Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ANKARA8873
2002-12-10 10:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

DECISION-MAKING IN TURKEY: AK'S INTRODUCTION TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008873 

SIPDIS


CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: DECISION-MAKING IN TURKEY: AK'S INTRODUCTION TO
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REF: A. ANKARA 8252

B. ANKARA 8586


Classified by CDA a.i. Robert Deutsch. Reasons: 1.5(b)(d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008873

SIPDIS


CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: DECISION-MAKING IN TURKEY: AK'S INTRODUCTION TO
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REF: A. ANKARA 8252

B. ANKARA 8586


Classified by CDA a.i. Robert Deutsch. Reasons: 1.5(b)(d)



1. (C) Summary: As disparate and well-placed sources had
predicted, Islam-influenced AK Party government received a
lecture on the dangers posed by "reactionary" Islam at the
Nov. 29 meeting of the National Security Council (NSC),the
first since AK assumed power. (On Dec. 9, AK P.M. Gul was
treated to another briefing on the "reactionary threat" and
other issues during a courtesy call on Gen. Ozkok, the TGS
Chief.) This lecture illustrates a facet of Turkish
decision-making between elected governments and powerful
elements of the State which has a direct bearing on how
Turkey will respond on Cyprus, Iraq, reform and other issues
of central interest to the U.S. End summary.



2. (C) According to reports we have heard, at the Nov. 29
meeting the military, seconded by President Sezer, made clear
to AK its view that the discussion whether to lift the ban
against Turkish civil servants' wearing the headscarf is a
non starter. "The discussion is over," Sezer reportedly told
P.M. Gul. Before the meeting, Chief of the General Staff
Gen. Hilmi Ozkok and the other TGS commanders limited to an
abrupt three (3) minutes their "courtesy" call on new Speaker
of Parliament Arinc, who had generated controversy when he
had his headscarf-clad wife join him to see off Sezer on a
trip abroad late last month. Official photos showed a
somewhat stiff, seated Arinc flanked on either side by Ozkok
and others. The visit stood in marked contrast to an earlier
20 minute call on Gul, whom the military and other elements
of the Establishment see as relatively more pragmatic and
sensible.



3. (C) The NSC, which according to the constitution has only
an advisory role (ref A),is customarily the formal venue at
which the Turkish military sets guidelines and, if deemed
necessary, issues warnings to the elected government about
what is fair or foul in Turkish politics. For instance,
after the rise to power of Turkey's Islamist Refah Party-led
government in 1996, the NSC let it be known publicly that
Islamic "reactionaries" constituted a primary threat to

national security (alongside the then-active armed insurgency
of the PKK). A similar warning about the threat of
"nationalist mafia" was issued in 1999, after the Nationalist
Movement Party (MHP) joined the coalition then led by Bulent
Ecevit.



4. (C) A former NSC staffer, who also served with the
military's West Working Group that helped execute the
"postmodern" coup against the Refah government in 1997,
underscored what many others are also telling us: the
military is especially concerned that AK might try to amend
or re-write the 1982 constitution to change the "unamendable"
preamble and articles 1-4, which are designed to freeze
Turkey within narrow, if ambiguously defined,"secular" and
Ataturkist bounds. Our contact vividly described the
atavistic fear among Turkish General Staff officers he knows
that AK, rather than accommodating to the military and
remainder of the Establishment, will try to transform THEM in
an Islamist way.



5. (C) A long-serving Justice of the Turkish Constitutional
Court (the Turkish Supreme Court) spoke similarly about the
approach of the military and other Establishment elements to
AK. According to the Justice, the biggest problem in trying
to set guidelines lies in the ambiguous core of "secularism"
and Ataturk's principles. The military's broad-brush
approach to defining (or avoiding definition of) its terms
runs the risk of creating a crisis; AK could, in theory,
cross a military "red line" without knowing where it is.



6. (C) The Justice noted that such "guidance" runs contrary
to democratic values and has an enormous impact not only on
the elected political class but on judicial decisionmaking,
which tends to focus more on preserving the ideological
status quo than on individual rights and political liberty.


--------------
Comment
--------------



7. (C) In assessing the developing relationship between AK
and the military, the Ozkok factor will be as significant as
the character of Erdogan. Ozkok is reportedly among the more
open-minded military leaders (among other things, he fasts
during Ramazan). Since 1996 Turkish dialogue between Prime
Ministers and TGS Chiefs has been limited. Despite the
difficulty of establishing such a dialogue, it would be to
Turkey's benefit if AK and Turkey's military leadership could
establish an easier dialogue. In that context, some AK
leaders recognize that Arinc's actions -- designed to
demonstrate not only his support for grassroots interests but
his independence as Speaker from party leader Erdogan and AK
government policies -- were ill-timed. The headscarf flap
not only stimulated angst among the generals, it also handed
military hardliners an issue right at the gate.

8. (C) AK sees itself as representing the aspirations of the
majority of Turks for cleaner and more just governance,
including on social policies. AK also wants to get away from
what it has characterized as an ingrained preference for a
"no solution" approach on Cyprus and other foreign policy
questions. In the latter regard, Turkey seemed to take an
initial step forward on the UN's Cyprus plan because AK
leader Erdogan was willing to take a fresh look at what had
become "policies of the State" in the MFA spokesman's words,
i.e., policies which no government should touch. AK is
rapidly finding out that moving the entrenched interests of
the Establishment is not easy and it remains to be seen
whether AK can forge an active approach on reform, Cyprus,
and other issues of central concern to the U.S. which is
digestable by the military and other elements of the State.


DEUTSCH