AK PARTY DYNAMICS AND U.S. INTERESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 008139

SIPDIS


CENTCOM AND EUCOM: PLEASE PASS TO POLADS AND J-5


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2012
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU, POLITICAL PARTIES
SUBJECT: AK PARTY DYNAMICS AND U.S. INTERESTS

REF: A. ANKARA 7683
B. ANKARA 7682


(U) Classified by Ambassador W. R. Pearson. Reasons: 1.5
(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Justice and Development (AK) Party's Nov. 3
landslide election victory gives us new opportunity to
influence AK leader Erdogan, his inner circle, and huge
parliamentary majority as AK forms the new government -- at
the point of AK's peak policy flexibility and maximum
interest in establishing itself as a legitimate interlocutor
with the USG. End summary.


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The Iron At Its Hottest
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2. (C) The size of AK's election victory is bringing into
sharp focus the extent of change wrought upon the Turkish
political landscape. With a massive legislative majority
(363 of 550 seats) just four seats shy of the two-thirds
needed to amend the constitution, AK controls a Parliament
set to emerge as a key policy decision making node. AK's
legislative weight also means that elected civilians will
have a more unified, and powerful, voice in the National
Security Council (NSC) than has been the case in many years.


3. (C) AK's ability to control the bureaucracy and manage
relations with the military, which is watching AK very
closely (septel) will be influenced by several factors:


-- First, AK's leadership lacks accurate information about
issues of central concern to the U.S. and our policies. Some
in the leadership are aware of this gap. All in the
leadership are convinced that the Turkish bureaucracy will
not keep them well-informed and want steady access to
reliable information. At the same time, sharp rivalries
within Erdogan's inner circle hamper the flow of information
vertically and horizontally.


-- Second, whether they like it or not, Erdogan's advisors
know that maintaining good relations with the U.S. will help
them manage pressures from the Kemalist elements of the
State. At the same time, within the leadership -- and even
more so lower down the hierarchy -- there is limited
familiarity with the American mind and the complexities of
how the U.S. debates and determines its interests.


-- Third, AK's grass roots are distinctly ambivalent,
recognizing that American secularism and freedom give pious
Muslims in the U.S. space they do not yet have in Turkey but
deeply disturbed by what they see as anti-Muslim U.S.
policies toward Palestine and Iraq. On this latter point,
AK's grass roots do not differ from Turkish society at large,
but the feelings are more pronounced.


-- Fourth, while not beholden to Denktas, AK shares
mainstream sensitivities on Cyprus. In this context, AK vice
chairman Mercan has emphasized to us how crucial a steady
U.S.-AK exchange of ideas could be in helping AK's leadership
sell a Cyprus solution, if one emerges, to a wary public.


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What to Do
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4. (C) Given AK's lock on Parliament and approaching decision
points on Cyprus, Iraq, economic policy, and EU relations,
the time to begin a serious dialogue on specific, substantive
issues is now. On Nov. 7 we opened that dialoge when the
Amassador informed Erdogan of Embassy's willingness to engage
in such a dialogue with him and other senior AK officials, as
they deemed useful. In this transition period, we will seek
every opportunity to engage with key AK officials. We think
there is an opportunity to influence the full circle of
Erdogan advisors at a point of (1) their peak openness and
intellectual and policy flexibility, i.e., before they become
captives of a bureaucracy that is instinctively defensive and
unimaginative; and (2) their maximum interest in establishing
themselves as serious interlocutors.
PEARSON