Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02AMMAN5912
2002-10-10 13:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

DEFUSING JORDAN'S GROWING FEAR OF TRANSFER

Tags:  PREL KPAL IS IZ JO MEPP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005912 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA A/S BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2012
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IZ JO MEPP
SUBJECT: DEFUSING JORDAN'S GROWING FEAR OF TRANSFER


Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005912

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA A/S BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2012
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IZ JO MEPP
SUBJECT: DEFUSING JORDAN'S GROWING FEAR OF TRANSFER


Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Over the past few weeks, many Jordanians of all
political stripes have become deeply afraid that Israel --
and specifically PM Sharon personally -- will exploit a
U.S. attack on Iraq to forcibly transfer large numbers of
Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. Senior
officials, media personalities, academicians, and
average Jordanians alike have raised -- on occasions
too numerous to count -- this possibility with us.


2. (C) FonMin Muasher raised his growing concern about
transfer to the Ambassador recently, something he said he
never imagined he could consider a realistic possibility
even a few weeks ago. He said he raised his concerns
directly with the Israelis three weeks ago in the U.S.
and received verbal assurances. His alarm has risen
precisely because he asked that the Israelis state these
assurances publicly and they have not. Professor Ibrihim
Badran, Assistant President of Philadelphia University,
told PolOff October 1 that transfer had become a dominant
topic of discussion on campus: "People are asking how can
the U.S. be totally insensitive to what hurts Jordan,
endangers Jordan? It is difficult to understand."
Abdulkarim Abulhaija, Director-General of the GOJ's
Department of Palestinian Affairs told Refcoord
October 9 that "everyone believes this is a credible fear
because we see the U.S. giving Israel the green light
to do whatever it wants."


3. (C) The Jordanian press has both fed and reflected
these fears. On September 29, Sa'ad Kan'an stated in an
editorial in Al-Arab Al-Yawm "The transfer is coming
. . . this, simply put, is Sharon's strategy." On
September 30, Uraib al-Rantawi, prominent columnist,
wrote in Al-Dustour "for us in Jordan, the word
"transfer" evokes the specter of the conspiracy that aims
against the whole nation and places the danger (to
Jordan) on an existential level." And, on October 1,
Rakan Al-Majali echoed the same fear that "Israel
will exploit the strike against Iraq to carry out
the transfer, which has long been a constant dream of
Ariel Sharon." Reflecting a fear held by some East
Bank Jordanians, Abdullah Abu Romman, Editor of the
East Bank Nationalist Al-Mira'a, told IO that the chaos
of war with Iraq will open the way for Sharon to flood
Jordan "once and for all" with Palestinians, bringing
about the end of the traditional East Bank Hashemite
order.


4. (C) In our estimation, a scenario leading to
mass expulsion seems remote at best, and we have sought
to reassure our Jordanian interlocutors on this score.
Nevertheless, whether grounded in logical analysis or
simple emotion, the fear Jordanians are expressing to
us is real. For them, "transfer" would constitute the
worst aspect of a host of calamities (including but
not limited to Iraqi refugees coming from the east,
a cut off of oil, economic dislocation, domestic unrest,
WMD-tipped SCUDS shot down over Amman, and terrorist
attacks) they imagine befalling the Kingdom in the
wake of U.S. military operations against Saddam.
Relief agency, UN and GOJ officials all note that no
one in Jordan would be physically or financially
able to deal with a new influx of Palestinians.


5. (C) To a large degree, Jordanian fears about the
consequences of a military conflict between the U.S.
and Iraq stem from a profound sense of powerlessness.
They believe they can do little to influence the
decisions of Saddam Hussein, Ariel Sharon, or, for
that matter, President Bush, and at the same time are
more convinced than ever that Jordan, in the end,
will suffer the most.


6. (C) While it is impossible for the U.S. to address
fully all aspects of Jordan's pre-war jitters, we
believe there are steps the U.S. can take to dampen
these fears on the issue of transfer. We believe a
private message to the Israelis strongly urging
them to state clearly that they have no intention
of expelling Palestinians to Jordan would be
extremely helpful. For our part, we should emphasize
publicly, and on the record, our national interest
in Jordan's stability and our rejection of actions
by any party that could compromise that stability.


7. (C) Prime Minister Sharon will be visiting
Washington in the near future. We hope that an
appropriate opportunity can be found to raise
this issue with him.
GNEHM