game
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3. (C) In the run-up to Copenhagen, the Turks painted
themselves into a corner by adopting a maximalist demand for
a 2003 date to begin formal accession talks with the EU --
and by raising the specter of a "train wreck" if Cyprus was
admitted to the EU prior to a "just" settlement. Senior MFA
officials began to warn us stridently against presenting
Turkey with a "fait accompli" on Cyprus, terming the UNSYG's
plan as unacceptably flawed. Meanwhile, the AK Party came to
power, decrying the traditional, "pointlessly hawkish" Cyprus
stance, and the foot-dragging on EU-related political and
human rights reform that characterized earlier governments.
Nevertheless, by early December, after receiving what MFA
officials described as "education" of quick learners on
Cyprus and other issues, AK began to take the position that
Cyprus could be solved only with a "positive" outcome from
the EU summit -- defined as a clear, early date for the start
of EU talks. A certain bullying posture entered some of the
exchanges between Turkey and EU members.



4. (C) Far from helping the Turks achieve their aims, such
tactics only tarnished the solid improvement in Turkey's EU
prospects that actually came out of the summit: a date for
review and a promise of negotiations if Turkey's reforms
continue and are implemented (unthinkable had the Ecevit
Government still been in power). Turkey's tactics have also
left it in an awkward position regarding and EU deal it said
24 hours ago was not acceptable, and a Republic of Cyprus in
the EU in a manner the GOT has been describing for months as
disastrous.


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Scapegoating?
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5. (C) Press reports in the days before the summit suggested
Turkey would uphold national honor in the event of
"humiliation" at Copenhagen by taking "punitive" action
against select European countries. Meanwhile, the GOT --
politicians and bureaucrats -- pushed hard for strong USG
support of its interests regarding the EU and Cyprus. Even
before the dust settled at Copenhagen, Turks began to cast
about for scapegoats. These include the USG. One columnist,
known for reflecting the views of senior State officials,
suggested that USG support for Turkey in the run-up to the
summit was "counterproductive" and had only antagonized
Europeans.


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What To Do
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6. (C) We will continue stressing to the Turks, particularly
the AK Government/Party, that they need to continue
accentuating the positive aspects of the outcome of
Copenhagen. AK at T-2 is spinning the results in a moderate
fashion (though Bulent Arinc, the President of the Turkish
Grand National Assembly and a senior AK member, called the
2004 date "not positive"). We need to support that
direction. In the days before the summit, AK officials
privately asserted to us that their aggressive approach
regarding an EU date was "only tactics." The Gul Government
and Erdogan see EU ties as essential: 1) in their bid to
change the political status quo and counter resistance from
an entrenched State Establishment; and 2) to justifying
reform to that Establishment as both a normative and
"strategic" imperative for Turkey. They are already
signaling a willingness to move ahead.


-- AK can take much credit, for pushing Copenhagen Criteria
reforms hard and right out of the gate (ref A). Indeed, such
progress would have been unthinkable had AK not replaced the
Ecevit Government on Nov. 18.


-- Financial markets can accept an outcome along lines of
that proposed by French and Germans. Although disappointed,
investors see it as confirmation that Turkey will be anchored
to the EU.
DEUTSCH