Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02AMMAN5527
2002-09-25 14:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

HAMZA MANSOUR AND THE IAF/MB: MODERATE LEADERSHIP

Tags:  PGOV PREL JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 005527

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL JO
SUBJECT: HAMZA MANSOUR AND THE IAF/MB: MODERATE LEADERSHIP
STRETCHED BETWEEN ITS FOLLOWING AND THE GOJ

REF: AMMAN 04236

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM. REASONS: 1.5 (b) and (d).

1 (C) SUMMARY. Since his July 17 meeting with R Special
Coordinator Christopher Ross (reftel),Islamic Action Front
Secretary General Sheikh Hamza Mansour has endured harsh

SIPDIS
criticism from those in and around the IAF/Muslim Brotherhood
for "speaking with the enemy." Mansour's recent appearances
and press interviews, combined with information from embassy
sources, indicate that he is making an effort to remain in
line (at least publicly) with the more radical views of the
rank and file MB membership. His position appears to be
representative of the MB leadership's increasingly
uncomfortable relationship with the more militant MB
membership. There are also rumors of a power struggle within
the "moderate" leadership of the MB, and Mansour may be
attempting to assure his internal leadership position by
maintaining his support from the rank and file. END SUMMARY.

--------------
FALLOUT FROM MEETING WITH ROSS
--------------


2. (C) On July 17 Ambassador Ross met with Mansour and two
other Islamic Action Front leaders (reftel). In recent
memory, Mansour has been the only member of the IAF
leadership to meet with embassy officials. Despite his
public invectives against the USG, Mansour has consistently
affirmed the value of dialogue between the USG and the MB.
In the face of harsh criticism in the local media by MB
commentators, Mansour has been publicly unapologetic for
"meeting with the enemy behind the back of the GOJ."


3. (C) Notwithstanding his defense of the July 17 meeting
with USG officials, Mansour spoke at a rally at the MB center
in early August. According to London based Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat, Mansour told the crowd that the "operation" (i.e.
suicide bombing) against the Hebrew University (which killed
eight, including four AMCITS) cost USD 50,000 and that such
large costs necessitate giving large financial aid to the
Palestinian people to carry out similar operations in the
future. (Note: The article did not directly quote Mansour,
but paraphrased him. Post has had no contact with Mansour
since his July 17 meeting with Ambassador Ross, and has

therefore not been able to express outrage at such comments
directly or get his version of what was actually said).

--------------
"MANSOUR DIDN'T MEAN IT"
--------------


4. (C) On August 18, poloff met with Ibrahim Gharaibeh
(strictly protect) an East Banker and former member of the
MB. Gharaibeh, currently in a master's degree program that
focuses on elderly care, said that he left the MB because it
"stopped focusing on charity and became a movement purely
concerned with politics." According to Gharaibeh, the MB
leadership is "very smart, and wiser than its following," and
is pursuing a (comment: relatively) moderate course on
domestic and foreign politics. Gharaibeh said that, within
the leadership, Mansour is more moderate than most. In order
to keep his support among the ranks of the MB however, he
makes speeches "on a hot level," that feed the rank and
file's appetite for invective against the USG. In the end,
according to Gharaibeh, Mansour "doesn't always mean" what he
is saying publicly. "If the moderate leaders spoke their
true thoughts to the average MB member, they would be
burned," Gharaibeh said.


5. (C) Gharaibeh said the current MB leadership has adopted
short-term strategies to maintain control of the organization
in the face of formidable extremist sentiment within the MB.
Privately, moderates are debating the merits and morality of
suicide bombings. Publicly, they are lambasting the USG and
supporting "martyrdom" operations against Israel. While
Gharaibeh does not believe that the moderates, as a group,
are in serious danger of losing control of the MB, he does
believe that some "moderates" are tarring others with the
pro-USG brush in an attempt to gain rank and file support.
This, he says, is the kind of dynamic that creates an
environment in which Mansour publicly praises the Hebrew
University attack.

--------------
MB LEADERSHIP'S LONG-STANDING COOPERATION
WITH GOJ BECOMING TOO HEAVY A BURDEN?
--------------


6. (C) On September 22 poloff met with human rights
advocate Sa'eda Kilani. (Note: although Kilani is a human
rights advocate, her family is well-connected within the
judiciary and security services here). Kilani's commentary
on Mansour echoed that of Gharaibeh's. "The IAF and MB
leadership have cooperated with the government regarding
extremists, such as Ba'athists and communists, for decades,
but the (IAF/MB) leadership is stressed right now."

7. (C) One root cause of this "stress" Kilani noted, is the
lack of channels through which the MB leadership can get out
its message. "Right now, the only political organizations
left are the professional associations," Kilani said, "and
that is not enough. The opposition are left more frustrated
and are losing faith in their leaders."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) The MB leadership's inner-workings are not always
easy to understand, but the recent activity by Mansour seems
to indicate that the "moderate" leadership of the MB/IAF is,
at the least, having difficulty managing its increasingly
frustrated following.
GNEHM