IRAQ AND THE JORDANIAN POPULACE'S MOOD DOMINATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004145

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL JO
SUBJECT: IRAQ AND THE JORDANIAN POPULACE'S MOOD DOMINATE
AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL ON FORMER PM MUDAR BADRAN

REF: AMMAN 03620

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM REASONS: 1.5 (B) and (D)

1.(C) SUMMARY. On July 23 Ambassador paid a courtesy call on
former PM Mudar Badran at his residence in Abdoun. The
substantive issues dominating the meeting were Iraq, the
Jordanian economy, the ongoing violence in the West Bank, and
the linkage between the three. Badran was clear in his
opinion that, in the face of the economic conditions here and
the ongoing violence in the West Bank, any effort by the US
military to remove Saddam Hussein could dangerously enrage
the Jordanian populace. In this context, Badran made
references to the events of 1970 and the potential for such
instability to be revisited. Badran is not connected in any
way with the current regime in Jordan and is neither
consulted nor informed by the GOJ with regard to current
events. That said, his long view of local and regional
history make his opinions notable. END SUMMARY

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BACKGROUND
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2. (SBU) Mudar Badran is an East Banker whose government
service spanned from 1958 (when he began his career as a
legal adviser to the Jordanian Armed Forces) to 1991, when he
completed his fourth stint as PM. Among other positions, he
was Director of the General Intelligence Directorate from
1968 to 1970. Between 1976 and 1991, Badran was PM for a
total of eight years, often serving concurrently as Minister
of Foreign Affairs and/or Defense. In 1991 he was appointed
a member of the Senate.

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THE ECONOMY, THE WEST BANK AND IRAQ: THIS IS NOT 1991
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3. (C) Following pleasantries, Badran jumped to the issue of
Iraq. He contrasted the current domestic situation in Jordan
vis a vis 1991, identifying poverty and the local perception
of a stagnant economy as the key issues currently facing the
GOJ. When he was PM in 1991, poverty was not rampant; there
was hope, and expectations, for a better economy. Badran
pointed out that this is not the case today, as Jordanians
are increasingly disenchanted, and the GOJ is slipping
towards an adversarial posture with the Jordanian populace.
In 1991, he said, things between the GOJ and the people were
not "personal". Now, increasingly, they are. After
illustrating this contrast, Badran commented that the
domestic situations in Egypt and Saudi Arabia were, in his
opinion, even more tenuous, largely because those regimes'
relationships with the USG were irritating their respective
populaces.


4. (C) Badran said that most Jordanians do not like Saddam
Hussein and recognize him as an unjust ruler. However, the
perception among Jordanians is that the economy will suffer
from a USG strike against Iraq, putting into jeopardy their
oil supply. Further, Jordanian-Palestinians in particular
view the 12 year isolation of Iraq, at the hand of the USG,
as unjust. The strength of Saddam, Badran said, is his
adversarial relationship with the US; in the third world,
leaders often need to be able to point a finger at an outside
force in order to survive. Badran said that Saddam has,
unfortunately, been provided with this by the USG. The Iraqi
people, and many Arabs in the region, Badran asserted, hold
the USG responsible for everything and anything bad that
happens in Iraq.


5. (C) Ambassador asked Badran what would happen in Jordan
if the USG did move against the Iraqi regime. Badran said
that there is much uncertainty, and this in itself is not
good. He cautioned that the security forces and
infrastructure surrounding Saddam were in his direct control
and "complex". Within Jordan, Badran said that he is
convinced that the GOJ is "not at all able to face this
problem". Ambassador asked if Badran believed that, in a
worst case scenario, the GOJ would be able to maintain
domestic stability. Badran replied, "I doubt it". The
economy is a very serious issue now, Badran continued. He
mentioned his experience as GID Director during Black
September in 1970, and salted the discussion with some
allusions to the domestic conditions at that time. Note:
Badran did not discuss the potential benefits that a
Saddam-free region could have in creating greater economic
opportunities in Jordan.

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"WHAT HAPPENED TO US"?
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6. (C) Badran was not pleased with some of the recent
tactics of the current GOJ regime. He became visibly upset
as he discussed the recent case of Toujan Faisal (reftel).
"What happened to us"?, he asked, referring presumably to the
GOJ. The current PM is a friend, Badran said, "but what is
the government doing chasing down a former Member of
Parliament because she criticized it"? This had only made
her allegations more visible, he said. He concluded that
previous regimes would not have wasted their time with such
matters.

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COMMENT
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7 (C) Badran is an elderly former PM, disconnected from the
current regime. This may well color his attitudes and
appraisals. However, he was directly involved in the GOJ
leadership from 1970 through the Gulf War, and with this
experience is able to offer a valuable perspective. His
major point: pessimism over limited economic opportunities
for the average Jordanian and the ongoing violence across the
river will add fuel to an angry popular rejection of any move
against Iraq. He sees this as potentially a genuine
challenge to the security forces ability to keep order in the
event of a crises with Iraq.

Gnehm