FORMER IRAQI OIL MINISTER SAYS SADDAM IS VULNERABLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004589

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2012
TAGS: PREL XF IZ JO
SUBJECT: FORMER IRAQI OIL MINISTER SAYS SADDAM IS VULNERABLE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM. REASONS 1.5 (B,D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Former Iraqi Oil Minister Issam Chalabi told visiting
SFRC Staffer Puneet Talwar August 12 that Saddam's hold is
fragile, that most Iraqis believe the U.S. is serious about
regime change "this time," and that they "want to see Saddam
gone, preferably while they are asleep." Saddam will use the
fear of chaos to try to keep his populace quiet, and the fear
of mass casualties from potential WMD strikes to keep the
U.S. from launching operations. Given heightened regional
tensions and low U.S. credibility stemming from the ongoing
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, regime change by covert means
would be far preferable to a more conventional approach
requiring a longer, and more visible, U.S. military build-up,
according to Chalabi.


2. (C) Turning to "the day after," Chalabi argued that the
Iraqi army should focus on providing order, that the
on-the-ground U.S. presence should be minimized, and that a
provisional government made up of technocrats, not military
men, should be put in place. U.S. security guarantees will
be essential in allaying Iraqi fears of possible future
Iranian or Turkish ambitions. Most Iraqis, he stated,
understand that their future is dependent on good relations
with the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Iraq
could rebuild itself "within five years" by boosting oil
production to six million barrels per day, along with debt
and loan forgiveness. If the U.S. does not act this time,
Chalabi cautioned, many Iraqis will give up the future once
and for all, and Saddam will emerge stronger than ever. End
summary.


3. (C) Visiting SFRC Staffer Puneet Talwar, accompanied by
Poloff, met former Iraqi Oil Minister Issam Chalabi August

12. Chalabi, who was Oil Minister from March 1987 to October
1990, has been resident in Amman since 1993. He currently is
an oil industry consultant.

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A Fragile Regime Dependent on Fear of Chaos
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4. (C) Chalabi began by arguing that, behind all the bluster,
Saddam's regime is fragile. The regime, he said, seeks to
keep its own populace quiet and loyal, and the U.S. at bay,
by heightening fears of the chaos and destruction that could
ensue should military operations commence. Looking back to
1991, Chalabi said "he (Saddam) was spreading rumors of
chaos, rumors that the intelligence services were behind.
People didn't rally around Saddam because they loved him.
They did so because they were scared." Although not
minimizing the potential for Saddam to use WMD against U.S.
forces, Israel, or his own people, he said that the regime
will seek to use those fears as a deterrent against threats
from within or without.

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But Once It Cracks, It will Fall
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5. (C) That strategy notwithstanding, Chalabi said he
believes that once an operation to change the regime begins
"Saddam will not be there for long. What you need to do is
separate Saddam from the people, block his lines of
communication to the Special Republican Guards, and then
flood the airwaves with your message. If the people are
convinced that Saddam has fled or is cornered, everybody will
run after themselves. Iraqis think you are serious now and
most want to see Saddam go, preferably while they are asleep."

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Covert is the Way to Go
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6. (C) Chalabi offered that a quick, precise, covert action
would be far preferable to a more conventional military
approach for a number of reasons. First, U.S. credibility in
the region is at a very low point as a result of the ongoing
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thus making the pre-positioning
of large numbers of U.S. troops and material difficult.
Second, Saddam would, with some success, paint a conventional
U.S. military assault as "an invasion force, not a liberation
force." This would result in greater, and better
coordinated, Iraqi resistance. Finally, a large
on-the-ground U.S. presence "would begin to look like an
occupying force after a while. You don't want this."

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The First Day After: An Immediate Need for Order and Calm,
And U.S. Security Guarantees
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7. (C) In this immediate "day after" environment, it will be
critical, Chalabi argued, that the Iraqi people be reassured
that order and calm will prevail and the country will not
fall into chaos. The Iraqi Army should focus on this task,
not overall governance, Chalabi said. Rather than military
rule, "a provisional government of technocrats should be
installed." (Note: Chalabi declined to identify anyone
specifically who should be included in such a government, and
recognized the difficulties of such a task. In his view "the
Iraqi opposition outside the country has no real constituency
and there is no Karzai. Saddam has gotten rid of anybody who
even had that potential." Chalabi also dismissed the notion
that there is any significant nostalgia for restoration of
Hashemite rule either.)


8. (C) In addition to internal order, Iraqis will also want
immediate reassurance that their national sovereignty will be
protected: "People understand that their future lies with the
West in general, and the U.S. in particular. You (i.e. the
U.S.) don't need to be there physically, but they need to
know that you will support them against Iranian or Turkish
ambitions."

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Iraqis Must Think of Themselves as Iraqis First
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9. (C) Peering further down the road at a post-Saddam Iraq of
the future, Chalabi said that "the question of federalism
needs to be looked at closely." Five to seven regional
governments would be feasible, he offered, including one for
the Kurdish areas. That said, for the most part these
divisions should not fall along ethnic lines: "People need to
think of themselves as Iraqis first." Future leaders should
work to include members from all groups in their governments,
but "somebody should not be hired because he's a Kurd or a
Shiite, or whatever. To follow the Lebanese model would make
matters worse and would be a constant source of instability
for years to come."

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Reconstruction: Oil and a Bit of Debt Forgiveness
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10. (C) Turning to the longer term aspects of Iraqi
reconstruction, Chalabi struck a very positive chord,
predicting that, under the proper conditions, the country
"could rebuild itself in five years." Iraq, Chalabi said,
"could go to 6 million barrels per day easily. I had that
plan in 1990." Increased petroleum revenues, along with
forgiveness of some Iraqi debts and loans, would hasten
Iraq's reintegration into the international community.

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It's Now or Never
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11. (C) As the meeting drew to a close, Chalabi made clear
that, in his view, the time had come for the U.S. to rid Iraq
of Saddam. If that does not happen, and the U.S. continues
with a policy of containment, "we will all feel disheartened,
disenchanted, and that there is no hope for our country.
People will believe that Saddam really does have some special
power and that he is here for good. There should be an
ultimatum from the Security Council about the return of the
inspectors. When they go back in, I'm sure they will find
things Iraq should not have. You need to have the support of
the international community, and you need to deal with this
problem now, before new (internal) problems arise in Saudi
Arabia or Kuwait and make the prospect of regime change in
Iraq even more complicated."
Gnehm