Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02AMMAN3894
2002-07-16 08:22:00
SECRET
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

JORDAN'S IRAQ JITTERS

Tags:  PREL ETTC EPET IZ JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003894 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2012
TAGS: PREL ETTC EPET IZ JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S IRAQ JITTERS

REF: (A) AMMAN JO 3705 (B) AMMAN 1782

Classified By: Ambassador Edward Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003894

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2012
TAGS: PREL ETTC EPET IZ JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S IRAQ JITTERS

REF: (A) AMMAN JO 3705 (B) AMMAN 1782

Classified By: Ambassador Edward Gnehm. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) Repeated public statements by Jordanian FM Muasher and
PM Abul Ragheb since July 10 denying that Jordan will be used
as a "launching pad" for U.S. military operations against
Iraq shed light on GOJ sensitivity to its vulnerabilities
vis-a-vis Baghdad. Similarly, on July 13, the GOJ issued a
clear statement distancing itself from former Crown Prince
Hassan's participation at a gathering of Iraqi Oppositionists
in London this past weekend. There may also have been a
political angle to the Jordanians' reluctance to put a stop
to oil smuggling through the Port of Aqaba, at least to the
extent that it was politically easier to begin than to end
the smuggling. With concern about the stalled MEPP as a
backdrop, the GOJ appears to be recalibrating its familiar
policy of placating the Iraqis and demonstrating to the
Jordanian street a degree of independence from domestically
unpopular U.S. policies. To calm the immediate uproar, we
recommend that the Department find an appropriate opportunity
to say that we have not asked Jordan to take part in any new
cooperative military activities beyond our routine
military-to-military relationship. End Summary.

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Jordan's Vulnerabilities
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2. (C) As senior GOJ officials from the King down routinely
stress to visitors, the government is extremely nervous about
the potential domestic repercussions of any visible U.S.
preparations for a military confrontation with Iraq, or of
perceived Jordanian participation/collaboration in such
preparations. The reasons for this concern are familiar:

Oil: Through its oil/barter arrangements, Jordan obtains
all of its oil from Iraq at below world market prices. A cut
off of Iraqi oil before, during or after U.S. military action
could have potentially devastating consequences for Jordan's
economy.

MEPP: Without much difficulty, the Iraqis could step up
the drumbeat of radical pronouncements on the MEPP, with
disruptive consequences for Jordan. At its most extreme,
this could turn into a campaign to destabilize Jordan by

labeling the GOJ a lackey of the U.S. in the "suppression" of
the Palestinian Intifada -- a hot button issue for most of
the Jordanian population. As long as average Jordanians view
the GOJ as weak on support for the Palestinians, the
government will see itself as vulnerable to pressure from
Iraq (and other radical states).


3. (C) Periodically, events (or the Iraqis themselves) remind
the Jordanians that Iraq has the power to do a great deal of
mischief if it chooses. The vulnerabilities noted above are
realities that the GOJ keeps in mind as it seeks to protect
its national interests in the region's political rapids.
Indirectly, they also help explain the GOJ's recent public
statements and other policy stances.

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Leaks Generate Frequent Jordanian Denials
--------------


4. (U) Over the past week, senior Jordanian officials have
gone out of their way to refute the proposition -- sourced
by the press to U.S. officials -- that Jordan will be used as
a U.S. "launching pad" for future military operations against
Iraq. In interviews with local, regional, and international
media (including the NYTimes on July 10),and most recently
at the conclusion of the Arab League Follow-Up Committee
meeting in Cairo on July 12, FM Muasher "categorically denied
any plans between Jordan and the United States in this
regard." PM Ali Abul Ragheb, in a July 11 Press Conference
(given prominent coverage in the local pro-government media),
echoed and amplified the message: "Jordan does not allow and
will not allow in the future its territory and airspace to be
used to interfere in the affairs of any other Arab country,
particularly fraternal Iraq."


5. (U) Both the FM and PM in their public statements have
also contended that there are "no U.S. troops on Jordanian
soil," and the local press reported that FM Muasher told the
Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan that he could "visit any military
base at any time to personally verify the veracity of the
Jordanian statements." A tour is being arranged for Azraq
AFB.


6. (S) The Ambassador, in meetings July 10 and 11, told both
Muasher and Abul Ragheb that their statements denying any
U.S.troop presence in Jordan were neither factually correct
(given our long-standing training and exercise program) nor
sustainable. Muasher's response was that this problem began
because "someone in the Pentagon had leaked materials on
preparations for an assault on Iraq. Look, this puts us in a
very difficult position. I'm being called by the New York
Times and others on this. We have no choice but to say what
we are saying."

-------------- --------------
Prince Hassan's London Appearance Adds to the Story
-------------- --------------


7. (U) Taking a similar tack, the GOJ July 13 delivered a
clear public message that former Crown Prince Hassan's
participation at the London gathering of Iraqi Oppositionists
was "a personal act . . and does not represent official
policy." Minister of State for Political Affairs, Mohammed
Adwan, in a statement carried by the official Petra News
Agency, and given prominent above-the-fold coverage in the
July 14 local press, stated "We were surprised at the
participation, which neither the leadership nor the
government had any prior knowledge of, and which does not
conform to the principled Jordanian stand on brotherly Iraq."

--------------
Humanitarian Flights and Oil Smuggling
--------------


8. (S) The barrage of public statements by senior GOJ
officials this past week are not the only evidence of the
wary "neighborliness" the GOJ seeks to maintain with Iraq.
This policy often has an overtly economic or commercial
component. Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ) has continued its
humanitarian flights from Amman to Baghdad at about 4-5 per
week. This represents a small downward trend in flight
frequency since the Embassy demarched the GOJ in mid-June
that RJ's Baghdad flights threatened to become a regular
commercial transaction and needed to be scaled back. (The
DCM raised this issue again with the FM's office on July 15
and pressed for further and faster reductions.)


9. (C) Similarly, after almost a month's hiatus, there was a
renewed attempt to smuggle illegal Iraqi oil from the
Jordanian port of Aqaba (ref a) at the beginning of July.
While this case appears to have been stopped successfully, it
suggests the allurements to fudging policy (and the truth)
that Iraq offers Jordanian officials. We can only assume
that some Jordanians, whether officials or private citizens,
have benefited from the smuggling that has taken place. The
scheme inevitably created a political dynamic, however, and
it was no doubt easier to start the exercise than to stop it.

--------------
Comment and Recommendation
--------------


10. (S) The actions and statements outlined above bear
careful watching, but we know from contacts with the King and
other senior officials that they do not represent any
fundamental change in Jordanian policy. They would love to
see Saddam go, but in the meantime they must live next to
him. They are the latest developments in the long-continued
balancing act that Jordan must carry out to protect its
interests. The perceived deadlock in the MEPP (current
diplomatic activities notwithstanding),the disappointment,
frustration and anger many Jordanians feel regarding the
plight of the Palestinians in the face of Israeli
reoccupation, and the continued economic difficulties Jordan
faces as a result of the Intifada and the global economic
slowdown heighten the GOJ's perception that on issues
relating to Iraq, it has to tread very carefully. We will
see a similar pattern whenever U.S.-Iraq confrontation
intensifies.


11. (S) Embassy Recommendation: To deal with the immediate
irritant on Iraq -- the stories reportedly tying Jordan to
U.S. military preparations against Saddam Hussein -- we
recommend that the Department find an opportunity to say that
we have not approached the Jordanians with requests for
military cooperation beyond our routine military-to-military
contacts.
Gnehm